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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Political

particulanstic legislation

economic

have always had an easy time
explaining the passage of

scientists

-

legislation that confers benefits

on

localities or particular

sectors at the expense of the entire
nation such as local construction
projects or

subsidies for particular mdustnes.

time explaining, however,
direct costs

on

is

localities or partieular

legislation exist; military bases

m

political scientists

have not had such an easy

legislation that does the opposite

benefit such as deficit reduction.

eliminated

What

economic sectors

-

in favor

Despite this difficulty,

have been closed, special

legislation that

imposes

of some general, diffuse

many examples of

this type

interest tax loopholes

of

have been

favor of general tax rate reduction, targeted tax
increases and spending cuts

have been approved affecting a variety of programs and
regions
reduction, national nuclear waste sites have been chosen,
and

despite the fact that

it

was an agreement

favor of deficit

in

NAFTA

was adopted

ended a number of subsidies and regulations

that

protecting particular industries in favor of the general goal of promoting free
trade.
In

The Logic of Congressional Action, R. Douglas Arnold seeks

the literature

by developing a theory of congressional policymaking

triumph of any one of three competing

interests

-

and

strategies

of modification

-

fill

this

-

strategies

gap

in

that “allows for the

general, group, or geographic.”'

argues there are generally three types of strategies

strategies,

to

Arnold

of persuasion, procedural

available to those attempting to build winning

coalitions in the legislative process but significantly, he points out that

1

it

is

procedural

strategies that “are

most

when

attractive

attentive or inattentive publics.”^

legislators decide to

impose costs on

cither

Procedural strategies are designed
to alter the political

calculus confronting individual
legislators on particular votes
by either strengthening or

weakening the causal chain between
utilizing

procedural

strategies

legislator action

such as a closed

and policy

rule,

omnibus

effects.

legislation,

legislation in secrecy, or delegating
decisions to an agency, individual

Congress can

free

Thus, by

writing

members of

themselves from more parochial concerns
and can vote

to support

general, late-order benefits while
imposing particularistic, early-order costs
on attentive
publics.^

Processes

Indeed, in her most recent book,
U,wr,l,oclo.x Lawmaking:
in the U.S.

become so widespread

textbook understanding of

it.

Legislative

Congress, Barbara Sinclair points out that the
use of these special

types of procedures has

model has replaced

New

how

a bill

in the

becomes a law

passage of major legislation that our
is

now

dated.

She adds, “no

single

Variety, not uniformity, characterizes the
contemporary legislative

process.

What
procedures

'

2

Sinclair does not address in her detailed account of the
use of “unorthodox”

in the legislative process,

however,

R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action,

1

is

the increasing use of what

(New Haven: Yale

I

call “extra-

University Press, 1990),

5.

16.

^

I have borrowed the descriptions “general, late-order”
and “particularistic, early-order” from Arnold, The
Logic of Congressional Action. The terms are meant to suggest continua on which various benefits and
costs may be placed. General benefits are those shared equally by all citizens and they are juxtaposed with

particularistic benefits that are shared

by

certain people based

delineated by age, sex, race, ethnicity, hobby, occupation,

etc.

on

their inclusion in

some

fixed group

Early-order benefits and costs are those that

are more quickly and visibly the result of some action taken by government. Thus, the particular policies
being discussed are those that impose costs on a concentrated group in the short term in order to realize

some

benefit for a large, diffuse public later on.

Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking:

New Legislative Processes

D.C.; Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1997), 217.

2

in the U.S.

Congress (Washington,

congressional”

unorthodox

legislative

procedures.

If

what

had

previously

been

closed rules, the use of
omnibus legislative vehicles,
post-committee

-

adjustments to legislation, the
avoidance of eomniittees altogether
legislating

considered

in

conference

-

has become the

new orthodoxy,

procedures are those that formally
delegate the power

in legislating,

and

new unorthodox

the

to craft policy alternatives
to

institutions other than Congress.^

^fining Ext ra-Congressional

Legislative Procedure.^

Extra-congressional legislative procedures are
procedures adopted by Congress
that

grant formal power to

outside

craft the specifics

of Congress and,

congressional approval.

in

some

of particularistic costs

cases,

to

to

ad hoc institutions

impose those costs without

explicit

Examples of these extra-congressional procedures include

the

base-closure procedures of the late 1980s and early
1990s, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
deficit

control procedure, the recent

line-item veto procedure,

and

fast

track trade

agreement approval procedures.

These procedures
procedures

Some
Politics

is

all

have several characteristics

in

common.

First,

each of these

an ad-hoc response to congressional difficulty in dealing with a particular

evidence of the “newness” of these procedures is suggested by additions to Gary C. Jacobson, The
of Congressional Elections, 4“’ ed. (New York: Longman, 1997), chapter 7. In a chapter on the

relationship between congressional elections and the internal politics of Congress, Jacobson argues that
the
pursuit of reelection does not necessarily translate into the ability to legislate in the national interest. The
politics

of Congress, he suggests,

different sections.

Among

“Symbolism.” In the

new

section called

in favor

third

“Doing

of the public

is

characterized by a host of diseases which Jacobson discusses in

these sections are “Particularism,” “Serving the Organized,” “Immobility,” and

and fourth editions, published
the Right Thing,” in

interest at the

in 1993 and 1997, respectively, Jacobson adds a
which he points out that sometimes Congress does legislate

expense of particular

the fast track process and the base-closure

commission

interests.

as his

Importantly, for our purposes, he uses

examples of “doing the

right thing.” In a

puzzling passage, Jacobson argues, “instances of this sort are the exception rather than the mle, but they are

by no means rare” (192).

3

policy problem at a particular
for instance,

was designed

procedures utilized

in the

particular trade negotiation

moment

m

time.

The Gramm-Rtidman-Hollings
procedure,

to reach specific deficit
targets in specific years.

passage of

and no

enhanced rescission authonfy

NAFTA

other.

The

Fas. track

were designed and approved

for this

line-item veto procedure,
which granted

to the president, could only

be used on appropriations and
a

very limited number of tax
provisions and. more importantly,
was only granted
certain

m

number of years.

the late 1990s.

I.

was created

to deal with the

Given the tension President Clinton’s
rescissions have

prospect of budget surpluses in the
near future, and the

down

the

problem of pork-barrel

mechanism

fact that the

as violating the separation of
powers,

enhanced rescission authority

will

legislation

created, the

Supreme Court

is

it

for a

struck

highly unlikely the

be renewed. Finally, the base-closure
procedures were

authorized only for specific rounds of base
closures in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995
Significantly, unlike

when Congress

guide deliberations in one of

its

creates an agency, a

chambers, these procedures

Not one of these procedures remains

limitation.^

was adopted within

new

in use

law, or even a

all

fact that

each

the last 15 years.

package of particularistic cuts

all

grant formal authority

to an institution outside Congress,

whether

it

a bi-partisan commission, the president, an agency, or a particular agency
official.

^

It is

true that

to

some temporal

today despite the

Second, these extra-congressional legislative procedures
to design a

contain

new mle

many times

the legislative language in a law, in the authorization of an agency, or

to guide legislative deliberations contains a so-called “sunset provision” that effectively

new

be

For

rules

makes them ad-hoc

institutions as well. There still remains a difference between these cases and extra-congressional
procedures, however. Extra-congressional procedures are designed for very specific rounds of policy
effects.

The base-closure commission

even agencies

existed only to

that are created with sunset provisions

come up with

four

lists

of bases.

have comparatively wide

actions up to the date prescribed in the legislation.

4

On

the other hand,

latitude to carry out their

example. Congress delegated
power

Commission

to

draw up

a

Pentagon and the president

l.st

to

the Defense Base Closure
and

to

of bases to be closed or realigned
and empowered the

implement the recommendations unless
Congress passed a

joint resolution to disapprove
the

list.

A

wide variety of authors have made the
mistake

of lumping the base closure commission

into the

same category

such as the Greenspan Commission
on Social Security

commissions and task forces have been
variety of purposes.

One

Realignment Commission from the

political clout.

even

to force

It

as other

in the early

rest,

however,

did not have the formal

to

1980s.’

Indeed,

is its

Base Closure and

statutory authority to frame and

While Greenspan’s commission had infomial

alternative.

Congress or the President

commissions

utilized throughout the twentieth
century for a

characteristic that distinguishes the
Defense

implement a particular policy

Rcahgnment

power

consider

to

implement

its

recommendations.

its

recommendations or

Each of these procedures involved some kind of formal
delegation of authority
stmilar to the base-closure commission.

The

line-item veto gave the president formal

authority to cancel individual appropriations.

Fast track procedures provided fomial

power

to the president to negotiate a trade

consider without amendments.

power

to

0MB

deficit targets

to

^

that

Congress would be obliged

to

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law delegated fomial

impose automatic cuts

in

most government programs and agencies

if

were not met.

Finally, each

least the

agreement

of these extra-congressional procedures

appearance of legislators being kept

at

is

designed to provide

an arm’s length distance from the creation

See for instance, George Hager and Eric Pianin, “Bipartisan Buyers Beware,” The Washington Post

National Weekly Edition, December 2-8, 1996, 21-2.

5

at

of the
the

final

poHcy product while

chosen

pohey

st.ll at leas,

alternative.'

allowing

Legislators

leg, slaters the

could

stop

sequesters from taking effect, they
could stop the base closure

NAFTA

option to d.sapprovc

GrantuvRudman-Hollings
list

in toto, they

could stop

from being implemented, and
they could override the
president’s decision

rescind funds, but they could not
alter the substance of these
policies

at

to

the margins.

Perhaps more importantly, when any
of these policy alternatives were
enacted, no
single legislator could be held
accountable as the author of a particular
policy effect.

was

the base-closure

commission

that

drew up the

procedure even afforded legislators an
opportunity
It

was

the entire Congress that

Rudman-Hollmgs law and
was

it

of bases

to

be closed, and the

go on the record opposing the

would presumably miss

was

who was

the president

to

list

a deficit target under the

list.

Gramm-

OMB that would initiate the automatic spending cuts.

responsible

for

line-item

It

It

veto cuts and the particular

provisions of NAFTA. In short, individual legislators
were provided extraordinary causal
distance from the negative policy effects of particularistic
pain.

Extra-Congressiona Le.gislative Procedures and the Legislative Process
l

Though Arnold does suggest
where

coalition leaders seek to

general benefit, he provides

between

alternative

In this sense,

it

is

little

procedural

that procedural strategies are preferable in cases

make

cuts in particularistic benefits in favor of

in the

way of guidance on how

strategies.

some

coalition leaders choose

The use of these extra-congressional

actually quite surprising that Congress does not utilize these extra-congressional

procedures more often.

If

Arnold

is

more worried about avoiding
of why members would
question of why they don’t do it more often.

correct in arguing that legislators are

blame than they

are with claiming credit, the focus

voluntarily hand

power and authority away

to a

is

shifted

6

from

a question

procedures

is still

examples of

the exception rather than the
rule.

their use,

problems, that

it

has

and they are being

become important

Nevertheless, there are enough

utilized to address sufficiently
similar policy

to ask

why,

some

in

internal congressional procedures
Sinclair considers to

cases. Congress uses Ihe

be the new orthodoxy and why,

in

Other cases, Congress uses these
extra-congressional procedures.^
It

Why,

is this

question that poses the central avenue
of inquiry for this dissertation.

for instance, did legislators use
extra-congressional procedures in the case
of base

closure and use the regular, internal
procedures of Congress to shepherd tax
refonn

through the legislature in 1986?

It is

simply not plausible

to assert that coalition leaders

attempting to close military bases thought of
the idea of a commission to shield

from the

legislators

political pain

tax loopholes did not.

and coalition leaders attempting

to cut special interest

These two groups of coalition leaders chose

their particular

procedural mechanisms for a reason or some set of reasons.

Particularistic Benefits

The

difficulty

and Theories of Congressional Policymaking

many, but not

that confers general benefits

all,

political scientists

have had explaining

while imposing particularistic cuts

is

legislation

a direct result of the

Remarkably little attention has been paid to the use of extra-congressional procedures as a trend. Francis
Rourke and Paul R. Schulman, Adhocracy in Policy Development,” The Social Science Jountal, \'ol.

E.

26, no. 2 (April 1989), 131-142, argue that “no development in

modem American politics

has been more

striking than the habit the country has fallen into of creating a wide variety of instant organizations and

charging them with the task of coming up with solutions to the most pressing problems of public policy”
(131). Their discussion is focused more broadly, however, on all sorts of temporary bureaucracies
including study commissions and task forces with no formal authority.
similarity

between many of these mechanisms but do not attempt

choice. See, for instance, Christopher

The Case of Military Base Closures”

J.

in

to

A variety of other authors

note the

develop any model of procedural

Deering, “Congress, the President and Automatic Government;

James Thurber,

ed.. Rivals for

Power (Washington,

D.C.:

CQ

1996), footnote 20. Also see Kenneth R. Mayer, “Closing Military Bases (Finally): Solving Collective

Dilemmas Through Delegation,”

Legislative Studies Quarterly,

7

XX,

3 (August 1995), footnote

3.

Press,

widespread acceptance of the model
of policytttaking asserted by
David Mayhew
Congress:

The Electoral Connection.

Mayhew began

Borrowing theoo-

with the assumption that

reelection seekers.”'"

Mayhew

all

directly

from cconomtcs,

members of Congress were “single-minded

argued that

in their pursuit

of reelection, members of

Congress pursue credit-claiming, position-taking,
and advertising. From
that studies

legtslatton

of
wtth

legislatures in the

which

this

advertistng acttvities have

by Mayhew

Mayhew mold

dissertation

little

to

in

is

this,

we

can see

have no way to explain the type
of

concerned.

While position-taking and

do with actual policymaking, credit-claiming

is

deftned

as,

acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant
political actor (or actors) that
one IS personally responsible for causing the
government, or some unit
thereof, to do something that the actor (or actors)
considers desirable."

While

this

Mayhew

definition might

seem on

almost explicitly rules out

its

face to include general benefit legislation,

this possibility

by arguing

further,

“it

becomes

necessary for each congressman to try to peel off pieces of
governmental accomplishment
for

which he can believably generate a sense of

Mayhew
then,

suggests the best

to

do

own

which

all

Not

members of Congress

boils

are able to bring

down

home

to

a

In the

end

scheme of

the bacon to serve

electoral needs.

David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University
"

surprisingly,

this is to traffic in particularized benefits.

Mayhew’s model of congressional policymaking

distribution in

their

way

responsibility.”'^

Mayhew, Congress: The

Electoral Connection, 52.

Mayhew, Congress: The

Electoral Connection, 53.

8

Press, 1974), 17.

Today,
natural

home

tl,e

Mayhewian understanding of congressional
poltcyntak.ng

in the so-called distributive

school of thought.

has found

The most commonly

piece in this literature remains the
work of Barry R. Weingast and William

"The
with

Industrial Organization

Mayhew
If

s classic

of Congress.”’’

Weingast and Marshall open

its

cited

Marshall,

J.

their article

explanation for the organizational structure
of Congress.

a group of planners sat

down and

tried to design a pair

of American
members’ electoral needs year
they would be hard pressed to improve on
what exists.'^

national assemblies with the goal of serving
in

and year

out,

For Weingast and Marshall then, as for Mayhew,
the congressional policymaking system
is

one dominated by committees, but they explain

the legislative institutions that

from the market exchange

that the reason is that

committees are

most effectively reduce the transaction costs

in particularistic benefits.

that result

Because members of Congress are

primarily interested in “attempting to provide benefits to
their constituents,”'^ and

because members of Congress are

free to bid to gain access to the

choice, congressional committees are

While

this

all

committee of

dominated by high-demand preference

their

outliers.'^

provides a remarkably stable and cost-free environment for the trade

particularistic benefits,

it

also

means

that certain kinds

of policies are impossible

in

to enact.

Because any given committee has a fixed jurisdiction.

Barry R. Weingast and William
Legislatures, Like Firms,

J. Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why
Are Not Organized as Markets,” in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 96,

no.

1

(1988), 132-163.

Mayhew, Congress: The

Electoral Connection, 81-82.

Weingast and Marshall, “The

By “high-demand

Industrial Organization of Congress,” 137.

preference outliers,”

particularistic benefits a particular

1

am referring

to

members who have

a higher

committee confers than the average member

9

demand

for the

in the legislative

chamber.

:=r

'-sr: .st„- rt;i

allows the contntit.ee to block
access

And

since

all

must expect

the

members

that they are

The

one

critic

going to be precisely the

members

last

in their policy area in
favor

of the distributive school puts

single policy implication to

we

ut the legislature to

of some general

benefit.

it,

which
''

rQSoT^Q?

”

ofL. loai’horrrn^;

inside the committee are
htgh-demand preference outliers,

advocate partieulanstic benefit cuts
In short, as

~=

distributive theonsts subscribe
at
“chentihstic” in the sense of Wilson

legislation

is

“particularistic” in the sense of
(1974, 53-55) or “distributive” in the sense
of Lowi (1964, 690)
In other words, legislation
generally confers concentrated
benefits to
constituents (or distncts) while broadly
dispersing costs.
One key
consequence of these distnbutive tendencies is
the oversupply (in terms of
economic efficiency) of policy benefits.'^

[a ay u’ew

This critique along with the empirical
observation that not
policy coming out of Congress looks this

way helped

all politics, legislation,

to

spawn

the search

for

and
an

alternative school of thought that could account
for both distributive legislation and
dedistributive legislation.

Into this void stepped the infonnational school
of theorists.

school of thought

this

is

provided by Keith Krehbiel.

models of congressional policymaking agree
distributive conflict.”'*^

best example of

Distributive and informational

that legislatures are “arenas

of individual

Importantly, however, while the distributive school argues that

Weingast and Marshall, “The
18

The

Industrial Organization of Congress,” 157.

-

Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan

Press, 1991), 25. Citations listed are Krehbiel’s.

Krehbiel, Information

and Legislative Organization,

10

5.

legislators organize

school

argues that

Congress so as
legislators

,o best capture ‘ga.ns
front

trade,- the

.nforntat.onal

organize Congress so as
to “provide tncem.ves

for

individuals to develop policy
expenise and to share
policy-relevant ntfonnation
with

fellow legtslators, including
legislators with competing
dtstributive interests.”^'
difference between the two grows
from an observation about
legislatures that

turned into an assumption about
legislative pol.tics.

environment

of

outcomes”^^ or

uncertainty

roll-call

about

the

eonnecttons

between

“poltcies

members operate

some time."

A

in

conditions of uncertainty

number of congressional

Distributive theorists, like

are

political

important

Weingast and Marshall, “The

Krehbiel, Information

and Legislative Organization,

Legislative Organization,

“^Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action,

is

their face to

be

scholars have taken this position

for instance, assert policy effects

to

ignore

the

uncertainty

in

5.

20.

17.

on Congress, John W. Kingdon, Congressmen 's Voting Decisions, 3'**
Michigan Press, 1989), xiii, tells us that “a major enduring feature of the
decision-making process is best seen as a case of bounded rationality. Legislators

in his classic piece

(Ann Arbor. The University

Congress

may seem on

effects of their

Industrial Organization of Congress,” 141.

and

For instance,

Mayhew

commodities" and tend

Krehbiel, Information

Ed.

their

But both of these assumptions fonn a
sharp contrast with the

distributive school.

not

and

votes and their “policy effects.”^^

rather obvious assumptions.

for

quickly

Individual legislators operate
in an

That members of Congress would be
worried about the policy
votes and that

is

The

that the

ot

pursue their goals as best they can, but in the context of imperfect information, limited time,
incomplete
canvass of alternatives, and a dramatic deficit of ability to consider floor votes thoroughly in the light
of the
tremendous volume of decisions to be made.”
See, for instance,

Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 146, fnl33. Mayhew makes the point
members as seekers of effects needs a razor taken to it; the electoral

explicitly in asserting, “the notion of

payment

is

for positions, not effects.”

11

relationships between policies and
effects that infonnational
theorists assume.
tells

us

members of Congress engage

activities

in

pursuit of reeleetion.

electorally profitable activities.

understood by
the other hand,

to

all

is

assumed

to

first

If there are

as position taker
is

activities

are,

outcomes from these
no uncertainty.

is

effect whatsoever.

and position-taking

by

definition,

pure

activities, they are

Position-taking, on

Mayhew

says.

a speaker rather than a doer
The
pleasing things happen but that
statements.
The position itself is the
is

not that he

pleasing judgmental

two

There

have no policy

electoral requirement

make

The

be positive outcomes.

The congressman
he

in credit-claiming,
advertising,

Mayhcw

make

political commodity."^”

The informational

school, on the other hand, assumes that
legislators’ calculations are

characterized by a great deal of uncertainty. Douglas
Arnold, for instance, points out that

we know

this is a reasonable

assumption because members of Congress

devote two of their scarcest resources
staffs

-

to gathering

-

their

own

and analyzing information

time and that of their

them avoid
positions and actions that are politically risky. Since legislators
are not a
frivolous lot given to squandering their scarce resources,
that helps

it

reasonable to believe that they

know what

they are doing

when

seems

they work

diligently to identify safe positions.

Not

surprisingly, the informational school holds that

own

personal resources to the hunt for voting cues.

resources of the institution.

uncertainty

is that

As

members devote more

They

also devote the organizational

a result, one major implication of the assumption of

the congressional committee system

is

organized to deal with problems

of infonnation-gathering rather than problems of contractual enforcement
and Marshall

assert.

Keith Krehbiel argues that for informational theorists.

Mayhew, Congress: The
’’

than their

Electoral Connection, 62.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 38.
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as

Weingast

m

as

the d.stnbuttve perspective,
the solution

he focus

in informational

approaches

is

is institutional.

on choosing

that

However

rules ami procedures

provide incentives for individuals
to develop policy expertise
and to
policy-relevant information with
fellow legislators
includimi
^
legislators with competing
distributive
share

’

interests.^^

These differences extend beyond
organizational questions, however.
Krehbiel

also points

out that.

the

implicit

standard

organization

of

according

performance

to

the

of

an

informational

efficient

legislative

perspective

is
also
that within the distributive
perspective. An
informationally efficient legislative
organization is one in which collective

significantly different

benefits are reaped

which

far

more

is

from individuals’ poliey-specific
expertise and

distributive benefits

high-demanders
Krehbiel

from

-

-

are carefully kept in check

not alone in this view. R. Kent

interested in figuring out

actually doing

-

credit-claimmg.^°

Weaver

what not

to

do

which courses not

to pursue.”^’

policies that are “politically infeasible.

important point to remember in
collect, analyze,

all

-

to

all

legislative majonties.^"

asserts that

how

members of Congress

to avoid

do.

blame
that

-

are

than they are in

members

More commonly,

Arnold points out

receive

constituents

that this creates a class

of these cases

is that

all

the

chamber

is

organized so as to

rank-and-file members.

members, and not simply high-demand preference

And

since

outliers as the

•)g

Krehbiel, Information

and Legislative Organization,

5.

Krehbiel, Information

and Legislative Organization,

6.

R.

Kent Weaver, “The

Politics

of Blame Avoidance”

371-398.

Kingdon, Congressmen

's

Voting Decisions,

of

Regardless of the temiinology, however, the

and disseminate information for

committees serve

by

John Kingdon agrees, arguing

few signals from constituencies about what
indicate

in

rather than accruing disproportionately
to

xiii.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, lA.
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in

Journal of Public Policy, Vol.

6,

No. 4 (1986),

distributive school suggests,

it

is

reasonable to imagine

that,

given the correct political

context, montbers can and
wtll vote for legislation
that cuts partieulanstie
benellts aind

confers general benents.

winch

,t

,s

In other

words, an informationally
efficient legislature

possible for coalition

who

leaders

procedures to alter the calculus
of particular
legislation.

The

are willing and

roll-call

significant point here, for our
purposes,

do

this

one

in

able to manipulate

votes and pass de-distributive

is

that informational

congressional policymaking arc able
to account for the ways
interested legislators

is

which

in

models of

rational, self-

while distributive models of
congressional policymaking do

not.

Notable for

its

conspicuous absence

in either the distributive

models of congressional policymaking, however,

is

or the informational

the congressional party.

Mayhew

says of congressional parties that “they arc
more useful for what they are not than for

what they

arc.”'^^

For Mayhew, eongressional polieymaking

is,

a system

whose zero-sum edges have been eroded away by
powerful
norms of institutional universalism. In a good many
ways the interesting
division

in

congressional

politics

not

is

between

Democrats

and

Republicans, but between politicians in and out of office.
Looked at from
one angle the cult of universalism has the appearance
of a cross-party
conspiracy among incumbents to keep their jobs.

Weingast and Marshall make the point more

explicitly.

guides their model of congressional policymaking
the behavior of individual representatives.”

is

One of

the assumptions that

that “parties place

no constraints on

Infomiationalists treat parties similarly.

Krehbiel points out that “infomiational theories omit or assume away these concerns and

Mayhew, Congress: The

Eleetoral Conneetion, 97.

Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection,

105.
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.hereby .nvi,e reactions rang.ng
from earp.ng ,o apoplexy.Nevenbeless, he responds,

“with the assistance of
empirical

findings,

would argue more strongly

I

that

the

assumptions are not overly simple.

The

intuitive

problem

for informational

partisan institutions exist in
the Congress,

contesting party

leadership

fights,

members spend

theorists,

however,

is that

a great deal of time and
energy

and party leaders have
fonnal power over the

congressional policymaking process.
scarce resources

and distributive

In other words, just as

members were expending

in

Arnold pointed out

that the

the search for information
suggests an

informational avenue of inquiry,
the fact that

members expend

these

same resources

maintaining and fighting for partisan
structures suggests a partisan
avenue of inquiry.

This objection spawned a third
school of thought that would attempt
theoretical justification for partisan
institutions in a Congress

seekers of reelection.

to find a

made up of single-minded

This third school, which has come
to be known as the party-

centered model of congressional policymaking,

of Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins

is

most closely associated with the work

in Legislative

Leviathan^ and

the

work of John

Aldrich and David Rohde.^^

Krehbiel, Information

and

Krehbiel, Information

and Legislative Organization, 261.

Legislative Organization, 261.

Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Part\>
Government
Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

in the

House (Los

38

John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, “The Consequences of Party Organization
in the House: Theory
and Evidence on Conditional Party Government,” Delivered at the Annual Meeting
of the Southern Political
Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, October 29-31, 1998. Aldrich and Rohde have
written extensively
on the subject both individually and together. 1 will generally refer to this conference paper both
because it
IS a recent work and because it summarizes the debate between
the party-centered model and the
informational model quite well.
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Cox and McCubbins begin

their critique

of the distributive and
infomiational

schools of thought by arguing
on both theoretical and
empirical grounds that the
notions
that

members of committees

control are

more myth than

are self-selected and
that committees are
reality.

the parties, after

is

It

all,

beyond partisan

that assign

members

committees. Moreover, seniority
as a norm for selecting
committee chairmen
far

more than

the existing literature
suggests.

members of Congress do

is

to

violated

Finally, they also find
that "a majority of

not serve on committees
that are dominated by
preference

outliers.

In

the

place

McCubbins seek
are

invented,

dilemmas

of

this

committee-centered model

develop a theory of party organization

to

structured,

and restructured

that legislators face.-"

In this

in

of policymaking, Cox and
in the

House

in

which “parties

order to solve a variety of
collective

model, individual legislators delegate
power

to

party leaders in order to help solve
collective action problems in which
"unorganized

groups

of reelection-seeking

legislation

fashion.

might

and underproduce collective-benefits

The reason

that the overproduction

electorally inefficient” is that

element

legislators

in the electoral

m

overproduce

legislation in an electorally inefficient

of

particularistic benefits can

any given congressional

election, “there is a

chances of members of the same

committee system was a solution

to

the collective

Cox and McCubbins,

Legislative Leviathan, 79.

Cox and McCubbins,

Legislative Leviathan, 83.

Cox and McCubbins,

Legislative Leviathan, 125.

Cox and McCubbins,

Legislative Leviathan, 121.
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particularistic-benefits

party.”"^^

Much

become

common
like the

action problems of contractual

enforccen, and inco.npice
inlbnna.ion
respectively then, the party
leadership

becomes

action problem for
party-centered theorists
label.

Cox and McCubbins
The

collective

for d.s.ribn.ive

-

and infonna.ional ,„coris,s

the sointton to a different
collective

the problen, of ntaintaining
a posttivc party

argue,

dilemmas facing

a party arc

“solved" chiclly through the

The trick is to induce those who
occupy or seek to occtipv
^
leadership positions to internalize
the collective interests of
the party.-*’

elective.

The

result, hopefully, is that
party leaders will

common

organize legislative action such
that the

partisan electoral clement will
be positive.

power of party leadership

to provide

Presumably, this means using the

some appropriate

level

of

particularistic rmt/ general

benefits.

Aldrieh and Rohde take this model
a step further by arguing that
the policy
implications of a party-centered theory of
congressional policymaking arc differentiated

from mfomiational and distributive models.
centered

model

condition,

IS

referred

to

as

a

Aldrich and Rohde’s version of the party-

“conditional

party

government” model.

they point out, “in conditional party government
concerns the distribution of

policy preferences in the two

If the

partics.”'^'^

two

parties are sufficiently

and sufficiently differentiated from one another, then the majority
party
provide

to

its

“The

is

homogenous

more

likely to

party leaders with powers and prerogatives, the party leaders
can be expected

utilize those

arrangements.

powers, and policy outcomes should
In short,

Cox and McCubbins,

whereas

in the

reflect

the altered institutional

informational framework,

Legislative Leviathan, 135.

Aldrich and Rohde, “ The Consequences of Party Government
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in the

House,”

2.

we

expect policy to

renec, ,he preferences of
.he .nedian legislator,
fratnework,

we

.he co„d..ional party
govennnen.

in

expee. pol.cy to rellee. the
preferences of the n.eciian
leg.sla.or vn,/„„

majority party.

The addihon of

,he qualiher

“eondihonaf

to .heir notion

allows Aldrich and Rohde to
place their model

and the informational school.
legislative process

may

rather than supplanting

When

this

a superior position vis a
vts Krehbiel

condi.ton

no. satisfied, they point out,
the

is

operate quite as Krehbiel argues
it,

the

of pany govennnen.

model of “condit.onal

it

does.

From

party government”

is

the.r

view

then,

placed over the

top of Krehbiel’s informational
model.

The theory of conditional party government
adds

the centrifugal pull of the

majority party on top of the politics
of the sort [Krehbiel]

modehng,

is

interested in

varying, inter alia, by the degree
to which the condition is
satisfied. Thus, we do not see
this as an either-or situation.
It is not
that
is either his account is right
or ours is. Rather, we see our explanation
as
a ding party, under specifiable and
measurable circumstances, to the kind
of party- free circumstances he considers.

While

this IS not the

question

is

what

is at

view taken by infomiationalists, notably
Krehbiel himself, the

stake in the dispute for our purposes.

Both the informational and party-centered models
can

theoretically explain

how

an atomistic Congress of single-minded seekers of
reelection could conceivably vote
cut particularistic benefits in favor of

marked improvements upon
policymaking.

general benefit.

more dominant

between these models

its

at the start.

promise of explaining

why

18

In this light, both

models are

distributive school of congressional

The question of procedural choice addressed

explicitly choose

project fulfills

the

some

to

On

in this dissertation

need not

the contrary, to the extent that the

coalition leaders

sometimes

utilize the

internal procedures

may be

of Congress and sometimes

able to offer

new

study will show that
interest

insights

In other words,

policymaking

by Congress

is

this debate.

members do indeed

m outcomes and effects

Congress.

on

is

we

years.

First, all

of the eases examined

m

it

this

care about outcomes and effects
and that this

consistent with the electoral
connection of
will see that the distributive

insufficient in explaining a

m the past 25

utilize extra-eongressional
procedures,

wide array of major

members of

model of congressional
legislation that

is

adopted

Second, exploration into the question of
why legislators

sometimes adopt extra-congressional procedures
and sometimes solve
problems internally may offer insights

into the question

of party

in

collective action

Congress.

It

is

no

longer controversial to suggest that votes on
procedures are proxies for votes on outcomes

and so these cases present us with an opportunity

outcomes or

not.

Finally, explaining the utility

implies an admission by

to

members of Congress

to

examine whether

fail to

puzzle

why

the internal committee

produce the most electorally

of extra-congressional

committee-dominated

efficient

procedures

informational

that the institution is

its

and party
outcome.

provides

models

and

necessary, can

structures of the institution both

It

a

the

is in this

new

sense then, that the

challenge

party-centered

Aldrich and Rohde, “The Consequences of Party Government in the House,”
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unable or unwilling

members deem

congressional policymaking.

45

dominate

of extra-congressional procedures, which

undertake some course of action that the majority of

help us to explain

parties

3.

both

the

models

of

to

Conclusion

There are

at least

deserves our attention.

two compelling reasons why
First,

in

this c,uest,on

of procedural choice

describing the difference
between distributive and

informational theories of legislative
organization, Keith Krehbiel
points out that these

two schools of thought “have

distinctly different empirical
implications at each

of two

observable levels of legislative
choice: the policies enacted
by legislatures, and the
institutions

developed and employed by

congressional policymaking account,

legislatures,’''''

any way,

in

Since

for the

so

few models of

passage of laws that confer

general benefits while imposing
particularistic costs and since the
development and

employment of extra-congressional procedures
appears
these are observations that warrant
explanations.
to the conventional

wisdom of at

least a

procedures that are new and unique,

it

When

to be an

that end,

Congress repeatedly acts contrary

major part of the

is

avenue towards

discipline,

and does so using

appropriate to ask in what ways our existing

explanations are incomplete or inaccurate.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the increasing
use of extra-congressional
procedures raises important normative questions that can
only be addressed
understand

why

procedures

mean

and when Congress chooses

to use them.

if

we

For instance, what will these

for the democratic accountability of our governing
institutions?

these procedures enhance the capacity of Congress to resist parochialism?
are not the central questions to be addressed in this dissertation,

important questions that cannot be answered unless

why and when Congress

we

first

it

is

Do

While these

clear that these are

have some understanding of

chooses to employ extra-congressional procedures.
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first

Concluding debate

in the

House of RepresentaUves
over

base-closure commission process.
Representative Richard

tirc

authonzui.on of the

Anney (R-TX)

argued,

the adventur^ of the
base closing bill serve to
demonstrate the strength of
our system. Our cumbersome
legislative

procedures ensure not only fhat
it
f™"’ heing made

'

but
buUta
a
bdl'
that any
bill that completes
the complex dance of
legislation has been
thoroughly considered and
deliberated.
Over the last 2 years every
onceivable objection to this
admittedly novel concept
ha; bee^

vl^:::ii; every

In this respect,

asTec”

Arniey sounds much

like

Barbara Sinclair

dominant textbook understanding of how
a
and desperately

in

need of editing.

bill

becomes

The question

dissertation suggests that at least one
chapter in the

what are perhaps the most complex

legislative

to

in

a law

arguing correctly, that the
is

dated, often inaccurate,

be asked and answered

new textbook ought
dances of

all

-

to

be reserved

Representative Dick

and Legislative Organization,

Armey (R-TX) quoted

in

7.

Congressional Record, October

21

for

extra-congressional

legislative procedures.

Krehbiel, Information

in this

12, 1988,

H30039.

CHAPTER

2

METHODS

The decision

to

examine procedural choice as
the

in the existing literature

on Congress.

uni,

While he points on,

of analysis

is

well-founded

tha, the various

congressional poHcymaking offer
diffenng and contradictory
intpHca.ions for

observable outputs (policies and
institutional

analysis.

choice

,s

Moreover,

Congress cuts
(see chapter

more

m

institutions),

fruitful

because

Krehbiel

a, leas,

two

argues the study of

provides a far more tangible
uni, of

i,

the particular case in
question,

particularistic benefits in favor

1 )

Keith

models of

we

are concerned with

how

of general benefits and we have
established

that procedural strategies are the

most common avenue towards

this

end."

Thus, procedural choice serves as both a
possible and an appropriate unit of
analysis.

But beyond the appropriate and the
possible, the question of procedural
choice
presents an interesting puzzle.

Congress

utilize different procedural

Much of the
favor of

More

mechanisms

literature discussing cases in

some

Krehbiel, Information
testing theories about

most prominent

which Congress cuts

and

In justifying the focus

cases has to do with the

Legislative Organization, 7-15. Krehbiel defends his claim by arguing,
“in
interactions in complex settings, clarity of inference is facilitated

on procedural

Congressional Action, 146,
the

by

implications of theories.

states, “I

strategies in his

repeatedly

own

show how

-

Of the two

levels of observation at

policies and institutions

strategies of persuasion.”
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-

the institutional

case studies, Arnold, The Logic of

coalition leaders

employ

believe are underappreciated by congressional analysts, whereas

more obvious

outcomes?

particularistic benefits in

made between

distinction

which theories of legislative organization have implications
implications are clearly the most immediate” ( 14-15).

1

to achieve similar policy

complex human

more immediately observable

strategies that

similar policy problems, does

general benefit references the nature of the particularistic
benefit involved.

specifically, the

focusing on

Why, when confronted with

1

several procedural

devote

little

attention to

geographic concentration of
the particulanstic benent
being cnt or cos.

This dtshncion prov.des a
potential h>po.he.,cai explanat.on

for the use

bang nnposed.

of these diffcren.

procedural mechanisms.

Ge ographic Versus Group
In

Benefits

adopting policies that impose
direct costs on specific
groups

benefit, does the type

in favor

of some general

of group incurring the cost make
any difference?

impose costs on one type of group than
another?

In

it

easier to

The Logic of Congressional Aciion,

Arnold suggests two categories of
particularism which he
benefits" and “geographic costs and
benefits.”*

Is

Group

refers to as

“group costs and

costs and benefits are those costs

and benefits incurred by a particular category
of people who may be delineated by
age, income, occupation, industry, race,
gender, or hobby.

Arnold goes on

to tell us, are

geographic location

is

the

Geographic costs and benefits,

simply a special kind of group cost or benefit

common

element.

-

one

in

nevertheless useful, both because geographic areas enjoy
direct representation in Congress whereas other
groups do not and
is

because

the recipients of geographic benefits (and the payers
of geographic costs)
are necessarily in close proximity to one
another

whereas

counterparts

who

receive group benefits (or pay group costs)

absolutely no contact.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 26.
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 26.
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which

While geographic and non-geographic

groups are not mutually exclusive, Arnold says,
the distinction

their

their

may have

The

d.st, notion is

Congress."

hnds

It

its

way

into ntuch of the literature

on

Furthemrore. while Arnold suggests
that geographic benefits
are ntorc

difficult to cut,"

collective

apparently important.

action

Kenneth R. Mayer makes the
point more

explicitly,

arguing that

problems are “part.cularly acute
when the affected groups

font,

geographic constituencies, rather than
more dispersed economic or social
interests.”"

Thus, while

imposed
25 years,
cases

we

can point to a significant number
of cases

particularistic costs

in

into

on discrete groups

in favor

in

which the

particularistic

costs

which

legislators

of general benefits over the

examining the question of procedural choice,
those

in

useful to separate these

is

it

were

last

relatively

geographically

concentrated and those in which the particularistic
costs were relatively geographically

In his seminal piece on Congress, David Mayhew,
Congress: The Electoral Connection, 56-57
recognizes the distinction in his discussion of credit-claiming
by pointing out, “a final point here has to do
with geography. The examples given so far are all
of benefits conferred upon home

constituencies or
but the properties of particularized benefits were
carefully specified so as not to
exclude the possibility that some benefits may be given to
recipients outside the home constituencies.
recipients therein

probably

...

Narrowly drawn tax loopholes qualify
probably conferred upon recipients outside the home
point.)

are.

as particularized benefits,

and some of them are

districts.

find solid evidence

(It is difficult to

Campaign

on

Some
the

contributions flow into districts from the outside, so it would
not be surprising to find
that benefits go where the resources are.” In another
example, Weingast and Marshall, “The Industrial
Organization of Congress,” 136, point out, “interest groups are not uniformly
distributed. They

typically

have concentrations of voters

in particular locations.”

The authors go on

to argue that

members

are thus
sensitive to constituencies within their district. “In the competition
for interest group support, specific
representatives have a comparative advantage. The lack of complete fungibility
of votes implies that
legislators are advantaged in attracting support from interest groups
located in their district (see Denzau

more

and

Munger

1986). This advantage arises because service to local interests attracts both votes and
organized
resources for the district’s representative. Service to this group by an outsider, in contrast,
attracts only the
latter and may lose votes.” Finally, in reviewing the work of distributive
theorists, Krehbiel, Information

and Legislative Organization,

26, argues, “the key point

that legislators’ preferences are geographically

is that distributive theories consistently presume
based and therefore that legislative decision making

provides opportunities for gains from trade."

For his

part,

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 141, argues, “competition for geographic

modest effects on the shape of public policy when programs provide abundant general
benefits” and that legislators “seldom support programs simply because they wish to obtain such benefits.”
benefits has only

But he also goes on

to point out, “the policy effects are actually greater

benefits are to be curtailed.”

Kenneth R. Mayer, “Closing Military Bases

(Finally)...,” 394.
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on

the

downside

-

when geographic

dispersed.

Table 2.1

legtslatton that

benefits.

illustrates a

imposed

number of cases

direct, early-order costs

on

in

which Congress was able

particular groups in favor of
general

Both categories include several
major pieces of

different types

of procedures were

to pass

utilized to enact them.

As

legislation

and

a variety

of

a result. Table 2.1 suggests

the utility of a case study
approach in order to identify other
relevant factors that impact

on procedural choice.

While the

distinction

between geographically-concentrated
and

geographically-dispersed particularistic costs
will be the main independent
variable to be

examined

in the

Wider view

Table 2.1

question of procedural choice, a case
study approach will allow for a

in the search for other factors

-

Cases

of significance.

m Which Congress Imposes Direct, Early-Order Costs on Particular

Groups

to

Provide Benefits to a General, Diffuse Public

Geographic Groups

Non-Geographic Groups

Choice of Nuclear Waste Disposal

Site

Airline Deregulation

Line Item Veto

Tax Reform Act of 1986
Social Security Reform
North American Free Trade Agreement

Base Realignment and Closure

Commission

Other Factors

Broad Versus Narrow Policy Areas.
congressional procedures

the use of

omnibus

is

a decision

legislation,

Ultimately, the decision to utilize extra-

by Congress

and legislating

to delegate authority.

Closed

in secrecy all help to allow legislators to

frame votes as binary decisions on an entire package without amendments.
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rules,

But

ultimately, they

leaders craft

require that

all

the

final

some

legislator,

policy alternative.

some eommtttee,

This means

or

some group of

some

that

legislator,

party

some

committee, or some group of party leaders
must be intimately connected with
the direct
costs that legislation imposes on
concentrated economic or geographic
groups.

surprising then, that in

many such

authority to an agency or

however, poses

its

own

some

set

McCubbms

refer to

of problems

separation

of powers,

in

must delegate enough power

executive branch.” Delegation,

of delegation, D. Roderick Kiewiet and
Mathew D.

in justifying the use

way

federalism

some way of

as

a

counter-balance

first

it

“a

to

the one hand, the principal

limiting the agent’s

the principal wants

by delegating power “agency

benefits of delegating in the

a reference to the logic

allow the agent to carry out his or her duties.

other hand, the principal must find

exercised as closely to the

and

-

of “auxiliary precautions” such as the

American constitutionalism. On
to

not

for Congress.

bicameralism,

dependence on the people”

that

member of the

one such problem as “Madison’s dilemma’’

employed by James Madison

is

cases, legislative leaders have
chosen to delegate

particular

In their generalized theory

It

But on the

power so

exercised as possible.

that

The

it

is

fear is

losses”^^ will be incurred that will outweigh the

place.

The

point, for Kiewiet

and McCubbins,

is that

See, for instance, Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” 371-398.

These “agency losses” could come

in a variety

of forms. The agent

than the principal. Additionally, because the principal in this case
principals, the agent

may be

loyal to or act

is

may have

different policy desires

the Congress, a

on behalf of only some of the

body made up of many

principals. Finally, the principal

also incurs losses in the process of monitoring the agent to be sure the foregoing losses are avoided.
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principals will only delegate

agency

power

if the

delegation includes

some method ofeontainino

losses.

It

clear,

IS

however,

same across policy

areas.

that opportunities for containing

agency losses are not the

Specifically, policy areas that are

more narrow

by

are,

definition, better candidates for delegation
because the nature of the poiiey area
serves as

a natural limit on the agent’s discretion.^*
addition to geography

Thus, one factor that

the scope of the policy area.

is

delegation of authority to impose particularistic
costs
policy areas because, by definition,
the agent in the

way

this

would be more

it

can be done

in

We

is less likely in

that

in

the

the case of broad

difficult to limit the jurisdiction

more narrow policy

to delegate authority in

can examine

would expect

of

areas.

While the discussion above focuses on blame avoidance
might be more willing

we

as a reason legislators

narrow versus broad policy

areas, there is

”

D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic
of Delegation (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1991).
58

“Broad” and “narrow” policy areas are admittedly vague terms in need of
clarification. There
by which to measure the scope of a policy area but two characteristics of policy

precise index

us to classify them

m relation to one another.

other issue areas in a

First,

more substantive way. By

number of other policy

areas in a lesser way.

is

no

areas can help

a

by

a “broad” policy area,

“narrow” policy

area,

1

I mean one that cuts
mean one that impacts a

across
lesser

of course, that virtually every piece of legislation
could be argued to have an impact on multiple policy areas and it is also true that it is
impossible to quantify
the level of impact a particular policy area has on another. But it is equally clear
that some policy areas
It is

true,

impact others in a relatively greater way than others. For instance, fiscal policy clearly impacts
a broader
number of policy areas than endangered species policy in more substantive kinds of ways. Second, policy
areas may be categorized according to their fiscal impact. Though this is a cmde measure that offers
little
insight into the nature of some policy areas that have nothing to do with money, it is clear, on the
other
hand, that a

bill that

bill that raises
it

is

closes 10 military bases

income taxes and

is

cuts spending

significantly

more narrow than an omnibus deficit reduction
The point here is that

m a host of programs and entitlements.

clear that military base closure, for instance,

reform.

Where

All that matters

is a more narrow policy area than comprehensive tax
drawn between “broad” and “narrow” is unimportant for our purposes.
recognition that one is more narrow in relation to the other.

exactly the line
is

the

is

For instance, Mayer, “Closing Military Bases

were willing

to delegate as

particular procedure

much

(Finally)...,” 393-413, argues that

members of Congress

authority as they did in the case of base closures not only because the

employed limited “the domain of the agent’s authority”
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in a

wide variety of ways, but

also a positive reason
reinforeing this

blame avoidance.

fewer opportunities for negative
policy consequences

Just as

narrow policy areas offer

in legislators’ districts,
they also

offer fewer opportunities for
noticeable policy benefits that
accrue to the general public.

The cases

in question

some general

benefit

-

-

cases in which Congress cuts
particularistic benefits in favor
of

are difficult cases precisely
because legislators fear those

who

will

benefit (the general public) will
be unlikely to notice or appreciate
the benefit while those

who
there

bear costs (groups and constituencies)
will certainly notice and
care.
is

a difference between broad and
narrow policy areas

m

general public will notice and appreciate
the general benefit.
tax reform are

more broad than base

That stated,

the extent to

which the

Because policy areas

like

closure, a vote for the general benefit
of tax reform

has more electoral value than a vote for
the general benefits offered by base
closure.

As

m

a result,

members of Congress have two

narrow versus broad policy

areas.

In

reasons to be more likely to delegate

narrow policy

areas,

members

are

more

likely to

avoid the agency losses associated with delegation
and they are less likely to be able
credibly claim credit for helping to deliver a general
benefit.

to

For both blame avoidance

and credit claiming reasons then, the scope of the policy
area becomes an important
potential

factor in determining

internal procedures

when and why

and when and

why

legislative leaders

employ

their

own

they employ extra-congressional procedures

in

cutting particularistic benefits in favor of some general benefit.

Mo ment

in Political

Time.

suggested by Stephen Skowronek.

Another factor

may

Skowronek argues

also because the nature of the policy area itself

had a natural

that

was

sufficiently

limit.
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narrow

impact procedural choice

that presidential

leadership

that the potential costs

is

is

of delegation

constrained by

study

its

focused

is

part.cular ntomen, within an
historical

on presidential power, extending

epoch.™

tins

While Skowronek's

concept

to

ntclude

other

governmental institutions such as
Congress and the bureaucracy
seems reasonable.

There are two rough ways

in

winch the moment

in

political

time offers

opportunities and constraints to
coalition leaders seeking to
impose particularistic costs

while conferring general benefits.
calendar

when

First, coalition leaders
are sensitive to the electoral

enacting policies sueh as these.

Votes

in

Congress, administrative

decisions, and policy impacts can
be timed to occur later or earlier,
before or after an
election, or at the beginning or end

of a congressional or presidential
term

in

order to

strengthen or weaken the ability of
constituents to link negative policy
effects with
legislators’ votes.

which

Second, coalition leaders seeking

this study is

to enact the types

concerned are sensitive to unique

various policy areas.

institutional

in the policy area?

also play an important role in determining

when and how

words, the

moment

developments

in

For instance, has there been a history
of mistrust between the

Congress and the relevant agency involved

to delegate authority to

of policies with

impose

in political

legislative leaders will

particularistic costs in favor

time

may

These considerations thus

of general

benefits.

choose
In other

constrain the procedural options available to

legislative leaders.

Existence of Po werful Champions.

Another potentially important factor

in

determining whether legislators will impose particularistic costs from within
Congress or
will delegate

is

whether there

exist

legislators

who

are well-positioned

enough and

Stephen Skowronek, “Presidential Leadership in Political Time,” in Michael Nelson, ed.. The Presidency
the Political System (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press,
1988), 1 19-161.

and
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mteresled enough to chantpion
the cause.

could never have

moved forward

in

No

observer would dispute that
tax refonn

1986 wtthout the efforts of
the Cha.nnan of Ways

and Means, Dan Rostenkowski
(D-IL), and the Cha.nnan of
Finance, Bob Packwood (R-

OR).

Why such

powerful champions are attracted
to these pteces of legislat.on

<he scope of this study and
will be treated only
pertpherally.

purposes

is

that

What

is

beyond

relevant for our

is

matters that tax refonn attracted
such powerful champions and
base

it

closure did not.

3MOne.theFeM^
number of

particularistic

general benefits.

In

tax

A

final

groups that must bear the costs

around the

site.

impose

is

in the

will consider

opposition.

is

tax

who

live in

and

higher or lower because of the sheer

In short, legislators

many

number of

suggests that, in these cases, the

would

ten high-level nuclear waste repositories than one
because
the objections of ten times as

the

waste repository,

on one group - those
it

is

course of delivering

siting a high-level

important because

hurdle to be overcome in enacting such policies

m

m

particularistic costs

This distinction

number of groups

we

refonn, legislators sought to close
a large

loopholes favored by various groups
whereas
legislators sought to

important factor

it

find

it

more

difficult to site

would require overcoming

obstructionist fellow legislators and groups.

Methods

The

factors

procedural choice.

benefit,

we would

procedure

when

discussed

First,

when

above offer a number of general propositions about
cutting particularistic benefits in favor of

some

general

expect Congress to be more likely to employ an extra-congressional
the

particularistic

benefits
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being

cut

are

more

geographically

concentrated.

Seeoncl,

wo would

benellt,

when

ct.lt.ng partienlaristic

expect Congress to be ntore
hkely to entploy an
extra-congressional

procedure when the seope of the
poliey area
enacting policies of this type,
institutional

henellts in favor „l sonte
general

we would

in

question

is

Congress, willing

area.

to stake scarce political capital

here arc several reasons

First,

on enactment of a policy

if

we were

studying

while

why
it

is

a case-study

of cases under study

ail legislation that

it

is

more appropriate

method

clear that Congress

is

that will,

we

is

rather than

by

expect that

is

quite capable

more

number of cases
is

rich detail

all

it

is

equally

legislation in

in greater detail.

less likely to

which

In short,

be answered reliably

of partieular cases.

Second, as the discussion above implies, there are numerous factors
procedural choice that the dissertation seeks to explore.

In short, since

adequately explain the use of an extra-congressional procedure
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of enacting

Because we arc examining exceptional

the central question to be asked in this dissertation

by crude quantitative measures than by the

benefit,

in testing

limited, for instance, than

confers general benefits or

to study a small

many.

most appropriate

of some general

limited; far

coalition leaders utilized procedural mechanisms.

cases,

Finally,

one or a few groups

legislation that cuts particularistic benefits in
favor

clear that the universe

that

be more likely to employ an
extra-congressional procedure when

the particularistic costs arc being imposed
on

these propositions.

expect

champions emerge wiihm

dennition, impose costs on particular
groups and/or locations.

I

we

Fourth,

also a function of whether or not
powerful

legislative leaders will

when

riurd,

expect legislative leaders to he
constrained by

developments within the given policy

procedural ehoice

more narrow,

is

at

work

in

geography cannot

in all cases,

we need

to

ngure out what does. The case
study metliod

poke” methodology

in

will allow us to utilize

our search for these additional

more of a “soak and

factors.

Case Selection

The cases

selected for study are those arranged
above in Table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2

Internal Procedures

-

Cases Selected for Study

Geographic Groups

Non-Geographic Groups

Choice of Nuclear Waste

Tax Refomi Act of 1986

Disposal Site

Extra-Congressional

Base Realignment and Closure

North American Free Trade

Procedures

Commission

Agreement

Because the geographic/non-geographic distinction

is

so prominent in the literature,

it

is

important to be sure cases are selected with an eye towards the
geographic dispersion of
the particularistic benefits being cut or costs being imposed.

The cases of tax reform and

base closure thus serve as two cases that meet the hypothetical
expectations of the

independent variable of geography.

Because base closure requires imposing costs on

relatively discrete geographic constituencies

and because the

literature tells us that the

geographic nature of these costs makes them particularly sensitive,

Congress
Therefore,

to

it

have a great deal of
is

difficulty

in

we

expect

members of

making these decisions

internally.

not surprising to us to find that an extra-congressional procedure was
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ut.lizcd.

used.

SimMarly, in

Because the

Congress prefers

to

tl,e

case of lax rclbnii,

part.eularistie

The ease of nuclear waste

which Congress seeks
general benefit.

benelits to be cut

cxpccl inlcmai procedures to
he
are

less

geograph, e

in

nature.

handle these matters internal
ly.

Each of the other two cases
choice.

we would

to

fails to

meet geographic cxpcclalions of
p,oeedural

disposal, like the case of base
closure,

impose geographically-concentrated
costs

in

was

a ease in

favor of

While we would expect an extra-congressional
procedure

the choice of a high-level nuclear
waste disposal site

is

to

be

some

utilized,

effectively handled within

Congress.

Similarly, the fast track procedure utilized
in the negotiation and
approval of

the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

fails

lo

nteel the hypothetical

expectations of this independent variable. Trade
policy, like lax refomi, clearly imposes
costs

on geographically dispersed communities suggesting
Congress would be more

mehned

to

handle the matter internally.

In this case,

congressional procedure.
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however. Congress utilized an extra-

CHAPTER

3

BASE CLOSURE

There are many reasons
closure.

the

We

search

procedures,

where they

want
for

to

variables

are not.

m

that

to

Second, as

a control case of sorts.

imposed

it

makes sense

to first

open the black box of base

examine an extra-congressional procedure

makes sense

it

why

It is

lead

coalition

leaders

to

first

utilize

because, after

pointed out

a case in

m chapter 2, base closure,

a relatively narrow policy area in favor of
general benefits.

main independent variable and other

The problem of elosing

Members have obvious

factors

is

we have

are, rather than

like tax reform, is

which geographically concentrated

congressional procedure was utilized in this case

costs are being

That an extra-

therefore expected according to the

already identified.

military bases presents a classic collective action
problem.

electoral incentives to acquire military bases for their
districts just

as they regularly seek federal grants and construction
projects.

But members have even

greater electoral incentives to ensure that benefits already acquired are
maintained.^'

not surprising then, that

bases in their

districts.

of constituents.

in

extra-congressional

begin our search where those elements
I

all,

members

It is

are willing to fight tooth and nail to maintain military

Bases provide jobs both directly and indirectly to large numbers

Members

fear these constituents will hold

for their fate should they lose those jobs.

The sum of

all

them personally responsible

members

fighting to maintain

This concept has become conventional wisdom among political scientists. For instance, see Arnold, The
Logic oj Congressional Action, 32, and Weaver, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” 371-98.
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the,r bases

means

Utilizing the

that

nonnal

Congress, as an institut.on,

is

unable to shut

down mihtaty

bases

legislative process.

The commission procedure eventually
two very similar forms.

Under

utilized to close military
bases has taken

the procedure adopted in
1988,“ Congress gave legal

sanction to a commission that had
already been established by
Secretary of Defense Frank

Carlucct to draw up a
hst

list

of bases

would then be forwarded

accept the

list

to

to the Secretary

without amendment.

disapproving the

be closed or realigned by December
31, 1988. The
of Defense,

Congress retained the

commission

the

Environmental

Policy

Act

and

the

right to pass a joint resolution

(NEPA)

NEPA

The

Signincantly, the

Pentagon

of

1969

requirements, but did require compliance with
realigning bases.

could either reject or

without amendments, but this
effectively meant a two-thirds

list

majority would be required to stop the
list.“

exempted

who

from

new procedure

complying

environmental

NEPA

with

impact

also

National

statement

requirements in closing and

requirements had been the main source of
congressional

delay and obstruction in attempted base closures
since 1977.

There were only a few differences

The second procedure
and 1995.

list

it

second procedure, adopted

in 1990.^’'*

called for three additional rounds of base closures in
1991, 1993,

In these rounds, the Secretary

and forward

in the

to the

of Defense was empowered

commission, which would be empowered

to

to write the initial

add or delete bases.

P.L. 100-526, approved October 24, 1988.

A joint resolution requires

the signature of the president and it is fair to assume the president would be
approved by and forwarded to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense. Effectively,
this means that Congress could only stop a list of base closures and
realignments by overriding a
presidential veto, which requires a 2/3 vote.

supportive of a

list

P.L. 101-510, approved

November

5,

1990.
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The

list

would then be forwarded

to the president,

who

could approve or reject the

without antendments. Congress
would again have the option of
disapproving the

whole with a

joint resolution.

While

in the first

mechanism was

was dropped

in the

as a

round, the commission was
forced to

choose for closure only those bases
whose savings would
years, this requirement

list

list

offset closing costs within
SIX

second procedure.

A

more automatic funding

also adopted in the second
procedure to cut off the appropriations

process as a potential back-door option
for legislators hoping to keep
their base open, and

GAO

review of commission calculations was
also mandated

Finally, under the second procedure,
appointment of

in the

second procedure.

commission members was

to

be

subject to Senate confirmation.

From

a public choice perspective, both
procedures provide a solution to a classic

collective action problem.

didn

t

The question, however,

is

why

this

particular solution!

Why

Congress, for instance, simply allow a committee to
report legislation and consider

the legislation under a closed rule?

Pentagon

to

close bases?

Answers

Why
to

didn’t Congress delegate authority to the

these

questions can only be had by

first

understanding the unique institutional and historical context
surrounding military base

When

closures.

context,

it

the collective action problem of base closures

becomes

clear that the base closure

placed within that

commission procedure represented the only

politically feasible route to closing military bases in the 1980s
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is

and 1990s.

^Brief History of Military Base
Christopher

controversy run deep

in

J.

rioQn.v>c

Deering points out, "the roots of
the base closure

American history

Article

I,

Section 8 grants the Congress

authority for the "erection of
forts, magazines, arsenals,
dockyards, and other needful

buildings” and Article IV, Section
3 grants the Congress power to "dispose
of and
all

make

needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property”
of the federal

government.

As

IS

close bases

restricted,

the case with

was delegated

many powers

granted to Congress, authority to
construct and

to the executive.

And

like

other policy areas, Congress

rather narrowly, executive authority
for the construction and disposal
of

military facilities during peacetime and
provided
wartime.'^'’

however,

many

One

is its

between the

distinctive characteristic

parochial nature.

legislative

more

liberal grants

of power during

of military construction as a policy

This led to relatively wide divergence

and executive branches

in this particular part

Because there are many communities which owe

their

growth and,

in

activities

in

some

official.

The

classic expression of this remains the

Committee aide who pointed out

cases, their

who

represent

became more ardent advocates and defenders of

undertaken on the base, and of the existence of the base

executive branch

policy views

of defense policy.

existence to the presence of a local military installation, the
legislators
these military communities quickly

area,

to

one researcher, “our committee

Deering, “Congress, the President, and Automatic Government...,” 155.
Deering, “Congress, the President, and Automatic Government...,” 155.
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the

itself,

than any

Armed

Services

is

a real estate

committee.

Don’t forget

that.

If

you study our committee, you
arc studying

real estate

transactions.”^’^

Th.s line of thinking

is

the most important legacy
of the early dcvclopntcnt of

military tnstallations policy
and remains to the present day.
intensity

and

political sensttiv.ty that

by the division of labor
Appropriations

for

the

subcommittees.

For

$9.2 billion

to

Security

bill

in the

surrounds military installations
policy

of

Defense

are

activities associated with

highlighted

is

reported

by

two

of these

1998, the Subcommittee on Militai^
Construction reported a

pay for new military construction.

(Armed Services

in the

The Subcommittee on National

Senate) reported a $247.7 billion

the Defense Department.

bill to

Moreover, for

pay

all

for all other

the anger and

resentment that President Clinton’s use of the
line-item veto aroused on Capitol

one package of rescissions was ever reinstated
overriding the President’s veto
million rescission package from a military
construction appropriations
All of this

legislators

is

that the

appropriations subcommittees of the
House and Senate.“

Department

fiscal

Arnold points ont

significant,

-

only

a $286.7

bill.

of course, because what matters most are

have about the costs and benefits associated with

Hill,

i\\Q

perceptions

legislative action.

For

instance, Arnold argues that,

the eventual

impact of local benefits on congressional policy making

depends crucially on how congressmen evaluate both the general and
group costs and benefits associated with particular programs.
Local
benefits

become paramount when congressmen

believe that a program

An unidentified staff member of the Armed Services Committee quoted in Lewis Antliony Dexter,
“Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy,” in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, eds..
New
Perspectives on the House of Representatives (C'hicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 182.
R.
eds..

Douglas Arnold, “I he Local Roots of Domestic Policy” in Thomas L. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein,
The New Congress (Washington, D.C.: American Lnterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1981), 263.
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™uld

In the case

have few general or group
benehts, or considerable costs
of either

of base closure, the format,
ve role the development of
mil.tary

poltcy plays

in legtslators’

mihtary installations policy

perceptions

,n

is

therefore cntcial.

temts of the local benefits

,t

Legislators

who

installations

concetve of

delivers cannot be expected
to

receive notices of executive
plans to close military bases
with reticence.

196Mm

The contemporary

and .lohnson administrations’
year, the

73 bases

battle

initiatives to close bases

Pentagon released a new base closure
in

of base closures began with the
Kennedy

list

and each year the

1961, 98 bases in 1962, 33 bases in
1963, 95 bases

1965.™ The congressional response
was increasingly

Armed
bill

between 1961 and 1965.

hostile.

Services Committee inserted a provision
in the

fiscal

in

In

lists

were extensive

bill,

a

1964, and 149 bases in

May

1965, the House

1966 defense authorization

compromise provision was approved by both houses

of restnctions on Pentagon attempts

to close bases.

The

that

imposed a variety

restrictions included a

mandatory

120-day delay between announcement and implementation
of base closures.
importantly, the

and April 30 so

70

-

providing for a one-house legislative veto
of base closure plans and, after conference

on the

69

Each

bill restricted

that the

Armed

More

the Pentagon to announcing closures between
January

1

Services Committees would have an opportunity to write

'

Arnold, “The Local Roots of Domestic Policy,” 253.

David Casimir Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures:

How Congress

Balances Geographic and General

Interests” (Berkeley; University of California, Ph.D. Dissertation,
1993), 51.

These figures appear to be a
matter of some controversy. Charlotte Twight, “Department of Defense
Attempts to Close Mihtary Bases;
The Political Economy of Congressional Resistance” in Robert Higgs, ed.. Arms, Politics
and the Economy

(New York: Holmes
December

&

Meier, 1990), 241-242, reports the figures as 73 bases (37 in the U.S.) in March
in April 1964, 95 bases in November 1964, and 149 bases in
1965. For our purposes, the exact figures are not relevant. It is sufficient to say that the

1961, 33 bases in

December 1963, 63 bases

Department of Defense was regularly releasing

lists

of significant numbers of base closures.
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language mio delcnse anthori.alion
hULs greclu.ln.g
no.

wan.

.„ close.

l-.esnle,.. .loin. so,,

V.olaled Ihe .scparallon of
I'.esiden.’s veto.

ciosnres nnlM

wilh

ti

.1(1

II,

vetoed the

c

dosme

Angus.

powers and Ihe Congiess did

1

no.

nfha.scs the Congre.s.s did

0„5 on the grounds

ll.at

i.

a.lemp. to overnde Hie

However, a new p.ovision was
passed delaying

nnplen.e.i.al.on of

days afler Ihe lenlagon had piovided
.he Armed .Saviees Comnuiiees

jiisli llccilion

lor closure decisions.

Despilc Ihis inini-ievolt, Ihe I'enlagon
had lemaikahle success closing
bases

clnnng Ihe IhbOs.

ll.e

ronii

of

legislalo,-s

I

here

was

icsislanee Iron. Congress, hnl lhal
resislance generally look

legislators appealing dircclly to

the

l>enlagon on behair ok ha.scs,
and

generally accepted even the lenlagon’s
adver.se decisions.''^

above, legislabus viewed the eonsirnelion,
and even inoie
nislallalions Ihrougb local lenses,

will, al.nosi

bow

is

il

no syslenialie resislance? More

Ihe dilatory and obsirnelioni.sl ladies they

Ibal Ibey

as argued

If,

so. Hie closure

of

inilitary

allowed Ibese closures

lo

proceed

specilically,

why

would employ jiisl

didn't legislalors engage in

a decade later iu respon.se lo

base closures?

I

general,

here aie several reasons

we

rellective ol

dominated by

can say

its

to the expertise

”

('ongress allowed closures to go forward, but

the base closure policy process

what many other policy processes looked

policymaking.

o(

that

why

own

set

like

of norms and practices consistent with

Members ofC’ongress

generally were

l%()s was merely

the

in

in

a

in

the

l%()s

-

it

was

sub-government model

more willing

than today to defer

and objectivity of Pentagon analyses. Particularly during the early IbPOs,

fwight, “Dcpiiitmcnl oC )c fcn.se Altcinpts to Close Mililaiy Ha.ses...,” 242-4.C
I

Iladwiger, “Military Base Closures..,,”

')!.
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the Pentagon retained
widespread prestige and dominated
the defense

The

early 1960s arguably

Congress were also
foree posture.

marked

the height

less willing to ehallenge

But another important faetor

proeess.

of the Cold War and so
members of
Pentagon assessments about
appropriate
in

explaining the relative
congressional

complaisance on base closures was
the cozy arrangement

members of

pohey

that

had developed between

the relevant military committees
in Congress and the
Pentagon.

argues that “the evidence

is

compelling

that bureaucrats

with representatives on the military
committees.””
that although bases in important

least partially correct.”"

In

members’

exchange

districts

avoided closing bases

Arnold

in districts

David Casimir Hadwiger points out

were closed, “Arnold

for the courtesy paid to

is

probably

at

them by the Pentagon, the

military committees gave relatively
wide latitude to the Department of Defense
on base
closure.

—
During the

cozy arrangement began
first

to

break

down

in the

late

1960s.

half of the next decade, four factors would
converge to help construct a

large bipartisan coalition against Pentagon
base closure

lists.

First,

rapidly eroding as the situation in Vietnam
deteriorated. At the
rapidly developing

members on both

its

the

own

Pentagon prestige was

same

sources of expertise and analysis.

time. Congress

The number of

House and Senate Armed Services Committees

tripled

was
staff

between

R. Douglas Arnold, “Legislators, Bureaucrats, and Locational Decisions,”
Public Choice vol 37 (1981)
117.

Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 89.
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1961 and 1976.
to defer to

Together, these developments
meant that Congress would be
less likely

Pentagon expertise.

Second, Congress was undergoing
period.

Kenneth Shepsle points out

dominated by

its

full

own

its

that the old

rank-and-file

equil.bnum

members were becoming

new

less likely to display the kind

committees on base closure policy

of deference

that

in

this

which Congress was

Many members came

Pentagon selected

to the

numbers of policy

which

areas.’‘>

tools at his or

districts, but also that

members

committee chairs of the relevant

lists

of the early 1970s angered members

to believe that closure lists

were

for closure bases in the districts

politically motivated,

of members

uncooperative with the administration, that the
Pentagon was complicit
information and actively deceiving

m

dynamic

had been the norm previously/^

Third, the particulars of the base closure

that the

change

member had more

her disposal to defend bases selected
for closure in their

of Congress.

in

institutional

active players in greater

This decentralization of power meant
not only that each

were

institutional

standing committees, and more
specifically by the chatrs of
those

standing committees, was being
replaced by a

full

rapid

members of Congress, and

that the savings

who were
in

hiding

from base

Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 92.

Kenneth A. Shepsle, “The Changing Textbook Congress” in John E. Chubb and
Paul E. Peterson,
the Government Govern? (Washington. D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
238-66.

Can

eds..

1989),

Speaking in general of the changes in Congress during the late 1960s and early
1970s, Shepsle, “The
Changing Textbook Congress,” 264, argues, “the slow accretion of resources permitted members
to respond
to the

changes

in their

developments began
Congress.”

home

to

districts and encouraged them to cross the boundaries of specialization. These
erode the reciprocity, deference, and division of labor that defined the textbook
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closures were not nearly
as large as the Pentagon

ela.med™

impositton of restrietions on
Pentagon closure plans

in

Looking back on the

1976 and 1977, Senator Carl

Levin (D-Ml) argued,

onpn

the

of the congressional

on base closings, which we
happened in
sachusetts in the early 1970s.
Massachusetts was the only state to vote
Democratic in 1972 and what happened
in 1974?
President Nixon’s
Pentagon came up with a list of bases
to be closed, and Massachusetts
was
isproportionately and heavily impacted
by that list.
.Let me remind
restrictions

.

my

.

colleagues that there was a reason for
this protection.
This country is
based on a premise that we do not
want all power in one branch of
Government. There was too much power
for the executive branch to
unilaterally close bases, and Congress
did something about it.^‘^
Finally, deteriorating

economic conditions

northeast and midwest in particular,
the

economic impact of

April

closures.*^"

in the nation as a

made members of Congress much more

When

in the

sensitive to

the Pentagon released a base closure

in

list

1973 that included 274 separate realignment
and closure actions, there was a

widespread belief that the actions disproportionately
northeast.

legislators

Shortly before the

list

was

fell

on those

The

release of the

list

For greater

detail
.

on

this line

it

Congressional Record,

Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 88.
Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 70-73.
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May

10, 1988,

in

served as a formative

of argument, see Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts

in

the

to review base closure

255-62.

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) quoted

in

fanned the flames of discontent

Congress and though the legislation never passed either house,

Military Bases.

districts

released, a group of predominantly northeastern

proposed legislation for an independent commission

proposals from the Pentagon.^'

80

whole, and

S10197.

to

Close

period for the coalition that
would eventually impose real
restrictions on Pentagon
closure
plans.

Wtth

roughly

500 bases closed during the

announcement of 147 additional closures
broke the camel’s back.
Representative William

Force Base

,n

March and

with

NEPA

for closure, a

to

block a closure

strong sentiment

but the Senate

the most recent

in

fell

Congress

after a decision

if

it

for

so desired.

Pentagon’s

list

It

of closures, Congress attached
required notification

DOD

when

bases

compliance

was made by

DOD

Though

was passed

Congress eventually passed and the

failure.

bill.

The only

this legislation

a year later

was only

60 days, but the

requirements would

year, a nearly identical

to military installations

History of Protection by the System,”

(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,

one

to

which made the procedural changes permanent.

Moreover, while the original legislation applied only

A

NEPA

effective for

change was

significant

implementation of closures was shortened

Congressional Quarterly, “Bases:

base to allow

President Ford vetoed the measure
despite

change was effectively meaningless because compliance
with
take a year.

to close a

an oveiride. The House did eventually
override the veto

Despite this

short.

that the one-year delay in

provision

the

the tncittston of Loring
Air

mandatory waiting period of 9 months,

President signed a nearly identical version
of the

still

“

requirements, a detailed justification of
decisions to proceed with closure,

and a 90-day waiting period

Congress

970s

April 1976 becante the straw
that

Cohen (R-ME), who was enraged by

restrictive provisions to the
military construction bill.

were candidates

1

Led by House Majority Leader
Tip O’Netll (D-MA) and

Maine on

central

,n

early

Inc.,

1989), 441.
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in

1988

employing

CQ Almanac

over 500 people,

it

was amended

1978

in

cover

to

all

military installations
employing

over 300. 83

1972dm
cold.

in

When

The new base closure procedure

Secretaot of Defense Harold

1978 and 1979, he was completely
Congress

now had

effectively stopped base
closures

Brown proposed base

frustrated. Charlotte

closures and realignments

Twight outlines the

difficulty.

a profusion of tools with

which to undercut proposed
court challenges, Congressional
hearings on *e
candidate bases and on the
detailed justifications
Lbinitted
Congressional demands for environmental
studies during the authorization
and appropriation process even when
not otherwise required by law
denial
of design funds for base consolidation,
disapproval of construction funds
to effect closures or realignments,
imposition of requirements
base closures:

NEPA

DOD

for alternate

use studies or one-year delays prior
to implementation, and
“remedial”
legislafion to block entirely DOD’s
decision to close
base.

or realign a military

These tools were employed with

Congress’ victory on the issue was
period between

total.

zeal.^*^

No

major base

-

not one

1977 and 1988, while 13 were created.*^

legislators with

difficult

something to defend.

politically

was closed

in the

Moreover, the Reagan

administration’s homeport project, which effectively
spread out the

Navy, made closures even more

-

home

ports for the

by e.xpanding the number of

Minor revisions were made

to base closure

procedures in 1982 and 1985, but the net effect was negligible.

What changed
in the

Congress?

members were

83

then, in the late 1980s, to

First, the

budget

deficit

make base

closure politically viable again

had become a

politically salient issue

and

increasingly searching for votes to bolster their deficit-hawk credentials.

Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts

to

Close Military Bases...,” 244-45.

Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts

to

Close Military Bases...,” 246.

Congressional Quarterly, “Bases:

A

History of Protection by the System,” 441.

45

Second, the .haw

,n

relat.ons

Congress were beginn.ng
spending

cuts.

Third, as

opportunity that would

between Eas, and Wes, mean,

,ha,

many .nembers of

,o look a, the large
defense budge, as a po.enbal
source

we

will see, the late
1980s offered a unique

make base

Whatever the changed

closure easier for

political

members

of

window of political

to swallow.

atmosphere was, however, one
thing was

sure.

A

successful base closure procedure
would have to be sensitive
to the historical and
institutional

developments of the preceding quarter
century.

expected to defer

to

Members could

no, be

executive expertise or prestige and
the rise of the more
individualized

political enterprises in

Congress meant

that the

new process would somehow have

insulated from the meddling of
individual legislators without entirely
delegating
institutional prerogatives.

Only

the base closure commission
procedure me,

to be

away key

all

of these

requirements.

Procedural Choice and Base riosnrpQ

The congressional debate over
variety of

ways

base closure.

m

the base closure

which the unique procedure

More

specifically,

particularistic cost being

while

we

satisfied congressional apprehension over

find that the

in this policy area outlined

procedural choice.

geographic nature of the

imposed and the scope of the policy area were

the choice of an extra-congressional procedure,

developments

commission procedure reveals a

it

is

critical factors in

also clear that the institutional

above served as another

In short, an extra-congressional procedure

critical set

made

of factors

in

sense in the case of

base closure because of the sensitive nature of the particularistic cost and
also because the
policy area in question provided a relatively cost-free avenue of delegation.
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But the case

also po.nts ,o the
.ntportance of h.stoncal
developnten, as a key factor

procedural

choice.

more widely
that

cited and discussed

the benefits

groups

“ As

represemat.on

likely to

m

the d.fftculty surrounding
base closure than the fact

from mihtary installations are
shared by concentrated
geographic

dtseussed earlier, not only does
this
in

both houses of Congress, but

,t

mean

also

that these

means

groups have d.reet

that these

groups are more

organize in opposition to a base
closure as a result of their
geographic

proximity.^^

One

piece of evidence suggesting the
importance of geography

closures have always been a matter
of

much

greater sensitivity

smaller constituencies than in the Senate.^^
This gap
best revealed

by the way the two houses reacted

attempt to unilaterally close bases
early in 1990.

In response, the

Defense Authorization
to

bill

m

Senate

Armed

the fact that base

the

House with

its

m comparative sensitivity is perhaps

to Secretary

of Defense Dick Cheney’s

Cheney proposed a

1990.

m

is

list

of 47 bases

to close

Services Committee version of the 1991

included provisions to remove some of the procedural
hurdles

base closure in place since 1976.

The House, on

the other hand, adopted procedures

many scholars I have cited in favor of this general proposition, it is important
to note
scholars cite base closure as the prime example of how
geographic benefits are more sensitive

In addition to the
that

many

than non-geogiaphic benefits. See for instance, James

M.

Lindsay, “Parochialism, Policy, and Constituency

Constraints: Congressional Voting

on Strategic Weapons Systems” in American Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 34, No. 4 (November 1990), 936-60. Significantly,
Lindsay finds that parochial concerns
intrude on defense policy decisions far less than the political science
literature would suggest
but that

military installations policy

is

the

most notable exception

to this

mle.

See, for instance, Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 26.

Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts to Close Military Bases...,” 241.
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designed ,o preclude
the

base closures, even those
that would have heen
allowed under

O’Neill-Cohen proeedures,

Cheney

until

offered

legislation

estahhshing a non-

partisan base closure
procedure.

The problem of geography was so
pervasive
major base had been closed

in the

in the

ease of base closures that
no

United States under the
O’Ne.ll-Cohen procedures

matniy because individual
members of Congress were very
active
closures in their distnets.

and representative
district

It.”""

to

As Twight

points out,

was

result

that,

Constituents

by 1988, actively blocking

longer provided any reward for
legislators.

new commission
opportunities”"'

closure

It

in his

demand

of every senator
or her state or

reelect.on requires

,t;

the closure of a military base,
no

was expected and required of them.
The

procedure, on the other hand, “might
expand such credit-claiming

by allowing members

In

list.

the perceived duty

block military base closures or
reductions

within the bounds of existing law.

The

‘Mt is

blocking base

in

become

to

heroic advocates for bases on the

frequently cited remarks, Senator Phil

Gramm (R-TX)

outlines the

political rationale.

The beauty of this proposal is that: If you have
- God forbid one should be closed in

district

under

this proposal,

I

have 60 days.

have mercy. Don’t close
south.

The Russians

this

base

down

in

So

I

come up

Texas.

it

could happen

here and

I

say,

-

“God

We can

get attacked from the
are going to go after our leadership and you
know

they are going to attack Texas.
lie

a military base in your

Texas, but

We

need

Then I can go out and
and the bulldozers are coming and I have a trusty
gets there to drag me out of the way. All the people
in
this base.

in the street

aide there just as

it

Congressional Quarterly, Congress ami the Nation, Volume
Inc., 1993), 353-354.

VIII,

1989-1992 (Washington D.C.:

Congressional Quarterly,

Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts

to

Close Military Bases...,” 250.

Twight, “Department of Defense Attempts

to

Close Military Bases...,” fn44, 276.
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«

Muleshoe, or wherever

Many
would

was

this

base

,i.e the

will say

is,

for the political logic

,0 vote to

Phil r,-

S
way

members of Congress from blame

free

‘You know

Ala.o,

others were equally expliet,
about the

Argumg
having

it

in

winch the contnttsston procedure

for the

loss

of geographic

benefits.

of a congressional vote of
disapproval rather than Congress

approve the base closure

list

from the comnnssion,
Representat.ve John

Kasich (R-OH) argues,
think

It
makes far greater sense from a
political perspective for
yourselves not to be held responsible
for being able to stop a
bill from

coming
buy

up.

t

IS

much

easier to

be able to make the argument that, •]
tried
d’sttPPtoval, but the Congress just
simply wouldn’t

it

The unique

political sensitivity

of geographic benefits

further underscored

is

by

the intense debate surrounding
congressional involvement in commission
deliberations.

During

that debate,

Representative John Porter (R-IL) proposed
an amendment that

would have included the chairmen and ranking
members of
committees

as

Representative Les
chair

and

Aspm (D-WI)

ranking

member of

amendment. Aspin argued,
this

92

committee

^^Senator Phil

members

ex-officio

in the

“I

of

the

commission.

the

relevant

Without

hesitation.

and Representative William Dickinson (R-AL),
the

the

House Armed Service Committee fought

the

have enough trouble getting myself elected as chairman
of

caucus over here every 2 years.”” Dickinson added,

Gramm (R-TX)

military

quoted

in

"I

would not

Dick Armey, “Base Maneuvers,” Policy Review (Winter 1988),
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Representative John Kasich (R-OH) quoted in Congressional Record, July

Representative Les Aspin (D-Wl) quoted

in

Congressional Record, July

49

7,

1988,

12, 1988,

HI 7079.

H17747.

.

e ,0 serve on [the
commiss.on],

Dellunts] or the gentlentan
front
to serve

I

do no, think the gentlentan

New York

front Califontia [Mr.

[Mr. Martin] are chontphtg

a,

the hi, or wislt

on

The antendnten, was defeated by
a voiee vote and

its

easy defeat underscores the

rationale for utilizing an
extra-congressional procedure to
deal with base closure
rather

than utilizing

more common,

legislative vehicles.

internal

procedures such as closed rules
and ontnihns

While Congress has been able

to craft other pieces

of legislat.on

cut parttcularistic benefits in
favor of sonte general benefit,
such as the

of 1986,

this

become

a

champion of that

legislation.

nature of the benefit involved in base
closure, however,

champion of specif,

closures.

It

is

T he Scope of
main sponsor and

was

procedures,

is

clearly impossible to attract a

not surprising then, that the
delegation of authority

m

To whom should Congress

the Policy Area.

to

how would

the

Armey (R-TX) was

the

But

delegate?

Representative Richard

the driving force behind the

commission procedure.

He had

attaching the commission procedure to the
defense authorization

1987, coming just seven votes short.
issue

it

Because of the geographic

attractive alternative to handling base
closure internally.

costs of delegation be contained?

succeeded

Tax Refomt Act

could only be accomplished because
there was sonte legislator
or group of

legislators willing to

became an

that

view

Armey

it

Armey

bill

in

believed that the key to the base closure

through an institutional

said,

nearly

lens.

Speaking of the O’Neill-Cohen

“one can speculate on whether or not the Maine delegation had

parochial motives in stopping base closings with red tape, but they
would never have

Representative William Dickinson (R-AL) quoted in Congressional Record, July
12, 1988, HI 7747.
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ccn able

to sell

it

to the

Congress as a purely parochial

concern.”'^'’

The

real issue,

he

argued, was the
legislative-executive battle.

ab,l.

y

hands'

to

n

deny

,t.

If, he

oxeeutive braneh

I,

as unrestneted (Veedo,

'TIT'

y

««'!».,

T

this

in

,ts

gress has an institutional
interest in insuring that
the

"'Crests ean be

ucicdteu,
defca'ter ... institutional
ms,i,ut°“ T'
interests cannot.

Anney knew

,

then, that a base elosnre
proeedure

would only be adopted

if

,t

eould address

problem of delegation.

Opponents of the commission proeedure
knew

this too,

pains to depict this delegation of
power as apocalyptic.

primary opponent of the legislation

I

do not know,

in

in the

and they went

to great

Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL), the

Senate, argued,

my

professional career, which spans now
almost four
decades, any kind of exceptional authority
as immense, as dramatic as

overwhelming, as undemocratic as the
provision in this bill that will
permit the Secretary of Defense to appoint
a commission of people of his
choice to bring back to him a list of bases
to be closed, and, boom, they
arc
closed and Congress has nothing to say.”‘^*^
Representative Frank Horton

(R-NY)

delegation of legislative authority

Armey, “Base Maneuvers,"

73.

Armey, “Base Maneuvers,”

73.

Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) quoted

in

refetred to

in the history

Amtey’s
of

Congressional Record,

Representative Frank Horton (R-NY) quoted

in

bill

this country,”'”

May

9,

and Senator Levin

1988, S10142.

Congressional Record, July

51

as "the largest unbridled

7,

1988, 1117063.

referred to

it

as “an excessive
delegation of power.

not in keeping with
our

IS

It

celebration of the Constitution,
which calls for divided power. 5.100

Meanwhtle, both sides of the
debate outlined the dangers
of allowing
“polittcar influence over base
closure decisions, whether

Pentagon, or the White House.
explain that

it

was

to the

iny

t,

the

Senate floor to

the constant stonewalling
of tnformation front the Air
Force regarding

sponsor of the restrictive base closure
legislation

Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) pointed out
procedure must be

base closure

Historically,

that the

that “the executtve

caprtctous decisions.”'"^

in

comes from Congress,

it

Senator William Cohen took

the proposed closure of Coring
Air Force Base tn

concern

for

in

had led him

that

1976 and 1977 .'“'

to

become

a

Representative

“most tniponam” aspect of a
base closure

branch will not be able to make
arbitrary or

Armey

Representattve

is

Maine

reiterated his

view

that

the “larger

the interest of the institution.

base closing has been used as a
point of leverage by
both Republican and Democratic

administrations,

administrations

political leverage
to vote

m

a

communities
that

over and above

manner
afflicted,

Members of Congress

that the administration

and

we have

seen,

I

am

would
afraid,

as

encourage them

to

So we have
even base closings

like.

would hamper our nation’s defense out of
a sense of

political

interest.

This institutional problem was so sensitive, in

many members
staff.

An

fact, that

during the congressional debate

raised concerns about the lack of independence
of the

commission and

opponent of the commission process. Representative Porter
pointed out

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) quoted in Congressional Record,

See the remarks of Senator William Cohen (R-ME)

in

May

10, 1988,

Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) quoted in Congressional Record, July

Representative Dick

Armey (R-TX) quoted

in

7,

Congressional Record, July

52

May

1988,

7,

that the

S10197.

Congressional Record,

10, 1988,

HI 7065.

1988,

HI 7072.

its

S10223.

Armey

bin would simply be
prov,d,„« legal sanebon

underway by Secretary of Defense
Frank

base elosure cITobs
already

Carlucci.

which presently

Lmn^nsed or
II

probably lead to the closing or
realigning of a number
of
All of that wilhonl any
congressional

installations.

is

^

milii-.rv

input."”

Porter

eventually

commission

proposed

staff who

In the light

an

amendment

barring

anyone

from

had been employed by the
Pentagon within the

of these

commission process was

institutional concerns,

politically allraclivc.

it

is

not hard to imagine

the beauty of the

commission process as

problem of delegation was most evident
Kenneth Mayer points out

domain of the agent’s
commission,

establishing

why

the

at all.

to close

to

only those

But as with most

a solution to the institutional

in the details.

members of Congress made

that

authority”""'

the

Congress would delegate authority

bases approved by the independent
commission or close none

works of art,

on

last year."’-'

propose base closures to an ad-hoc
institution and force the
executive

great

serving

sure to limit “the

by establishing decision-making

membership

controls

over

the

criteria

commission,

and

for

the

most

F^epresentative John Porter (R-II.) quoted in
Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, FI17743.
'

^

The amendment was defeated

but restrictions of this sort did eventually find
their way into the final
Defense Secretary ITank Carlucci had created the
commission without congressional
approval earlier in the year and the plan was that the
commission was to report to the Secretary by the end
of the year. I he Armey bill was seeking to
provide legal sanction for the Secretary of Defense to
implement the commission’s recommendations. It would therefore
be difficult to terminate all of the
existing commission staff and hire entirely new staff
so late in the process. Porter and Senator Dixon were
partially successful, however, in arranging for a
compromise. The final 1988 bill did impose controls on
the portion of commission staff directly from the
Pentagon and expand the number of commissioners, and
congressional leaders were informally a part of the process of selecting
the new members of the
commission. See, for instance, the remarks of Senator Sam Nunn (D-CiA)
quoted in Congressional Record
October 12, 1988, S29888.

version of the

bill.
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importantly for our purposes,
restriCng the jttrisdtctional
scope of the coutunssion’s
dehberattons.

The deeision-nraking

crtteria urtposed

upon the eonrnnss.on both
hnrited

the range of candidates
for closure and forced
the creatton of a
wntten record, which

could

later

be subjected

to analysis

Mayer provides an example of how

One

criteria

by other independent
organizations such

as the

GAO.

the cnteria hmited the
commission’s discretion.

imposed on the 1988 commission,
but dropped
all costs of any one
base closure be

a requirement that

thereafter

recovered

was

wh^m sa

™yacry; it was added to the
* bii^ h d'^H
Services
^
the
m - not even the commissionCommittee, but nobody outside of
e committee
itself - knew who had

im

or

why

It

was

inserted

The provision meant that the
commission could
bases because it was impossible
to quickly recover

there.

close any large

it

not

the
ge costs of shutting down a major
installation (transfer of
military
personnel, upgrading facilities
elsewhere, property disposal, etc.)
and tte
shutdown itself might take several years.

Congress also exerted control over the
membership of the commission and
staff

Under

the 1990 procedure, the president
could appoint

but the nominees were subject to
Senate connrmation.

within the Department of Defense within
the

last year.

members of the commission

In the first

required that half the commission staff
had to be people

its

who had

In the

round. Congress

not held positions

1990 law, the

level

was

raised to two-thirds, and requirements were
added specifying that no Defense Department

employee could serve as a lead analyst on commission
research and

that

Defense

Department employees who had previously worked on
base closure issues within the
Pentagon could not serve on the staff’®*

Mayer, “Closing Military Bases

(Finally)...,” 400-01.

Mayer, “Closing Military Bases

(Finally)...,” 402.

54

Finally,

by limiting

its

and most importantly. Congress
also limited the commission’s
discretion

Many members

jurisdiction.

to consider overseas bases
for closure.

of Congress fought

it

much

so

set out to accomplish.”'"'’

we

that

Armey

allow the commission

Representative John Kyi (R-AZ)
argued that

foreign bases should not be included
because

going to complicate

to

“it is

going

to

muddle

the thing up,

are really not going to
accomplish the

first

pointed out that foreign bases
had to be

it

task

left

is

we

out to

prevent,

commission from being sort of sucked
decision-makmg point of view, a bottomless
and a number of considerations of foreign
this

that take us far

But

this

what might be, from a
of international relations
policy and international treaties
beyond the original scope of this bill.”®

was more than

just a matter of

Members of Congress were very much
ability

making

into
pit

easier for the commissioners.

life

interested, as

Mayer

points out, in limiting the

of the commission “to make judgments and trade-offs

boundaries.”'"

Provisions were added

commission from looking

at

Department of Defense, so

facilities

that

in

for

instance,

were not under the

that

facilities

1990,

that crossed

that

any issue

prohibited

direct control

under the control of the

the

of the

Army Corps of

Engineers could be protected.”^

It is

clear then, that the scope of the policy area played a central role in
procedural

choice in the case of base closures.

commission’s purview has obvious

The amendment

political appeal.

to include foreign bases in the

Members could

then vote to cut the

Representative Jon Kyi (R-AZ) quoted in Congressional Record, July 12, 1988, HI 7751.
Representative Dick

'

'

'

'

Armey (R-TX) quoted

Mayer, “Closing Military Bases

in

Congressional Record, July

(Finally). .,” 404.
.
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12, 1988,

H17753.

improve defense posture and know

deficit,

most of then,) would be

amendment

home by

perceived more political danger
influence a larger

nobody's

by wtde margins

failed

,ha, a, leas,

in

district.

both houses.

number of issues

Why?

Because members obv.ously

(in this ease, the

in other policy areas
than they

the dice and allowing for
the potential of the

costs (and hopefully

Despite this inherent appeal,
the

allowing the agent

in

sene of the

saw

commission)

in

commission closing bases

to

simply rolling
in their

own

districts.

Thus, the variety of ways
discretion of the

which members of Congress were
able

in

commission goes

a long

way towards

explaining

to limit the

why Congress

utilizes

extra-congressional procedures in the case
of base closures and does not do
so in broader

policy areas such as lax refonn.
cuts

simply not a politically

is

because, by definition,

way

this

was done

in

Ih e Moment

it

The delegation of authority

to

realistic possibility in the

case of broad policy areas

would be impossible

to limit the jurisdiction

military

development.

in Political

Time.

installations

policy

first

of the agent

in the

The case of base

is

very

in

much

closure also points to the

procedural choice.

a

product of

its

As discussed

own

historical

That members of Congress view the construction and
closure of military

bases through a parochial lens has as

were

particularistic

base closure.

importance of the unique history of the policy area
earlier,

implement

built

as

it

much

to

do with the ways

in

which military bases

does with the nature of the policy area or the geographic

concentration of the benefit.

In other

words, while

it

is

relevant and important that the

benefits and costs associated with the construction and closure of military
bases are

'

Mayer, “Closing Military Bases

(Finally).
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relatively

geog.aphica„y concentrated,

Congress came

A

good

to

view mil.tary mstallations
pol.cy through

of the reason

part

also relevant and
nnportant that .nenrhers
of

.s

development of military
In addition,

why

that

happened

we have

restricted the Pentagon’s

Pentagon

power

development.

to unilaterally

because of the unique
historical

also seen that the perceived
political abuse of base
closures
in the

,970s was a major reason

why members

to unilaterally close
military bases in the late
1970s.

attempting to close military bases
a decade

not politically feasible.

over time.

installations policy.

by the Pentagon and the White
House

this histoncal

is

that parochial lens

later,

Effectively, this

coalition leaders had to be
sensitive to

meant

Specifically, delegation

draw up a

list

of bases

In

that certain procedural
options

of authority

to the president or the

be closed was understood by

to

were

all to

be

an unrealistic option.

Much of the

congressional literature deals directly with
the development of social

nomis, practices, and patterns of behavior
institution.

that help to

While those norms certainly owe

structure conflict within the

their existence, in part, to rational
actors

seeking to structure conflict within a large and
diverse body, they also are the result of
the

outcomes of previous
teaches us that

to

conflicts

and resolutions.

open or foreclose

in order to assess the

important to note as well, as

that

ways

in

it

is

important

which those

histories

certain options.

commission process was
legislation

a result, the case of base closure

m developing a more complete model of procedural choice,

examine histones of policy areas

It IS

As

cuts

also very

much

particularistic

we

will see in other cases, that the base closure

a product

benefits

57

of the

or

political calendar.

imposes

Any piece of

particularistic

costs

can

realist. cany

be adopted only

,f

.t

finds sonte

way

to obscure the causal
chain

votes oflegislators and the
negative poi.ey effects.-

I,

legislators to utilize
procedural tactics ,n the first
place.

why the contntission

reasons

been

,n

1987, or 1973 (the
First, legislation

Election

Day

in

1988,

time

it

had been proposed) for

authonzing the
voters,

first

to

closures

was being

felt

by

1988 than

.t

had

that matter.

and more tmportantly,
challengers, would know

that

would have no idea winch bases

list

was

Day, on December 31, and
there was a requirement
to 1990.

.n

of

round of closures was passed
shortly before

be closed. The specific base
closure

implemented prior

that leads

all,

In this light, there
are a variety

the .neumbent had voted
to close bases generally,
but

were going

notion, after

process was ^ore attractive
to legtslators

first

when

,s this

between the

be released

to

that

after Elect, on

no closures would be

This meant that by the time the
economic pinch of base

constituents, there

would be

several years, redistricting, and
at

least a

couple of elections between any legislator’s
vote for base closure and the
policy

effects

of those closures."^

The 1990 law, which

called for three additional rounds
of base closures, in 1991,

1993, and 1995 displayed similar temporal
sensitivity.
closures at once, limiting the
bases.

Second,

it

m

it

called for three rounds of

votes legislators would have to cast to
close

added an extra round of base closures before
members would be

running for office in their

announced

number of

First,

new

district

boundanes

in 1992.

the middle of non-election years, allowing

Finally, closures

members

in affected districts

time to contain the political damage.

For a discussion of this concept, see Arnold, The Logic
of Congressional Action, 44-51.
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would be

Bu, JUS. as in.por.an, as
original

of

all

base closure procedure.

Dickinson pointed out
the fact

IS

fea.ures

many circumstances have come
together
window ,o pass this legislation
now.
I,

no, pass this

to

my

is

and allow these base closures

bill

uetense,

Dickinson added,

“all these things

Reprosen.a.ive

to

ui

it

opinio

be

uhit

n™e^‘

if
,is

'ameduck adm.nis.ra.iou, we
all
of wbom support this

come

adds to the credibility of the
bill.”""

this

of .ho

that,

legislation.""

and

.he pohhcal

During .he congressionai
deha.e,

have a^lamXctleS’e;^^^^^^

In later debate,

was

that

in .his shor.

we do

.I.ese

into alignment a, the

Representative

.loel

same

time,

Hefley (R-CO)

explained that the timing was politically
safe because “the commission
would report after
Election

Day and

the Secretary

In short, there

calendar that

That

it

was

made

would have

was something

to act before Inauguration

special about 1988 as a

the vote to close bases far easier
than

a unique

moment

is

undisputable.

The

it

Day.”'"

moment on

the electoral

would have been otherwise.

rare double play

of a lame-duck

administration and congressional redistricting
directly on the horizon had occurred
only a

very few other times in this century

at

limes

when an

extra-congressional procedure

arguably unnecessary for base closure."* The
point here
political time offers constraints

and opportunities

is

that the particular

to coalition leaders that

moment
need

to

considered in developing a working theory of procedural
choice.

Representative William Dickinson (R-AL) quoted in Congressional
Record, July

7,

Representative William Dickinson (R-AL) quoted

12, 1988,

Representative Joel Hefley (R-CO) quoted

These two

factors also

came

in

in

Congressional Record, July

Congressional Record, July

12, 1988,

together in 1908, 1920, 1928, 1960, and 1968.

59

was

1988, HI 7057.

H17745.

HI 7776.

in

be

Did

Of course,
Congress decided
sensitivity

all

of

this is

,o ge, action

Work'^

it

empty symbolism

if

it

did not work.

on base closures out of
Congress

of geographic benents.

We

have seen

that

We

,n par,

We

have also seen

tha,

effects

of base closure. But did
In

most cases,

the counter-factual.

it

is

We

t,

did not result in

difficult to

others.

of base closure and the
policy

answer these questions because
one cannot prove

On

the other hand, one

political actor

who

for realignments,

which

The amount of money

slated for closure.

job losses

led to

hard pressed to find a

is

the case otherwise.

round, 86 bases"’ were slated for
closure and

246 bases"" were

in the

believes that the commission
process

more closures than would have been

fourth rounds, another

were slated

in favor

tha,

to further

cannot say with certainty what
would have happened

commentator or

In the first

problems

work? Were bases closed? Was
money saved?

absence of the commission procedures.
single political

because of the

Congress timed the procedure
so as

obscure the causal chain between
legislators’ votes

that

Congress created a new,
ad-hoc,

institution with a rentarkably
limited jurisd.cional
author.ty to avoid the

attend delegation.

have seen

in

in the

Many
some

other bases, of course,

cases and job gains in

actually saved from these closures

dispute as the total estimated savings depends
on what

is

second, third, and

counted.

is

a matter of

some

The Department of

Defense excluded both environmental cleanup costs and
the projected revenue from land
sales from

its

calculations and estimated the total savings of the
four rounds together

Bob Benenson, "Members Hustle to Protect Defense Jobs Back Home,"
Cmgressiomil OuarKrly
Weekly Report, January 13, 1990, 87.
1

20

Karl Vick, “It’s Closing

Time

for

Base Commission,” The Washington Post, December 29, 1995, A21.
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would be $56.7

bill, on

over the next 20 years.'''

base closures, on ,he o.her
hand, nrany

had no. generated as ntueh

Even these

eri.ies,

n, embers

In rejecting calls
for

of Congress argued

another round of

,h„, .he four

rounds

savings as the Pentagon and
the con, mission claimed.'^^

in

however, do no. dispute the

fact that

money

,s

hemg

saved as a

result

of base closures, regardless of
how savings arc calculated.
Another measure of the success of
the commission process

were
lists

relatively

few attempts

to

circumvent the process

open and the few attempts

suggests that,

in the firs,

unpopular within their

round

districts.

that did

While

the fact that there

keep bases on the commission

occur were largely unsuccessful.

many of

at least,

to

is

Hadwiger

the bases closed were bases
that were

legislators could no. be seen to
stand tdly

by while

the Pentagon closed these bases,
they could allow the bases to be
closed if their hands

were symbolically
the reasot, for the

closures

tied.'^^

In

any event, there

muted response was

would not be decisive

is

some

empirical evidence to suggest that

that legislators correctly

determined that the base

factors in their reelection efforts.

There were many cases, however, where the
response was not muted.

Senator

Dixon, described as “the Senate’s most vocal
opponent of the base-closing panel’s

mandate,”"^ planned hearings

to

“grill

Pentagon base-closing staffers.”"^

Others

'

1

1

2

i

Department

of Defense,

“Base Closure and Realignment Report” (March 1995),

1-3.

^

Paul Richter, “Senate Rejects Bid for

More Base

Closures,” Los Angeles Times, July 10, 1997,

A 19.

Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 195.

See

for instance,

Hadwiger, “Military Base Closures...,” 218-39, and C’harles

Furor: Minimal Political Impact for
1

Members,” Roll

Call,

March

18,

E.

Cook, “Base Closing

1993.

25

Mike Mills, “Base Closings:
December 31, 1988, 3629.

I'he Political

Pain

is

Limited,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report
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planned ,o circunwen, the
connniss.on process by figh,i„,

b,ocb ,be appropr.a.ions

necessary ,o go forward with
base closures.- Senator
Arlen Specter (R-PA)
challenged
.he closure of the
Ph.ladelphia Naval Shipyard
in court and took his
case
the

Supreme Court.

cases,

legislators

Though

there

were cases of a few jobs being
saved

were otherwise completely
unsuccessful

m

the

all

way

to

very few

in

keeping targeted bases

open.

Another possible rndica.or of the
commission process’ success was
op.

some of its

its

ability co-

strongest victims and detractors.
For instance, Representative Jim
Coulter

(R-NJ) served as the chair of the
commission

for its

second and third rounds.

Though

Coulter supported the commission
process, he was a strenuous and
vociferous opponent

of the

list

that

emerged from the

for the closure

first

round of the commission process.'"
That

of Fort Dix, a major base

in

New

Jersey,

and on April

called

list

18, 1989, less

than

two years before he was appointed as chair
of the second commission by President
Bush,
Coulter

voted

for

recommendations

the

in the

joint

resolution

seeking

to

overturn

the

base

closure

House.

126

Mike Mills, “A Dogged, if Futile, Trench
Weekly Report, Usitch 25, \ 9 % 9 662
,

127

Mills,

ofc the

“A Dogged,

1988 closure

if Futile...,”

list,

War

is

Planned by Some on

Hill, ”

Congressional Quarterly
’

.

660-62.

“Military Base Closures...,” 195-217. Describing such
efforts
Hadwiger points out that a few efforts to keep open some facilities
on

in the

wake

or near bases

being closed were successful. Similarly, President Clinton,
along with the California and Texas delegations
worked to privatize a number of jobs lost as a result of the closure
of Air Force depots in those
states.

While

was successful, it so alienated members of the delegations from states
where these
privatized jobs were supposed to go, that it remains the central
reason another round of base closures has
not been approved. See Helen Dewar, “Behind the About-Face
on Base Closings,”
this effort

July 16, 1997,

The Washington Post

A 17.

Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Commission
Weekly Report, March 2, 1991, 555.

May

Help Ease Members’ Unsavory Task,” Congressional Quarterly
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Senator Dixon, as

we have

was

seen,

the primary opponent
of the commission

process in the Senate in
,988, te.hng one reporter,
“you-ve go, to understand.
process was designed to stop
a guy hke me."'»

Air Force Base
the

in Illinois

open

after

commission process, declaring

Dixon accepted

it

He

fought vtgorously to keep
Chanute

was recommended
closure “an

tts

This

for closure in the first

Amencan

tragedy."'^'

the appointment as the
chair of the commission
for

round of

Nevertheless,

fourth round of

its

closures.

Without a doubt, the greatest conversion
on the issue of military base
closures,
however,

that

is

of William Cohen.

provisions in ,976 and 1977 that

bases in the

first

place,

named

I’ve told

my

made

sooner was Cohen, the author of
the legislative
it

so difficult for the Pentagon to
close military

Secretary of Defense than he

rounds of base closure. Sounding

What

No

like a

member of the base

former colleagues

is

was

calling for additional

closure choir,

Cohen

said.

that there aren’t

any more easy
hemlock time now. Are you going to
protect these excess facilities that are no
longer needed, or are you going to
protect our forces by putting modem weapons
in their hands?
choices.

Cohen

Those

are

all

gone.

It’s

recently reiterated his call for additional
rounds of closures, this time calling for

two rounds
however,

is

in

the

2001 and 2005.'^'

same reason why

Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) quoted

in

The reason

his call will be ignored

his restrictive base closure provisions

on Capitol

were accepted by

Elizabeth A. Palmer, “Former Sen. Dixon to Oversee Painful
Report, October 8, 1994, 2898.

Round of Cuts,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL) quoted
1

32

William Cohen quoted

in

James

in

to

Kitfield,

Seek

New

Palmer, “Former Sen. Dixon...,” 2898.

“Cohen Opts

for the

Middle Ground,” NationalJournal

24, 1997, 1042.

Susanne M. Schafer, “Cohen

Hill,

New Base

Closures,” Associated Press, April 2, 1998.
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May

legislators in

adopted

in

1976 and 1977, and

1988 and 1990

-

tlie

historical

same reason why

and

the

commisston process was

institutional incentives.

<^onclusion

Several

adopted

at

in

important

1988 and again

in 1990.

the time, has been eliminated.

Congress

that the defense

have changed since the commission
process was

factors

Ftrst, the deficit, at the

Second, there

is

$200

a sense

budget has already been cut as

billion

Texas and California

that

in

were supposed

1976.

to

far as is appropriate.

But most

much anger and

President Clinton privatized jobs in

have been shifted

the 1995 round of closures and realignments.

rising

among many members of

importantly, the last round of the
commission process led to nearly as

resentment withm Congress as existed

mark and

Armey, now

to

bases in other states

in

the Majority Leader in the

House, suggested,

They [members of Congress] could overcome

their fear of losing a base as
long as they thought they had a fair shake in the
matter. But the president
poisoned the well badly ... You cannot have a commission,
you cannot
have closures without trust and confidence. ... It’s my
honest assessment

you will not have another commission as long as Bill Clinton is
in the
White House and the reason is that, no matter how much he pleads
that

that

this

time he will play

it

straight, they

This view reemphasizes the argument
itself

made

won’t believe
in this chapter.

because of the geographic nature of the

will not delegate authority to the

it.'^^

Congress will not close bases

particularistic benefits involved.

Pentagon or the president

Congress

to close bases unilaterally,

because of the history of base closures. Today, military bases can be closed only with a
procedure that delegates authority, temporarily, to an institution independent of the
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executive, and only with
a procedure sensitive
to the political calendar.
In short, the story

of base closures teaches
us

do what

it

that extra- congressional

procedures can

empower Congress

to

simply cannot do othenvise

Additional questions about
extra-congressional procedures
remain, however.
instance, a deeper understanding
of the sto,^

about the case of nuclear
waste

appear to have

much

in

of base closures

site disposal.

common. They

On

in favor

of curiosity

the surface, at least,
these

are both cases

impose geographically concentrated
costs

raises our level

m

which Congress

of some general

For

is

benefit.

two cases
cr
seeking to

Moreover

they are both very narrow
policy areas, suggesting
delegation of authority as
a possibility
since the jurisdiction of
the agent could be
restricted quite easily.
legislators not

utilize

an extra-congressional
procedure

in

Why

then, did

the case of nuclear waste

disposal?

Similarly,

the

case of base closures raises
interesting new questions
about

Congress’ use of an extra-congressional
procedure

The congressional debate surrounding
base

members of Congress were comfortable
was because of

(fast track

NAFTA

Representative Dick

delegating the extraordinaiy authority
they did.

clearly displays the

Armey (R-TX) quoted

in

in trade policy.

closures clearly indicates that one
reason

the narrow nature of the policy
area.

trade policy and

procedures)

This

is

clearly not the case with

wide range of policy areas trade policy

Dewar, “Behind the About-Face...,”

A 17.

This view echoes the view of delegation generally
asserted Kiewiet and McCubbins in The Logic
of
They challenge the predominant view of political scientists
that Congress abdicates its
responsibilities for crafting difficult policy solutions
because it lacks strong centralized leadership. They
argue, ‘the alternative we pose to the abdication
hypothesis is that it is possible to
elegation.

others and yet continue to achieve desired outcomes.
Indeed,
be achieved only by delegating authority to others,”
3.
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delegate authority to

it

is

often the case that desired outcomes can

affecs.

We

w,ll explore eaci,

the case of tax refom, as

it

of these quest, ons

in tun, but Hrs,

,t

is

useful to

serves, like base closure,
as a control case of
sorts.
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examine

CHAPTER

4

TAX REFORM

Base closure presented a
control ease of
geographically concentrated
benefits
suggests that taking

away

away geographically concentrated

to delegate the

power

to

make

chose

in

we

and because the

benefits

benefits,

the painful cuts.

a relatively narrow policy
area, and because

worried about agency losses

Because base closure took

front constituents,

do than taking away geographically
dispersed
chose

sorts.

it

is

harder for legislators to

no, sun, rising that legislators

is

Moreover, because base closure

expect that legislators would
be less

narrow policy areas,

IS

It

useful to think ol the

514) as the mirror image of base closure.

it

is

no, suntrising that legislators

Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Puhlic Law 99-

Tax reform

a

is

case where legislators are

operating in a broad policy area and arc
taking away particularistic benefits
relatively dispersed.

Congress

It

utilized

is

its

own

more than just geography and

moment

m

political

that arc

not surprising to us then, that in
enacting these particularistic
inlcniai procedures to get the

sec, procedural choice in lax reform,
like in the case

the

is

to delegate.

In this light,

cuts.

literature

job done.

But, as

we

will

of base closure, was a function of

the scope of the policy area

- it

was very much impacted hy

time and the presence of powerful champions of the
cause of lax

rcfomi.

Before addressing the question of procedural choice,

it

is first

necessary for us to

understand the policy problem the legislative proponents of tax reform
were attempting
address.

After a very brief history ol tax policy,
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we

will

examine the problem of

tax

reform and assess

why

never become law.

so

many

Finally,

we

believed the Tax Refonn Act
of 1986

(TRA86) would

will discuss the procedures
utiltzed to pass

devote some attention to each of
the factors

that

TRA86

and

impacted procedural choice.

A Brief History o f the Income Tav
The Constitution
government clear authority

power “To

to tax

written

income.

common Defence

clause qualified that

I,

Section 8 granted Congress the

power

and general Welfare of the United
States.”

stating, “all Duties,

throughout the United States,” and Article

Tax

Article

1787 did not give the national

lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and

provide for the

direct.

in

shall

be

mainly

-

Imposts and Excises shall be uniform

Section 9 added,

laid unless in Proportion to the

directed to be taken.”

limited ways,

I,

As

a result, while

to address

But the

capitation, or other

Census or Enumeration herein before

some income

war-time deficits

“No

-

taxes were

employed

the nineteenth century

in very

was primarily

spent arguing over the constitutionality of the income
tax. This debate culminated in the

Supreme Court

s

5-4 decision in 1895 that the income tax was a
direct tax that

states disproportionately

When
constitutional

the

and was therefore unconstitutional.

concept was given

new

life

amendment. President Wilson and

modest income tax

hit certain

that affected less than 2 percent

in

1913

with

the

enactment of a

the Congress quickly enacted a very

of the population.

From

its

modest

beginnings, the income tax rapidly expanded with each successive political crisis

John

F. Witte,

The Politics and the Development of the Federal Income Tax (Madison, WI: The

University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 78.
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in the

nrst half of the

More than any

twemie.h century; World

War

1,

The Great Depression, and
World War

II.

other event, however, the
second world war transfonned
the income tax

from a tax on the wealthy

to a tax that

impacted most Americans.

Whereas, before the

war, those with incomes under
$3,000 paid about 10 percent of all
inconte taxes, by 1948,
they were paying

From

significant part of American

m

>rld

War

following World

-

11

War

11

income

tax stood as a

pennanent and

life.

1974,

was

this point on, the

Like base closure policy, tax
policy

in the three

decades

characterized by a sub-goveniment
type of polihes. Timothy

Conlan, Margaret Wrightson, and Davtd

Beam

point out that “details, not principles,
were

the focus of action” during this period.

Impenetrably complex and often boring, the
making of tax policy became
the province of a closed elite of key
legislators, executive leaders and
lobbyists whose actions were seldom
challenged (or even closely
inspected) by the public or
the post-World

War

period

its
-

elected representatives.

from 1958 through 1974

Indeed, for
-

much of

tax legislation

was

closely guarded and controlled by a single
individual, Wilbur Mills, the
powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee.

None of

this is to

contrary, tax bills

say that there was no change in tax policy

in these years.

On

the

were regularly drafted and adopted and the face of taxation
changed

over time. For instance, between 1948 and 1974, the share
of federal revenues from the
corporate income tax

the individual

Timothy

J.

income

fell

from 25.6%

to

21.0% while

tax increased from 51

.0%

the share of federal revenues from

to 64.6%.'^“^

The

rapid

economic growth

Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson. and David R. Beam, Taxing Choices: The Politics
of Tax

Reform (Washington D.C.:

CQ Press,

1990), 18.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices,

18.

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1984
Edition, 46. These figures exclude social insurance taxes and contributions.
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the nation

experienced

in

tlre

1950s and

1960s fueled the rapid expansion

n,

the

tndividual ineonte tax. Because
of the progressive rate structure
of the utdtvidttal inconte
.ax,

more and more of

.ndtviduals.

As

the

tax

burden automatically sh.fted
from eorporations

to

a result, the tndividual tax
rose in comparison with
the corporate tax

because of so-called “bracket creep.”
The income tax rates were not
indexed

and so while incomes were

rising, taxpayers

were being pushed

into higher tax brackets.

Tins provided the federal government
with automatic revenue
increases.
increased revenues

came more from

to inflation

And

these

individuals than from corporations
because whtle the

corporate income tax also utilized a
multi-bracketed system throughout
this period, there

were fewer brackets and most corporations
paid

A

m

second, and even more significant,

the post-war period

was

at

way

the

in

same

rate.

which the face of tax policy changed

the expansion of so-called tax
expenditures.

Tax expenditures

are tax deductions, credits, or other
preferential treatment given to specific
kinds of

income

that result

m

revenue losses. They are commonly referred

because they provide monetary benefits
guarantees, or expenditures.

that could otherwise

be provided by federal loans,

Because the growth of the economy and bracket creep

offered legislators pain-free revenue increases,

provide tax relief

to as tax expenditures

it

also offered legislators opportunities to

In that context, the question then

became what form

tax relief

take and tax expenditures were the most attractive choice for several
reasons.

Arnold points out

in his discussion

of tax policy, across-the-board

attractive to legislators because small rate reductions

much

As Douglas

rate reductions are less

become very expensive very quickly

and those who benefit rarely appreciate what has been done
tax expenditures are very

would

for them.

On

the other hand,

appreciated by the beneficiaries, cost far less than across-
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.hc-board rate rcduCons.
and „,„s, often pnovKie
legislators w,,h an
opporlnnfty
credft for sonre general
benefft.

For ins.anee, .he nroftgage
imeres, deduelion allows

leg.sla.ors ,o clain, eredft
for expand,

cost

of hous.ng.

In tins

elain,

ng ,be

Irons, ng s.oef n, ,l,e
na.,on

and lower,
ng ,be

sense then, ,ax expendi.u,es
offer legislators the
additional

benefit of be.ng able to
advance policy goals .ha, they
tnay be unable to advance
.h,ough

cosily

direct

expenditure

programs

tha,

rec,uire

legislative

oversight

and

large

bureaucracies.'*’®

Given the

we

fact that legislators prefer
to

should no, be surprised to see

tha. the

regular staple of the histoo,
of tax policy.

adoption of the income tax

in

Period

expansion of tax expenditures
has been a

As we can

see in Table 4

4.1

-

,

between the

New Tax

Expenditures

29
30

New Tax

Expenditures

1975-1981

15

Data compiled from a

list

of

all

Yciar

.03

2.14
tax expenditures in

John Witte, The Politics

Tax, 276-281

This pace accelerated rapidly after 1974 for a variety
of reasons that

The important

/

.91
1

and Development of the Income

a, a rate

The Growth of Tax Expenditures

1945-1974

the next section.

1

year.

1914-1945

Source:

.

1913 and 1974, Congress created
tax expenditures

of about one tax expenditure per

Table

provide lax relief through tax
expenditures,

point here

For a more complete discussion of the

is

to get

some sense of

we

will

examine

the magnitude of tax

lure of tax expenditures versus tax rate reductions, see Arnold,

71

in

expenditures as instruments
of tax policy.

(measured as

income

revenue) was $92.9 billion
per year or 56.6
percent of

im

Even though

tax expenditures totaled
nearly

important to note that this
-hidden welfare

period

1975, the cost of these
tax expenditures

total

federal

tax receipts.

ii25
.s

lost

By

when

the

Ways and Means Committee

state- had been

far less

likely to serwe that

billion in 1975,

made

function after 1974.

it

co.ts.ructed during a

served as a guardian of
the treasury.

the institutional upheavals
of the late 1900s and early
1970s

Committee

$93

Ways and Means

the

.lust

But

as changes in the

incentive structure in Congress
had opened the door to
legislators seeking to protect
bases
in their districts in the
late

1

970s and early

tax expenditures in the late
1970s

As we saw
the late 1970s.

in

Table

980s. legislators were also

more

free to enact

and early 1980s.

4.1, the

This acceleration

1

is

pace of enacting new tax
expenditures accelerated

even more staggering when one
looks

at

the cost.

in

By

1982, tax expenditures cost over $253
billion or 73.5% of federal
income tax receipts.

By

1985, the Joint Committee on Taxation
estimated that the

from tax expenditures would be over
$424

fiscal

1986 revenue loss

billion.''’^

The Logic of Co?igressional Action, 198-204.
Witte, The Politics

and Development of the Income

Tax, 292.

For an excellent discussion of the importance
and magnitude of tax expenditures as an ignored part
of
American welfare state see Christopher Howard, The
Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and
Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University
the

Press, 1997).

Witte, The Politics

Joint

and Development of the Income

Tax, 292.

Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures
for Fiscal Years 1986-1990 (JCS
'

8-85), April 12, 1985, 22.
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How

did this happen.’

The

central reasons are
institutional.

rules changes, changes
in the ntentbership
of the

declining influence of the

Committee, and high

Stinsiiine rcromis,

Ways and Means Committee,

Ways and Means Committee

inflation all conspired
to create an

the

vis a vis the Senate
Finance

atmosphere more conducive

to

the expansion of tax
expenditures. Douglas Arnold
argues.

one assumes

if

that legislators’

motives

for creating

and expanding

tax
preferences were unchanged,
then one must consider
both means and
opportunity. In both instances
there

were

The refomts of

the early 1970s that

were designed

scrutiny and open to participation
by junior
particularly hard.

Ways and Means drew

of the power committees

was forced

to hold

lost its

Committee and opening

incentive than

the form

House.

open hearings,

on committees,” and

“safe” electorally.

in the

,t

significant changes.''’’

members

to

make Congress more open

the

hit

Ways and Means Committee

the fire of refonners mainly
because

Ways and Means was

to create

subcommittees,

forced to

lost its role

standing closed rule on the House
floor.

up,

more and more members were

For obvious reasons, these

Ways and Means members

of tax expenditures. As

if that

and Means, Wilbur Mills, eventually
Strange relationship with a stripper

legislators

in the past to

lost his

it

was one

become

larger,

as the "committee

In

recruited

expanding the

who were

would then have

greater

the powerful

chairmanship when his alcoholism and his

became public knowledge.

Gary Mucciaroni, Reversals of Fortune: Public Policy and Private
Institution, 1995), 46.
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in

Chairman of Ways

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 202.

Brookings

less

provide benefits to constituents

was not enough,

to

Interests (Washington, D.C.;

The

It IS

easy to see

how

less prestige

power, more open heanngs,
and

Means gave

all

constituents.

treasury, the

legislators

With Ways and Means

more

its

more

on the House door

retreat, ng

to prov.de

from

tts

a

ground

was provided by

changed issue context of

more taxpayers

traditional role as guardian

of the

for

the

expansion

means

for

expanded

tax expenditures,

the succession of tax relief bills
that were a result of the

High indation pushed more and

to enact tax relief bills in 1975,
1976, 1977, 1978,

among

and 1981

the expansions in tax expenditures that
grew out of the

reforms of the 1970s was the 1981 Economic Recovery
Tax Act (ERTA)
all

of tax

for tax expenditures.

tax policy in the late 1970s.

Last, but not least,

category by

to

into higher tax brackets and Congress
thus found itself with the additional

revenue necessary

end

Ways and

expanded tax expenditures

more hospitable place

these institutional reforms provided
the

the opportunity

tree to

for

collegial atmosphere and far
less restrictive rules, the
Senate

institutionally fertile

As

,n the chantber, less
centralized

induence of the Senate Finance
Committee was on the nse; and the
Finance

expenditures. With

a

less restrictive rules

enhanced means

Committee had always been

is

and tnfluence

Christmas

itself.

trees.

John Witte argues

that the

The new law indexed income

radically in a short time.

ERTA

historically in a

become accustomed.

expanded and added new tax expenditures

Witte estimated that the

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 202.
Witte, The Politics

“was

the Christmas

tax brackets to inflation taking

the automatic revenue increases to which legislators
had

importantly for our purposes,

ERTA

-

and Development of the Income

74

Tax, 235.

new

that

away

More
grew

tax expenditure provisions of

KRIA
by

cost the federal

government nearly $14

bi||

ion in fiscal 1982 and
over

$29

bilMion

fiscal 1983.''^'^

Hy

l‘«5, ,hc l„s, revenue
Iron, ,ax expenditures
had reached

year, the Joint

Co.nmiUee on Taxation estimated

expendi.ures hetween
a result,

when Senator

intuitive appeal

sign,

llseal

liill

1986 and

fiscal

that

peak.

the lost revenue Iron,

In

that

all

tax

<>90 would he over 2.5
trilhon dollars.- As

Bradley (D-N.I) hegan pushing

of the idea seemed

its

clear.

Legislators

Tor tax reforn, in

would he able

1982, the

vote for a

,o

cant tax rate reduction in return
for trinumng a variety
of tax expenditures.

I,

problems confronting such a piece of
attention to outline in

some

John Witte would declare
policymakers ought to

detail

in

legislation

why

were many, however, and

i,

is

The

worth our

experts on Ihe history of the
income tax such as

1985 that rather than attempt to
reform the tax code,

set their sights

on simply hailing the

further erosion

of the tax

base.

he answer

is not to reform the tax
system or even to seek immediate
policy remedies, but rather to alter the
political process to prevent even
further regression.
The general goal should be, as Allen Schick
has
I

compcilingly argued, to restore non-deeision
making - to change the
polities of taxation so as to retard and
stabilize change.
Thus, the goal
should be to seek not remedies but merely
a remission from the malady.

And
Given

this

that requires political, not policy, reform.'^'

melancholy

forecast,

we ought

to first outline

why

Witte and virtually every

other expert on tax poliey argued that fundamental tax
reform was an impossible dream.

Witte, The Politics

Joint C

and Development of the Income

ommittee on

1

Tax, 233.

axation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years

8-85), April 12, 19X5, 22.

Witte, The Politics

and Development of the Income

75

Tax, 380.

1
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(

IC'S-

The Problem Posed bv Tnx
The
us

at

colleclivc action

tins point.

In

problem posed by

tax reform

their detailed account

Bimbatim and Alan Murray offered

Rpfnrr..

is

one which

is

not unfamiliar

of the triumph of tax refonn,

.leffrcy

a concise but complete
description.

he groups with an interest in the
existing tax system were
well-organized
and ready to defend their breaks at a
moment’s notice; the populace who
soo
to benefit
from lower rates was unorganized
and diffuse
hurthermore. Congress was a slow
and cumbersome institution that
usually made only ptecemeal, tncremental
changes. Tax refonn proposed
something very different: a radical revamping
of the entire tax structure
There was a tremendous inertia in
Congress that resisted any such
sweeping change.
In this

atmosphere, rank and

file legislators

could not be counted upon as likely

One member of the Ways and Means Committee,
this will inevitably

be an uphill

will ever enact reform

also

knew

potential winners are skeptical that

A

away from one group and

decade

earlier,

Committee, Sen. Russell Long (D-LA),

When we

The

proceed

the former

to shift the taxes

lot

should have been that
additional taxes resent

Jeffrey H.

Birnbaum and Alan

S.

way
it

all

very

Moreover,

Congress

legislators

conferring them on another,

is

Chainnan of the Senate Finance

around so

that

one

set

of taxpayers

else pays a lot less taxes, the people
it

very long. They tend to

the time, and the people

who

feel that

it

are paying the

bitterly."'^

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch (New York: Vintage Books 1987)

13.

1

53

a

articulated precisely this view.

more taxes and somebody
who benefit from it do not remember
pays a

Rep. Willis Gradison (R-OH) argued,

and the potential losers are organizing.”''^

that taking benefits

negative-sum game.

fight.

allies.

Representative Willis Gradison (R-OH) quoted

in

Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown

at

Gucci Gulch,

108.

Senator Russell Long (D-LA) quoted

in

Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown

76

at

Gucci Gulch,

15.

In addi,,on ,o the

collecive action probletn
posed by tax rcfonn though,
thee was also

.he problent of htstoty.

Con, an, Wngh.son, and Scant
pent on,

faeng advocates of tax rcfonn
was
endured.

As one of those

There

the “bitter historical

that

antong the obstacles

expcnence"'«

tax refonners had

non-believers, John W.tte
summarized this view best.

nothing, absolutely nothing in
the history or politics of
the income
any of these schemes lie
shgh.esrhopr Tf
be.ng enacted ,n the forms
proposed. In
is

L

.ax that tndicates that

refbm

fact, if the past is

efforts

Finally,

...

was

there

the

additional

institutional capacity at the
particular

piece of legislation.

explaining tax reform

the critical

ays and
lead^ership

any gmide

are very likely to aggravate
the problem over

question

moment

of whether

in political

L

long

Congress

had

the

time to pass such a radical

Randall Strahan points out that
one of the biggest puzzles

m

is that,

first

step in enacting reform

was successfully undertaken by

Means Committee, whose power, autonomy,
and

the

centralized

had been major targets of the congressional
refonn movement

of the 1970s.

Thus,

as

is

if

procedural mechanisms were necessarily central
to any effort to pass tax refonn

the premise of this study

which tax refonn
For that reason,
to

legislation

to

there

was reason

would need

many believed

be handed over

-

Randall Strahan,

to originate

that tax refonn,

and

all

very committee

of tax policy more generally, ought

7.

and Development of the Income

New Ways and Means

(Chapel

Tax, 380.

Hill,

NC: The

University of North Carolina Press

1990), 143.

1

58

-1

See for instance, Stanley

S. Surrey,

C'hange,” Tax Notes, February

2,

“Our Troubled Tax

1981, 185.

77

in

was incapable of employing them.

an independent commission responsible for raising revenue.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices,
Witte, The Politics

to think that the

-

Policy: False Routes and Proper Paths to

Such arguments notwithstanding
an extra-congressional
procedure, or any kind of
,

delegation for that matter, would
not be the route for tax
reform.
policy probicn,

was

hanclial

by Congress, ubli.ng

legislators (Voin electoral
retribution

haiKlIed this matter internally,

Act ol 1986 as

it

is

when

possible.

own

the end, this

that

complex

internal proceclnrcs ,o
shield

Uefore discussing

why Congress

nsefnl to Hrst review the
provisions of the

was eventually adopted so

it

i,s

In

we have

Tax Kefornt

sense ol the scope and

ri

direction of the policy involved.

d

I

for

he Provisions of the Tax Reform Aet
of

he central provisions of tax reform as

it

was enacted

in

19^
1

986 cut income

tax rates

both individuals and corporations and
eliminated or scaled back numerous
tax

expenditures.

code,

make

The

point of the exercise

to

enhance the horizontal equity' ''' of the

the tax code less complicated, and to
pass a

While the new law did not
significant

was

measure

in

treat all

income and

each of these areas.

all

bill

that

was revenue

tax breaks equally,

The key provisions

it

tax

neutral.

did succeed in

are listed in Table 4.2

below.

'

^

By

“Iiori/.ontal

equity”

1

income pay similar amounts

mean

that

in taxes,

one goal of reformers was to ensure that persons who receive similar
lax expenditures obviously frustrate horizontal equity because they

give special tax breaks to individuals or corporations engaged in particular kinds of economic activity
without providing a compensating benefit to others, d'he result is greater variance in tax liability between

persons with equal incomes.

78

Table 4.2

-

Key

Provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of

Reduced
the

m

number of individual tax rate brackets
from 1 4 to 2
ividual tax rates from a
maximum marginal rate

corporate income tax rates from
a
brackets at 1 5% and 25%

of 50%

maximum

rate

of 46%

to

to

28%

14^ with

In

Increased
the standard deduction (or
old “zero bracket” amount)
from 82

480 tn
non
” r
smgle taxpayers and from $3,670
to $5,000 for
personal and dependency exemptions
from $1,080 to $2,000 in 1989
and after
and hberahzed the earned ineome
tax credit for low-income
families “dt dhidren
’

ma^upfaf

the

pa“op ratr°"'

ra^si^;^:

ri::

"

“““

^

applying

2™r

minimum

taxes by creating an alternative
minimum tax of 20%, with a
to replace the previous add-on
minimum

840*ooTexemption,
$40,000

tax

penalties for tax negligence and fraud

cpealed

deductions for state and local sales taxes
deductions for consumer interest (like credit
phase-out through 1990
the

card, auto, and student loans)
with a

marriage penalty” deduction for two-earner
households

$50 tax credit for political contributions
the exclusion of $100 dividend income
the

income exemptions

for

many

“private activity” municipal bonds

provisions for income-averaging

60% deduction for long-term capital gains, treating
long-term) as ordinary income
the exclusion of income from unemployment
the

all

capital gains (short- or

compensation benefits

deductions for expenses of adopting a child
the exclusion for most prizes and awards
deductions for charitable contributions by non-itemizers
deductions for educational travel
extra personal exemptions for the elderly and blind

deductions for the land-clearing expenses of farmers
lower rates on the capital gains of corporations
the investment tax credit (ITC) for business expenditures on
machinery,
automobiles, and other property placed into service after December
31,

(continued on next page)
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1985

Tabic 4.2

-

continued

Limited or Modified

deductions for contributions

to individual

reirenent accounts (IRAs) and

deductions for business meals
and entertainment to
deductions for mortgage interest

to qualified first or

the exclusion of scholarship
and fellowship grants
deductions for home office
expenses

80%

second homes

sr

''’dividual

1(K)

of expenses

personal exemptions, as well
as the lower 15% tnv r-Uf' m.’
reporting requirements for
municipal bm^s
the deductibility of losses
from “passive" economic
activities

tTncT
Oncluded

4(1

to

income gained onlv

and employee business expense
deductions

among them employment-related

education, professional and union
dues
and supplies, tax and investment
counseling, and job-scarch
costs) by imposing a 2% income
floor
rk-relatcd tools

deductions for business cruise travel
'’i"‘°'-i<'

touting'”'
credits for research

buildings and the provision of
low-income

and development

de^rmpn rules for business property under the accelerated

cost recovery system

Retained
deductions for state and local income, real
estate, and personal property taxes
deductions for mortgage interest on a primary
residence and a second or vacation

home

exemptions

for income from “public activity”
municipal bonds
on the proceeds from the sale of a personal residence
child and dependent care expenses

tax deferral
credit for

credit for the elderly and the pennanently
and totally disabled
deductions for alimony, business gifts, and gambling
losses
the exclusion of employer-provided fringe
benefits, life insurance proceeds,

workers’ compensation payments, and veterans’ disability
benefits
tax incentives for natural resources (including
oil and gas drilling, timber growing,
and solar and geothennal energy)

Source: Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices,
4-5.
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’

One
tax

rcsuK ol

all ,l,oso

expcndiinros and

,n

provisions

the

expenditures were repealed

-

revenue

was

los.

a dra.nalic

as a

resul,

roughly the same as the

repealed between Idl3 and 1985.'“

lost

In the

revenue from lax expenditures

of $262.2

TRA86

of

total

And

I

lost

The most

in fiscal

in ftseal

1990 would he $597.9

1990 would be $3.35.7 billion'"

fhe

-

a tlilTerenee

hill

was revenue

was

bill

TRASb was

billion per year while taxes

six

were

that the

roughly to zero.

milhon'" poor
income

the fact that corporate taxes

on individuals were decreased

percent of Americans thus received a direct
lax cut as a

edne Sandlord, Successful Tax Reform
1

meaning

TRA86 summed

of TRA86 while corporate income taxes rose by
40

ommittcc on

neulral

also dislribulionally neulral across

noticeable shift resulting from

81)

rale reduelions that

TRA8(, removed roughly

fael that

the

rolls,

by Ihc same amount. .Some

Joint C

lax expenditures

ol'

February, 1987, the
Contmittee estimated that the

in

from Ihc provisions of

with the exception of the

were increased by roughly $24

(

14 tax

Apnl, 1985. the .loud
Committee on Taxatton

In

were not butigel busters,

Anterieans from the lax

rcsiill

nutnher

because of these base-broadening
measures, the

revenue game, and

classes.

boih ihc mnnbcrs oC

billion.

I'recisely

part

wake ofTRAHh.

in

of iax expen.l, tores.

total

projeeled that the total revenue
lost from tax expenditures
b.llion.""

dccimc

(

percent.'^’''

rrowbridge, (treat Britain: Idscal

l'ublication,s,

133.

axation, hstimates of Federal Tax Expenditures
for Fiscal Years 1986-1990

(

K'S-

8-85), April 12, 1985, 22.

Joint (

ommittcc on

I

axation, hstimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 1988-1992 (JC\S-

3-87), l•'cbruary, 27, 1987, 17.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing' Choices,
Arnoltl,

The Lof^ic of Congressional Action, 2

1

3.

5.
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Procedures as

While the

tax cut for individuals
that

Ke

was

part

of

TRA86

suggests

some of

the

appeal of tax refonn to
legislators, the larger
question that focuses this
study rematns.

The

taxes to be paid by
corporations

Washington
a

$120

that

-

were increased by $120

-

a class with significant
organizational presence in

bill, on

over five years so that
legislators could give

billion tax cut to a general,
diffuse public.

impose

particularistic pain in favor

How

does Congress approve polices

of a genera, benefit?

The case of base

closure

discussed in the previous chapter
seemed to prove the old aphorism
that necessity

mother of invention.

is

the

Incapable of closing military
bases with the traditional,
internal

procedures of Congress, legislators
created a

new

institutional fomt.

While tax refom,

certainly did not utilize an
extra-congressional procedure or even
any procedures that are

unique to the particular piece of
utilization

legislation,

of legislative procedures was no

Despite

this

centrality,

is

ask,

is

fail to

most surprising about the standard

is

not

most widely read account of TRA86, Jeffrey

“what created

this legislative

lessons of political science, logic, and history?”'^^
tax reform passed but

enactment of TRA86.

the extent to which the deft use
of procedures

In the epilogue to the

Bimbaum and Alan Murray

should be pointed out that the
tactful

less central to the

however, what

accounts of the passage of TRA86

even mentioned.

it

They

offer

miracle that defied

some

all

description of

the

how

include procedural tactics explicitly or implicitly.
Similarly,

Bimbaum and

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 285. Douglas Arnold also finds
the explanation for
by Bimbaum and Murray to be deficient. Bimbaum and Murray, Showdown
at Gucci
Gulch, 175, argue that the vote on the House floor for TRA86 showed
that “under the right conditions,
members of Congress would cast a vote for a tax bill that was in the general interest, even
though it went
against the wishes of powerful lobbyists.
But as Arnold, The Logic oj Congressional Action, 213, fn42,
points out, “Bimbaum and Murray never specify what those conditions
or circumstances might be.”
tax reform offered

82

n

.he other popular book-,
eng, h account of tax refonn.
Con, an,

argue that

TRA86

ntade

its

way

through the House through
-a cotnbination of

cajoleo,. calculation, idealism,
and ,uck.”'“

doubt present,

this

the environment in

v.ew

fails to

Wngbtson, and Bean,
leaders,,, p,

While these amorphous elements
were

all

no

recognize the degree to which
procedural tactics altered

which .deahstic leaders could

cajole, leg.slators could
calculate,

and

luck could be utilized.

The procedural
weakening the

A

benefits.

tactics utilized

links in the causal cha.n

firs,

step in this direction

Means Committee, Dan Rostenkowski
Rostenkowski had returned

when

the

were many but they revolved
around a single

to closed

Committee was considering

between

was taken by

interest

group influence,

the

and the loss of group

Chaimtan of the House Ways and

(D-IL). Desp.te sunshine
reforms a decade eari.er,

committee markup sessions

in

tax reform, the use of closed

was nothing unusual. When simply closing
from

legislators’ votes

1982.'"

By

the doors proved to be
insufficient protection

Rostenkowski employed a second procedural

end, Rostenkowski employed 12 such task
forces that included between 5 and
7

This not only gave rank and

1985,

committee hearings

delegating difficult decisions to small
informal task forces within the
committee.

each."’'’

goal;

file

members of

the committee

tactic

In the

members

some

greater

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices,
85.
Strahan,

New Ways and Means,

143-144.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 219, points
out, “all that the proponents of a specific tax
preference had to do to pressure committee members to retain
a favorite tax preference was to demand a
recorded vote. Indeed, despite the fact that the doors were

closed, Strahan, New Ways and Means, 144,
points out that proponents of specific tax breaks were
successful in forcing 48 recorded votes in the Ways

and Means markup.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 115.
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-

attachment to and pride in
the committee’ s ultimate
product,
difficult decisions out

Rostenkowski claimed, “they would
work out a
and then help

On

the

House

modified closed rule

also took the

me

defend

floor,

that

Of

this procedural innovation.

project, report

back with some pride of

it.”'^®

procedures were no

less important.

allowed only 3 amendments

-

The

was given a

bill

a Repubhcan substitute and
2

other minor amendments.
Moreover, the rule only allowed
for 5 hours of debate

period given the broad scope of
the legislation involved.'^'
tactics, the strategy

would be used

of coalition leaders of

to ensure that

and Means Committee
break.

Finally,

weaken

to

the

-

most

legislators

-

even

would be shielded from

one additional procedural

tactic

in the

bill

is

In

-

bnef

a

employing each of these

House was

many of the

clear.

Procedures

legislators

on the Ways

the opportunity to save their
favored lax

employed on the House

House Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA)

favor say aye, opposed no, the

happened

TRA86

the traceability chain occurred by
accident.

bill itself.

most

of the formal hands of
the committee reducing
the number of

opportunities for legislators to
save specific tax breaks.

creation,

it

When

the time

said in a mechanical

passed.”'"

floor that helped

came

on

for a vote

way, “Ail those

Bimbaum and Murray

relate

m

what

next.

He

then looked to the Republican side of the
chamber, expecting to see a
Republican member rise and call for a roll call, but
no one moved. The
speaker banged his gavel, and it was done. The
Republicans, in a moment
of confusion, had missed their only opportunity. A few
Republicans made

Representative

Bimbaum and
^^Representative

Dan Rostenkowski

(D-IL) quoted

in

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices,

1

15.

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 162.

Thomas

P.

O’Neill

(D-MA) quoted

in

^

84

Bimbaum and

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch,

a

show of complaining

fatr

that the speaker had
gaveled ton
witness could see that the
Republicans had simply made

TRA86

Thus,

passed through the House
without a

of the members did not have

The

House

fact that

a

to

go on the record as

number of the procedural

roll call vote.

i,

a mistake.'”’^

The

legislative

packages

an opportunity to amend.
disadvantages.

relaxed

in

to

any

First, the rules

the Senate.

agreements.

bill at

As

by the time a

is

name

Revenue

bill

a result, the

body

1,

Amendments

anxious to add their

is

one senator

all.

House allow

The formal powers
coalition leaders to

and

file legislators

rules governing

amendments

are very

generally run by unanimous
consent
is

generally free to offer

amendments

Section 7 of the Constitution provides
that “All

shall originate in the

not surprising.

in the

of debate and the

gets to the Senate floor,

is

most

Senate, on the other hand,
has two important relative

implies, any

or concur with

and each senator
differences

the

As

that

renected in the differential

is

to the floor without offering
rank

any time. Second, Article

Bills for raising

may propose

The

was

tools available to coalition
leaders in the

treatment that tax packages
receive on the House and
Senate floors.

bnng complex

result

for or against the bill
at

are not available to
coalition leaders in the
Senate

given to the Speaker and the
Rules Committee

,

as

it

on other

is

own

House of Representatives; but
bills.”

Effectively, this

the Senate

means

that

the proverbial last tram leaving the
station

caboose. The result of these two procedural

John Witte examined

all

revenue-losing and revenue-

gaining tax provisions enacted into law between
1970 and 1981 and classified them by

which

institutional actor

proposed the provision.

-

the executive branch, the House, or the Senate

He found

Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown

that the executive branch

at Gucci Gulch, 175

85

.

-

had originally

and the House displayed

rough balance between
revenue-losing and revenue-gain,
ng provisions with respect.ve
ratios

on. 17

and

The

1.34.

Senate, on the other hand,
weighed in at 4.24.

Of 97

tax

provisions ongmating in the
Senate, only 17 increased
revenue.'^"

Despite this difficult .nstitutional
environment, coaiit.on leaders

were able

to ut.lize several procedural
tactics to their advantage.

nrst attempted to

was

staggering.

mark up
So the

the

first

bill in

bill,

decision the Committee
revenue-neutral.

F, nance

Committee

procedural tactic utilized was to
privately draft a

members met

made was

Senate

open sessions and, not sutpnsingly,
the revenue

behind closed doors. Once the
members of the Committee were

components of the

The

,n the

mark up

to

the

to agree that all

bill in

loss

new

bill

satisfied with the central

open session, and the

first

subsequent amendments must be

This agreement forced particulanstic
interests to face off against other

particularistic interests rather than
particularistic interests facing off
against the general
interest.

After only a few amendments, the
Committee approved the

On

the Senate floor, there

is

no doubt

Chairman Robert Packwood (R-OR) had
agreed to oppose
senators that

relief

all

that

it

bill 20-0.'^^

helped that Finance Committee

built a bipartisan coalition

of 35 senators

who

amendments, and had established another informal
agreement among

amendments be

revenue-neutral.

But Packwood also received procedural

from a provision of the 1974 Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act.

Arnold explains the provision which.

Witte, The Politics

and Development of the Income

Tax, 323.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 221.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 179.
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™

rl
r

of a
Congress had not yet adopted
its
H
annual h
budget
resolut.on. Although this
prohibition eould be overturned
by a majority vote waiving the
point of order, it was much
easier to defend
a procedural vote of this
kind than it was to defend

mlal^t'hat

if

,

the stlbseoue

agreement by proposing an
refused, 54 to 39 to allow

Two
mention.

this

unbalanced amendment,

but

the

Senate

consideration.'”

other interesting procedural
tactics utilized on the
Senate floor deserve

First,

Senate floor

Its

m

TRA86 was one
full

view of

of the

first bills

live television cameras.

had a significant impact on the Senate

Members were
their usual long

ever to be considered and
enacted on the

According

to

floor.

of appearing to obstruct reform.
harangues might look unseemly to the
leery

to risk appearing in full color

special interests.”

*

Second, when an amendment

to

Bimbaum and Murray,

They

feared that

public. Few wanted
on the evening news as a defender
of the

restore

the tax

credit

for

IRA

contributions

sponsored by Senator Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY),
coalition leaders cooled support
popular amendment by offering a symbolic
“sense of the Senate” resolution
issue should be revisited in conference.

bills that

and given the
that

the

TRA86

bill.

emerged from the House and

sensitivity

Beam

78

’’’

IRA

the Senate

margin.'^'^

were substantially

different

possibility

could unravel in conferenee. Again, procedural tactics were utilized
argue,

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 222, fn59
1

that the

of many of the provisions, those differences raised the

Conlan, Wrightson, and

for the

Support for the resolution cooled support for

D’ Amato’s amendment, whieh was narrowly defeated
by a 51-48

The

was

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 179.
Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 181.
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way

be

,l.e

coulceuee was

Comm.ltee o„

b....l

w,-.„,,g

lax

such

is

cslimales l,o,„ h.ghly-lr

gicaler coulrol over

legislators to

is

II

ulib/.alio,i

a„d

As
stall'

a

slalT,

lieicely

preseuee Ihe.e ,d Ibe top

slall

l,o,„ .he

sums up

task

Because

.erpiuiug eo.uplex

.eveuue

coulrol access lo slalT
lesouices are

„,

a„

a .esull, because pro-,elon„
Kosleukowsk. and

Packwood had

resources, they were able lo

of

ault-rel'orii,

devoid

lo the del'l

clear the.., lhal .lespile

of piocedures

leeh.ucal

who

Ihose

even propose anieiulinents and

survived. Arnold

ll,e

laxaliou, .aises o„e olher
u.iporlau, pioceduial po,,„.

legislahou

...Ivamaged posiliou.

haudle.l,

,„

II,

alternatives.

e lack of sysle.ual.e alleul.ou

the passage of

this

view

I'ruslrale the ability

TKAHb,

ihe

bill

coul.l „„i

have otherwise

well.

II
legislators had not chosen to accept
these extraordinary procedures in
order to weaken the traceability chain
lor group elTeets, the electoral
eonneetion would have prevented many of them
hoin ever supporting tax
relorm. There ean be little doubt that these
procedures were

e.ssential lor

tax reform.

Ihoeediiral rhoieeiand

hat procedures

I

elear

I

^

is

the

answer

were central

to the

to the c|uestion that

('oiiliiii,

Wnglilsoii, and Ik-ain, Taxing C/ioicr.s,

Arnold,

I'lw l.o^ic of ( 'oii^ivssioiKil Action,

Tax Reform

passage of

consumes

l‘)()-|‘)l.

I
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TRAK6

this study.

is

thus clear.

Why

What

is

less

those procedures?

Why
to

d,d„-. legislators choose
to ut.lizo a procedure
sinular ,o the base clostne
procedure

weaken

the

same

the traceability chain?

factors that

we examined

factors particular to the

need

The a
i nswer
in the

poHcy area and

to this question

legislators

wanted

opportunities for claiming credit

to

case of base closure.

be found

in

examining

Becauisc of a variety of

the pol.cy instrument
involved, legislators did not

to uttlize an extra-congresstonal
procedure.

believe that

is

On

the contrary, there

to

handle

TRA86

o,v

we//

avoiding blame

ts

reason to

internally because the bill
offered

for the loss

of

particularist.c

benefits.

Geog raphic Versus Non-Geourap hir
procedural choice that this study examines
ctit

is

or the particularistic cost being
imposed.

explicitly discusses the importance

Rcnefiis.,

The

central variable impacting

the nature of the particularistic
benefit being

Because he

is

one of the few authors who

of the nature of the particularism
involved,

it

is

not

surprising that Douglas Arnold assesses
the impact of the geographic
distribution of
particularistic cuts in tax reform.

reform

bill

needed

He

hurdles.”'

to

He

argues, “coalition leaders tpiickly
learned that a

he geographically neutral

in

order to survive

all

the legislative

continues,

although coalition leaders failed to temiinate any
major tax preferences
that were geographically concentrated,
they were far more
successful in

eliminating those that were geographically dispersed.
Legislators on the
tax-writing committees could protect but a
limited

number of

preferences without undennining the entire

chose

to protect

geographic benefits,

lest

bill.

They

they be accused of neglecting

their constituents, while allowing coalition leaders
to terminate

group benefits

have wished

1

82

that

were geographically dispersed.

to help the real estate, financial,

1

Arnold,

77/e

Logic of Congressional Action, 2

1

6.

89

tax

quite naturally

Many

dozens of

legislators

may

and restaurant industries, but

*

—

-

.Specncally. A,.nol.l suggests
,hu. ,hc .datively
s.nall price pa.d hy
the

and gas

oil

industry and the dent, on
orthe dcduetib.lity oCstate
and ioeal n.co.ne and prope,ty
taxes
,

tne evidence of the
privileged pos.tion „r
geographieaily concent, ated
bcncllts

scrantble to llnd tax expenditure
cuts to pay for lower lax
rates.
claints,

however, Arnold offers no
en.pnical support

context of this study.

If

,,

is

true

that

what

for

legislators

Aside

a central ,dea

is

a long

way

,l,e

(Von. these geneial

the

do care more about protecting

geographically concentrated henelits
than geographieaily dispersed
benelits, and
in laet, dirl tins in the

,n

if they,

ease of tax reform, the nature
of the partieularistie henclit
would go

lowartls explaining proce.lural
choice.

If

we know

that legislators a,e

more

sensitive to cutting geographieaily
concentrated heneliis than
geographically dispersed
benelits,

,1

would make sense

and were unwilling
Unit

on

to

that legislators

were willing

to

handle tax reform internally

handle base closure internally. Ifase
closure

imposes geographieaily concentrated

particular groups.

While eliminating

-

a policy instrument

is

and only geographically eonecnlraletl

tax expenditures

handled internally hecaiisc legislators could
selectively

is

we examine

geography

to seek out

18.1

the differential trealmenl

evidence

to

of

1

7.

90

It

is

types of

important

tax bcncllts with an eye towards

support or refute Arnold’s claim.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressioiwl Action, 2

suggesting that

|irolcct the

benehts that were most sensitive and thus minimize
the electoral damage.
then, that

costs

imposes both geographically

eoncenlrated and geographically dispersed
costs on groups, Arnold

IRA86 was

-

While they don’t always
several authors argue that
there

of tax expenditures originate

Similarly,

refer explicitly to the
geographic nature of benefits,
is

wide variation

in the

in the

executive branch, Christopher

James Buchanan points out the important

individual and corporate tax expenditures.

He

Howard suggests

distinction in political logic

that

hetween

argues.

If individual taxpayers are
presumed to be unable to trace out the
incidence
and effects of alternative corporate tax
structures, the observed support
for
the
986 tax law changes may have reflected
a failure to make the
translation from corporate to individual
tax accounts.

Describing the political environment

in the

House Ways and Means Committee, Randall

Strahan argues that there was a clear geographic
pattern

saved and which were

to

which tax expenditures were

not.

Rostenkowski was forced

to shift from a coalition-building
strategy
stressing opportunities for enhancing prestige
and enacting good public

policy to a strategy that included negotiating
changes to accommodate
local or group interests of importance to
individual

committee members.

As one committee member
awful

lot

described the markup process, “There was an
of protection going on - in terms of protecting what ’s good
for

your state, your region, your district." By the count of a staffer
who
worked closely with the chairman, five of the twenty-eight members of the
Howard, The Hidden Welfare
i

85

State, 186.

James M. Buchanan, Tax Reform

as Political Choice” in

1987), 31.
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Economic Perspectives,

vol

1

no

1

(Summer

coalition that iiltimalcly
supported the committee

bill

one Republican) supported the
chaimian from the
exacted as a condition ot support
local or regional concern}

James Snyder,

Finally,

tax

Jr.

makes

at least

the point

more

(four

Democrats ind

outset; the reniainde!

some conecssions

for

„f
qj

explicitly arguing.

preferences

for speeifie industries
or finns, such as those
for
agriculture, timber, oil and gas.
Philips Petroleum, and
Cimarron Coal
clearly have the properties of
locally concentrated
benefits and diffuse
costs.
On the other hand, for many big-ticket,
federal versus local tax
policy issues - such as the deductibility
of state and local sales taxes and
the deductibility of interest
on state and local bonds - both
benefits and
costs are dispersed rather widely,
at least viewed
geographically.'^^
In

making

this point,

Snyder, of course, leaves out state
and local income and property

taxes, the deductibility

of which was retained

in

TRA86.

We

are left to

assume

that the

reason legislators retained the deductibility
of state and local income and property
taxes

while eliminating the deduction for state and
local sales taxes was because
the benefits of
the deductibility of state and local

income and property taxes

are

more geographically

concentrated than the benefits of state and local
sales tax deductibility.

That

is

also the

explanation to be inferred from Arnold’s claim that
state and local income and property
tax deductibility

were retained because of their geographically concentrated

Fortunately, this happens to be a case in which

claims

made by

a

number of authors. Data on per

we

character.

can do more than infer from

capita state and local taxes are readily

available and serve as an excellent measure of the
comparative concentration of the
benefits of the deductibility of state and local sales, income, and
property taxes.

our hypothesis

Strahan,

1

is

that

geographically concentrated

New Ways ami Means,

149,

my

benefits

are

more

Because

difficult

for

emphasis.
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James M. Snyder, Jr., “Comment on ‘Loeal Interests, Central Leadership, and
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 12, no. (1993), 183.
1
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the Passage of

TRA86’”

in

legislators

an<l

ct„,

winch

we would

to einninate,

expect to

legislators

tl.td that u,

would

choosing wh.ch tax
prelerenees

retan,

those that are ntore
geograph, eally

concentrated and einninate
those that are more
geographically dispersed.

know

TRA86,

that in

to retan,

legislators retanted the
deduet.h.hty

of

and

state

we

In ad.hlion,

local n.eonte

and

property taxes and elintinated
the tleducib.hty of state
and local sales taxes.
Therefore,
-ho geograph.e eoneentrat.ons
of these taxes are an
in.portan, variable

winch

tax

benents are cut and winch
are spared,

we

should see

in

some

if

detennining

statistically

signilicant difference between
the variation in per
capita state and local
ineo.ne and

property taxes on the one hand
and the variation

on the

,n

per capita state and local sales
taxes

other.

Capita State and Local Sales,

Income, and Property d’axes

Fiscal 1985

Deviation of Per Capita Sales Tax in
50 States
Std. Deviation of Per Capita
Income Tax in 50 States
Std. Deviation of Per Capita Property
Tax in 50 States

Fiscal 1988

Stcl.

F

Statistic

F

Statistic for Property

for

Income Tax versus Sales Tax
Tax versus Sales Tax

$156.40

$175.66

$195.75

$235.63

$212.47

$240.38

1

.566*

1.799**

1.845**

1.873**

Source:

Statistics above arc from author’s
calculations based on data from Tax
Kmndation, Facts and Figures on Government Finanee, 23'^'
edition (lialtimore MDhe Johns Hopkins University Press,
1988), Table 31 and Tax Foundation, Faels and
Figures on Government Finanee, 26"’ edition
(Baltimore, MD: J'he Johns Hopkins
University Press, 99 ), Table 31.
I

1

1

* Significant at

** Significant

188

.1

at .05

recognize that

tliere is

some dispute

as to wliether

population data as opposed to sample data.

I

it

is

appropriate to utilize an

have included the relevant

useful.
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I-'-statistic

I-’-test

given that

here for those

this is

who

find

it

4.3

local

p,

ovules con.pa,a,ivc n.oasu,cs
of

incon,e, p,-„pe„y,

e„ac,n.c„l of

cxpecleci,

we

TRA86) and
.see Ihal

.here

local per cap., a ineonte

a.ul

llscal

is

sales .axes

IW8

,n

cerlain

r„,-

(ligh,

hc.wccn

lx.U,

slalcs lo. pc,- cap,,a
s.alc

Hscal

|.,«5

Ihe enael.neni

alle,-

„-,g|„

of TRA80).

and pioperly laxes eon, pared
w.lh per capila sales

slates

II,

whose men, hers

then

iorise.

Tor

this reason,

rt

is

•fable 4.4

-

Moreover, as

we

memhers

lion,

each

will see shortly, the

Capita

Local Sales, Income, and I’ropcrty
Faxes

Fiscal 1985

Stcl.

Stcl.

This

came from

slate.

Comparative Weighled Varial,.,,,ll^i^^;;;;,7^;i^^

Sul. Deviation

laxes.

appropriate U, weight the stale
per capita lax payments

Tahle 4.3 hy Ihe nriniher of
louse
I

As

have a nnu|.,e and sign.nean,

drive lo retarn the dedrreirhilily
of slate and local income and
property laxes
I

of Per Capita Sales ax in 50 States
Deviation of Per Capita Income l ax in
50 States
Deviation of Per Capita Property 'Fax in
50 States

Income Fax versus Sales Fax

l

V

Statistic For

F’

Statistic For Property Fax versus Sales
Fax

.Slale

T

an

Fiscal 1988

$1 14.44

$131.77

$230.87

$284.88

$162.37

$199.27

4.070*

4.674*

2.013*

2.287*

Foundation, luic/s and Figures on Government
Finanee, 23''’ edition (Baltimore Ml)'
Ihc Johns Hopkins University Press,
1988), Table 31 and Fax Foundation, Faets and
h^ures on Government Finanee, 26"’ edition (Baltimore,
Ml): Flie Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991), Tahle 31.
* Signilleant at

.OOP

,|.e

c dedncUInlity a,e n,o,e
geograp.neally

incenl.ve to relan, the deduclih.lity
of these taxes.

die

„ero,-e

sian.licaally greale,- va,-,a.io„
a,„ong stales in sla.e a,„l

greater varial.on .neans lha,
ihe benelils of

concemraled

va, ia,i„„

I
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in

The

results

of this weighting are displayed

the disparity between sales
taxes and

Conlan, Wrightson, and

Beam

we

can see there that

is

greater.

In

more than ample anecdotal evidence

to

suggest that geography played
a signiftcant role

were retained while

Table 4.4 aind

income and property taxes becomes
even

addition ,0 this empirical
evidence, there

tax deductibility

in

explaining

in

sales tax deductibility

was

why income and

property

eliminated. For instance,

point out that the slate and local
income tax deduction

was

a particularly difficult provision
for legislators to eliminate
because.

such popular provisions were not
viewed by the average taxpayer as
special-, merest loopholes.
They were often incidental to Jere
one
worked or lived, and few used the provisions
as a ploy to lower taxes.
This fact and the high concentration
of benefits from deductibility of
state and local

income and property taxes were not

Means Committee, where

3

lost

on the members of the House.

committee members were from

highest per capita state income tax in the
nation

-

Chairman Rostenkowski

states,

-

income and

In addition to the influence

Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA) made

that eliminating the state

and

Ways and

the state with the

retaining the state and local

property tax deduction became “the fulcrum of
reform.”’

committee members from high-tax

New York

In the

local

it

clear to

income and property

deduction was unacceptable telling him.

Dan, the power of the Speaker comes down to whether a bill
gets on the
floor or doesn t get on the floor. Two things I’m
interested in: state and

You don t have
Remember that.

local taxes.

court.

those in the

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 95,

bill,

you don’t get a day

in the

my emphasis.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 112.
Representative

Thomas

P. (Tip)

O’Neill

(D-MA) quoted

Choices, 113.
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in

of

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing

tax

n.c
ol-

.

fate

1,0

hack

at

oChe

slate a„cl local sales lax
daluelion

in, po, -lance

allowed ,„e slate and

.signilleamly lower

when

the ilala

likely ,o

$17.5 hillion hole

on

amendinenl.

dednclon

vaiialion

is

all

Ilia,

when

llie

local

ooKnig

ol'lax lelonn

a

move

.sales

n. the

Ihe slate and local
sales lax

lax

I

in

is

louse

deducon

he sensitive ,o members of Ihe
Senale than memhers of Ihe
House.

(K-MN)

anri Palriek

lloor, bul

in Ihe hill,

Moynihan (l,-NY| wauled

,o reslore

because relaining ihe deduclion
would blow a

and because mos, senalors were
eonmnlled

ainendmenis, neither senalor was
willing

When

l

would be

per eapiu, stale and

or,Caini„g

evulenee

Hener.ls.

House veis.on

,o be einnnialed, Iheie

n,

rinll.ei

weighted hy ihe ninnher of
members

n,d, eating lha, henellls

dednclion on the Senale

neiilrahly

n„l snipiising

The

,1.

Senalors David Dnrenberger
.lie

,s

it

local sales lax

Hie Senate ,o leinslale

were more

the Senate piovicles

of the geo^iaplne eoncenlialion
of pailicnlanslic

Tables 4.3 and 4.4,

rrom each slate

ii.

several oilier senalors pul forward
an

to

,o

revenne-

even put lorward an

amemlmenl

that

would allow

taxpayers lo deduct eilher Iheir stale sales
lax or Iheir income laxes, bul
nol both, senalors
Iron,

high-mcoine

lor tear lhal Ihe

tax slales liirned against Ihe
dediiclihilily ofslalc

amendinenl would open up Ihe possibility oflampering

lax deduclibihly u, conference.''"

sales lax vis a vis

was no big

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam,

l>aliick

I

Moynihan (I)-NY)

laxes,

deal for

/W,v///g

local sales laxes

will, slate

income

lighlighling Ihe differeiil polilical calculus
for Ihe

income and properly

saying, “the sales (ax

Senator

and

New

Moynihan would

later

explain his reversal

York.”‘‘^^

Choices, 183-184.

inioted in (’onlan, Wnght.son, and

96

Beam, Tasw}’ Choices,

184.

In

addmon

,o ,he state

and

local tax deductions,
the other set

of geographically

concentrated tax expenditures
ntenhoned hy An, old were tax
preferences for the

oil

and

gas industo^. Just as retention
of the state and local inconte
and property tax deductions

were

critical

tax credits

components of passing

was

tax refom, in the House,
the retention of oil and
gas

critical in the Senate.

Ways and Means,

Despite the lack of a strong

state

and gas presence on

the warning signs on this
geographic benefit were clear

Committee stage when lawmakers from
deduction for

oil

oil

and gas

states

and local income and property
taxes.

voted

m

at

the

House

lock-step to retain the

Bimbaum and Murray

point out

that,

Rostenkowski

s people knew there was
trouble for sure when Democratic
Representative James Jones of Oklahoma
wrote an op-ed piece for The
Washington Post that demanded the
retention of the deduction for
state
and local taxes. State taxes in
Oklahoma were so low

Reagan had chosen Jones’s home state to
make
of that deduction. He argued the
write-off
tax states like

that President

his biggest pitch for repeal

represented a subsidy by low-

Oklahoma

wasn’t buying that

line.

to high-tax states like

For

political expediency,

New York

but Tones
Jones and other “oilies”

Jewish groups to protect each other’s tax
breakT'^'^'’^

The Senate Finance Committee,

in particular,

cutting oil and gas tax expenditures.

proved

to

be a hostile environment for

When Chairman Packwood

committee, he quickly met resistance according

to

brought the

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam.

The committee

rank-and-file promised nothing but trouble. Building
on a
and gas votes that included Long, Dole, Bentsen, Max
Baucus,
D-Mont., and Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyo., outspoken
opponent David
Boren, D-Okla., was actively soliciting conspirators for
his

bloc of

oil

“kill the bill”

coalition.

Bimbaum and

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 129.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 148.

97

bill

to

The

.ru,h

however,

is,

would play

in the

,ha, ,h.s assess.,, e„,
actually understates the
role that oil

Finance Committee.

from the Treasury Department,

James Baker,

and gas

bill

had ever been sent

interests, led

a Texan, had been
successful „,

would have taken some $44
years.

oil

Before the

removing provisions from the

billion in tax benefits

m particular,

it

is

from the

not sunrrtsing that

oil

Congress

by Secretary of the Treasury

Gtven the differing geographic
makeup of the House

Means Committee

to

and gas

oil

bill

that

and gas industry over 5

in general,

and gas

and the Ways and

interests

had been

hit.

But the partisan and geographic
makeup of the Senate and the Senate
Finance Committee

were

far

more hospitable

to oil

and gas

interests.

First, the

Senate had a Republican

majority more synipathetic to Baker’s
political logic and the bias
of that logic was

One anonymous
the offending

way

oil

to finance

administration official

was quoted

in the

and gas provisions, “the Republican
party

campaigns

in

Texas

if this

clear.

National Journal as saying of
is

going

to

have to find a new

goes through.”'

Administration influence notwithstanding
however, a second and more important
reason

why

oil

Committee had

and gas tax expenditures would receive
favorable treatment
to

Finance

do with the geographic makeup of the committee.
Table 4.5 displays

the percentage of the gross state product
comprised by
state represented

in the

oil

and gas extraction for each

on the Senate Finance Committee. 8 of the 14

states with the largest oil

and gas sectors are represented on the Finance Committee,
including numbers 2 through
5.

Overall, nearly 3 times as

Finance are comprised by

Anonymous

oil

much of

the

economies of the 20

states represented

on

and gas extraction compared with United States as a whole.

administration official quoted in Ronald Brownstein, “Wagering on
2, 1985, 247.

Journal, February

98

Tax Reform,” Nationul

Table 4.5

Comparison of Dependence on

% of State’s

Senator

1986

GSP

Oifii^as

from Oil and

Exlraction by State

Rank

State

Gas Extraction

Long (D-LA)

7.90%
17.35%
8.85%
8.25%
3.02%
2.06%
.62%
.08%
0.18%
0.08%
0.04%
0.03%
0.01%
0.01%
0.01%
0.01%
0.01%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1

Wallop (R-WY)
Boren (D-OK)
Bentsen (D-TX)

Baucus (D-MT)

Dole(R-KS)
Armstrong (R-CO)
Pryor (D-AR)
Heinz (R-PA)
Moynihan (D-NY)

Roth (R-DE)

Packwood (R-OR)
Danforth (R-MO)
Chafee (R-RI)

(D-ME)

Grassley (R-IA)

Matsunaga (D-HI)
Bradley (D-NJ)
Oil and

Source.

Gas Extraction
Gas Extraction
Author

s

A

4
r

8
11

1

(R-ID)
Durenberger (R-MN)

Oil and

i

12

1

Symms

Mitchell

1

14

20
27

29
30

34
35

36
o
u

40
41

43

44
45

% of Gross National Product
as % of Finance Committee Member States’
GSP
as

calculations of data from Bureau of

1

06%

2.89%

Economic Analysis,

U.S. Bureau of the Census

For the purposes of
former.

oil

this

this study,

The existence of

however,

this latter statistic is less important than the

a solid minority of senators intensely committed to preserv ing

and gas tax benefits meant

that tax

reform could proceed through Finance only when

geographically concentrated interest was appeased.

point out that on the final day of committee markup,
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Conlan, Wrightson, and

when

it

was becoming

Beam

clear that the

proverbial train

would be leaving

the station, the

oU and gas bloe was more
suecessful

than any other group. They
add,

outcome was only a matter of who had
the
Packwood, and so energy-state senators
won
the

votes. In the end

tax benefits enjoyed

others

Boren owed

by “working
his

interests” in oil

committee assignment

^

nramage
Zmafe of cconvenience

it

amendments

their

was

not

to protect

and gas projects^ Like
to Long, and all had

" "oiideological, nonpartisan
that

no one, not even Wallop, was
about

to
abandon, tax refonn or no tax reform.
Energy’s strong track record in
turn, was enough
to
convince the core group that,
without an
aecommodafion, the committee might be

unable to report a

even during a period of remarkable
alliances never wholly broke down.

bill.

hat,

Significantly, the battle lines over the
oil and gas

esprit

It

shows

de corps, traditional

amendments show how

the

power of

geography can overwhelm the power of party.
Dole (R-KS), Bentsen (D-TX), Boren
(D-

OK), and Long (D-LA) fought and won on

oil

and gas against Chafee (R-RI), Bradley
(D-

NJ), and Mitchell (D-ME).

In addition to the special treatment

local tax deductions, the important role

accorded the

of transition rules

further evidence of the importance of geography.

provisions inserted into tax

and new tax law.

bills that

oil

and gas industry and
in enacting

TRA86

state

and

serves as

Technically, transition mles are special

provide for an easier transition between old tax law

But because the chaimien of Finance and Ways and
Means have

effeetive control over

who

gets transition rules,

it

is

easy to see

the grease that lubricates the legislative tax machine.

how

And because

these provisions are

transition rules are

targeted towards specific companies or localities, they are perhaps the
purest form of a

geographic benefit. The best-case scenario for legislators seeking
interests in tax reform

would be

to protect constituency

to save the tax expenditures their constituents utilize

100

most.

A

sccoml-bcsl scenario

the tax bonclil.

In the

is

to gel a I'avotable

insition rule that will ease
the loss

lr;i

ease of lax rcronn, transition
rnles we
were used

to help

move

the

of

bill

over each legislative hurdle.

During the marknp of

TRA86

Rostenkowski, sensing he was abont

in

the

to lose

Ways

revenue

an.i

to

Means Committee, Chainnr.n

an aineitcimeni that wotiUI
expand

the dednelibilrty of business
lunches, pleaded with the
eontm.itee that tletluetion should

be scaled back as a matter of

and

that

he would tlceide

lairness.

who

Itut

he also pointed out that there
would be a

got transition

rt.les

and

who

tlid

not.

bill,

ISrrnbaum and

Murray describe what followed.
Rostuikowski s threat to tieny transition
rtiles to any member who
crossed
Inm could not be ignored. Whether it was
Rostenkowski's

plea for reform
or his threat to deny transition rides
that caused the change, the
committee
majority shifted after the speech.

On

the Hnal

day of markup, Rostenkowski did indeed
dispense more than $5

transition rules to

hoped would
inserted a

still

number

members who had been

friendly or to

be willing to get on board.
of

members who

the

billion in

Chairman

Not surprisingly, Rostenkowski also

favorable transition rules for Rep. Claude
Pepper (D-FL), the

Chairman of the House Rules Committee, who Rostenkowski
knew he would need
a favorable rule for the bill

on the House

lloor.''^'^

Transition rules were no less a part of the success Chairman

Finance Committee. Gary Mucciaroni points out

that.

197

C'onlan, Wrighlson, and ficam. Taxing Choices, 176.

Birnbauni and Murray,

to get

Showdown

at

Gucci Gulch, 146.

Birnbaum and Murray, Showdown

at

Gucci Gulch, 146-147.
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Packwood had

in the

:rzJTS:‘:T"" ‘r“‘
200

As o„o

p.r(,cipanl in Ihc llnal ,n„mcnls
,n

somclimcs looked

like the lloor

inancc rclalcs, the

l

hon| here.

came tU>wn
in

On

the

like

an a.ietioneer:

Can hike lilly |million| there?”
lc was hoUling up this
paper ami

‘'

1^0

got liliv

I

I

order to pay (or the

Overall, thal’s^wlril

it

auclinning nITprovisinns

last

few special deals.

After Sen. Pete Wilson

,K-CA, and Sen. Alan Cranslon
,I)-CA) had ahandoned

Chairman on an aiuendmenl seeking

to

expand

tax credits for

conlribuimns to IKAs

an amen<lme.u Paekwood had beaten
baek by the slinuuest of margins
behind an amendment by
for

rules

the Sctialc llonr, Packwo.xl’s
eontrnl ever liansilinn rules
also helped In keep troops

Hne.

itt

In.

f„,-

of a slock exchange.

ackwoo. was stanihng up there
talking
|nii

lu.nl

Unocal

Howard Metzenbaum (D-OII)

that California’s senators

margin and the message
In

.Sen.

had leqtiested.

to other senators

was

-

Paekwood

-

got

to eliminate a transition rule

Ihc amcntlmenl passed by a wi.lc

clcar.^"^

conlercncc, transition rules emerged again
as a saving grease.

When

trouble

broke out among Senate conferees, Paekwood
made a point of reminding

his fellow

conferees that he and Roslenkowski would
each have about $3 billion

additional

transition rules to

remembered.
dropped

hand out and

202

who

Some were remembered more

his objections after

Miicciaroiii, Reversals

Quoted

that those

quickly than others as Sen. Chafee (R-RI)

Paekwood provided Rhode

and [team,

Taxitif'

Choices, \15.

^

(

supported the conference report would be

of Fortune, 52.

in ('onlan, Wrighl.son,

onlan, WriglUson, and Beam, Taxing C hoices, 185.
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in

Island

$100 million

in

authority

.0 issue

700

cenain types of tax-free bonds.-

transit, on rules at a
total cos,

concentrated benefit for
In

of

-

-

vs.

contained neatly

non-geograph, c benefits,

procedural choice.

I,

is

clear that leg.slators

to utilize an internal
procedural strategy in the case

allowed them

it

TRA86

every one of then, a
geograpineally-

concluding our discussion of
geographic

w.llmg and able

pages.

billion

Hna, vetsion,

some member of Congress.^”'^

important to be rennnded of our
focus

because

S„

„t ,ts

Summarizing the

make

to

final

the very chotces

contours of the

bill,

we have

of

discussed

TRA86
in the

Conlan, Wrightson, and

it

is

were

precisely

preceding

Beam

offer

this revealing passage.

The

TRA

neither pluralist in tone nor
modest in the scope of its
predecessor, and interest-group
bargaining was clearly
noutedom°™ /nfluenee on the legislation.
Indeed, losers constituted a
virti a^ W, os
virtual
Who among the U.S. economic interests
that traditionally
have shaped tax policy, including real
estate, heavy industry, large
banks ’
casualty insurance, defense contractors,
and multinational corporations.^”
IS

f

What

is

noticeably absent from this

concentrated tax expenditures.

list,

however, are beneficiaries of
geographically-

Legislators proceeded with tax refom,
precisely because

they employed a procedure that allowed
them

Long (D-LA) expressed
state agatnst

who

this

view best

do

fellas are
It

choose winners and

defending the

and gas

Sen. Russell

interests so vital to his

in tax reform.

lawmakers. We’re supposed

deliberately and

Bimbaum and

know who

to

know who we’re

helping and
we’re hurting and do that deliberately.

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 277-279.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 218.
205

oil

losers.

an amendment supported by a former judge
Sen. George Mitchell (D-ME),

argued for “blind justice”

We

in

to

Conlan, Wrightson. and Beam, Taxing Choices, 233-234.
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Now

the people in

the oil

and gas husincss arc the
most denresse.1
If you’re s.tt.ng over
there iranurre

.ndusto- .n the Un.ted States.

Til
riiis

ame.
he

hell

”
fella s

with him.

Not surprisingly, the

soing

broke,“'l
down and out.
1

do anything about

can’t

tax expenditures

sensitive particularistic benefits
of all

Ih e Scope of_ihe_P pliey
question of procedural choice

in

-

most

that.”

If

is

billion in

a broad policy area.

politics if only

A

Area.

second factor found

to

be relevant

base closure was the scope of
the policy area.

TRA86

TRA86

it

is

in

the

While

equally clear that tax

not only put every aspect of the
then nearly $500

is

area.

table, but also

Conlan, Wrightson, and

an interesting story for students of
American

because of “the size and sweep of the
TRA, bringing nearly every

important institution and interest

Murray make

were the most

geographically-concentrated benefits.

revenue from individual and corporate
income taxes on the

correctly point out that

the

~

legislators sought to save

touched upon and affected virtually every
other policy

Beam

’all

heln But
you’re a judgi that’s

base closure presented a clear ease of
a narrow policy area,

refomi

to treat then,

God knows he needs

the point

more

in national politics to the foreground.”^^'

explicitly suggesting that tax refomi

fundamental way than dealing with more narrow policy

areas.

was

Bimbaum and
different in a

Early on. Treasury

Secretary James Baker and his lieutenant, Richard Damian,
had hoped to secretly cut a
deal with key legislators ahead of time and push tax refomi
through the Congress just as

they had done with Social Security
strategy could never have

worked

Senator Russell Long (D-LA) quoted

in

in the

in

1983.

But

Bimbaum and Murray

argue such a

case of tax refomi because.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 176.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 230.
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Enacting tax refonn thus
poses more legislative problems
than jus, the
cutting visible and concentrated
particulanstic benefits
benefit.

It

also

means you

are

making decisions

final

In relating

contours of

you are

favor of a diffuse general

m other policy areas

and citizens have cross-cutting
policy preferences.
encountered while negotiating the

in

fact that

TRA86

in

which

some of
in

legislators

the difficulties

conference, Conlan,

Wnghtson, and Beam provide two examples
of this problem.
Not only did conferees despair over
changes

affecting

most corporations

T

For example;
®
Bill
Bm Roth
RoTh - an advocate of savings
incentives and a consumption
tax to
discourage spending - made IRAs his
line m the sand. When
Packwood
went back on his promise (made earlier

Roth out
support.

m

during Senate floor debate) to help
conference, the Republican from
Delaware withheld his

Similarly, Danforth

was determined

completed contract method of accounting
he couldn’t, this much-respected
conference agreement and,

later,

to preserve the so-called

for defense contractors.

When

Presbyterian minister voted against
the
against the TRA.^®*^

Thus, while legislators wanted to protect
the particular benefits flowing to
their
just as they

wanted

to in the case

districts

of base closure, tax reform’s broad scope
added an

additional dimension of complexity. Legislators
could be sure in the case of base closure
that the

agency losses incurred by delegating authonty

to

draw up a

list

of bases

to

be

closed would be limited. But in the case of tax reform,
legislators could conceivably lose
particularistic tax benefits

The power

'JQg

to tax, after

Bimbaum and

and lose

all, is

the

in a host

power

of other policy areas

to destroy.

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 76.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 210-211.
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Given these

far

beyond the

facts,

it

is

tax code.

inconceivable

tl>at

logislalors could

institt,tional

to

Baker

I

feel

secure delegating the power
to relornt the tax
code.

prerogatives that were

s plan to

sat tn

at

stake were ntadc clear in
Rostenkowski-s response

move TRA86 through

my

the Congress quickly.

rocker and said: “Jesus, Jim,
don’t show

We re creating
Wc’rrcrcatina

r.
T7'''® and
"Tthis
m
legislation,

the

is

first

I

le

remembered,

me how

in, prudent

“’''licence.
step in the process
We’re

^

tetli year™olTr’’"«
While
legislators

the concern over agency
losses

from delegating the power

commission, the ease of
compelling reason,
areas.

general

why

lax

reform

also

to

tax

to

reform to a base closure type
of

points out

tliffusc

we

a

second, and

perhaps more

TRASb

arc focusing on in this study
confer

while they impose concentrated
costs,

delegate the authority to

contain agency losses. But

make

we

This differs from base closure

these decisions so long as they can

in

some

political reward.

a fundamental way.

In

base closure, legislators

can support the policy vehicle when, and only
when, they arc reasonably sure
electoral fallout from their vote will be negligible.

employed

expect

presents such a massive policy area that
delivering the

diffuse general benefit actually offers legislators

tactics legislators

prevent

legislators are unlikely to
delegate authority in broad policy

bcnclus that arc

want

would certainly be enough

to craft

Precisely because the particular
laws

legislators to

The

to increase the distance

Not surprisingly, we saw
between

their votes

all

that the

kinds of

and the negative

policy effects including delaying implementation of closures,
handing off the decisions

over which bases
timing their votes

to close to others, placing restrictions

at particular

moments

on the agent’s authority, and

in the political calendar.
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Importantly, however.
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and
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and scope, olTe,s legislalois
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Will, legislators thus loensed

on ihe geneial henelil and on Ihe
opporlnn.iy

eredd, Ihe noiinal polilieal logic wenl
o„l Ihe win.low,

course ol evenis

in a

coiireience eonimillee on a lax

ol boll, sides, Ihe conl'erees in

li-o,,,

holl, Ihe lio„,se

a resnil,

lliud

I

RASh

and Ihe Senate

sotiglil lo

lo gel rales

was

comhine

down

clam,

hor instance, while Ihe nonnal
lo

comhine

Ihe pel loopholes

Ihe loophole-c/o.vmg pi-ovisions

as low as possible,

Qmie

conleiees cho.se Ihe longlier provision li-om the
House and Senale

ollen, as

hills for Ihe

version of TRA86.^'^

Kc'prcscnlalivc

Dan Ro.slcnkowski

(D-ll.) qiiolcd

Arnold, The l.o^ic of( 'on^ressioiial Aeiion, 2
212

hill

u,

,

See Appendiees

the evolution of

A

and H

in

Ihmbanm and

major |)rovisions

in

I

1

m

(’oiilan, Wnglilsoii,

and Beam, Taxing Choices, 93.

3.

Murray,

Showdown

RAX6.
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at (iiieei Cidch, for a detailed t-rapliie on

Co.I.,ion leaders were so
succcssCuI in p.m.ng ihe
general
ui.in-alely,

mcur
‘‘.0

nrany legislators eanre U,
believe lha, Ihey had to
vote lor

Ihc wralh of angry
constiUienls.

Americans.-

lint

wha, average Americans

I

KAKb

ihal

ihcy

les,

Conlan, Wrigh.son, and lieain
eorrecly poin, out,

be sure, directing bla.ne
or credit for tax reronn was
not

average

benem up from

what really matters most

will be thinking, or

at that ti.ne

on the minds of

to legislalors is their
perception

wha, they might be made

to think,

of
on

EIcclion Day. Gary Mucciaroni
argues,

members of Congress who might have
been tempted

to vote against
Ihc next election point
out llun they
dilTuse bcnelll and that they
were captivel

rclorm risked having challengers
had denied their constituents a

hey
less

had Ihe opportunity

hatl

to

at

vote for greater fairness and
efllciency and

government and they had shied away
from

support

More

it.

In

the end their fear

'"“"y "'«"hcrs to
"e’lbrm.^'“'‘'

than anyone, legislative leaders
feared being blamed for failing
to enact

FRA86. One senior Ways and Means Committee

aide recalled,

when we had

trouble, when we lost on the bank
vote, ... [the chairman’sl
argument tended to be: “We can’t do this. The
Democrats arc going to get
blamed lor killing tax reform.
can hear Ronald Reagan out there right
now saying your rates arc now 50 [percent] and could
have lowered them
to 35 percent
1

I

[

That legislative leaders had these sorts of
worries was important.

enactment of TRA86, James Buchanan suggests the
possibility

promoted “by

2

political

Conlan, Wrighlson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 174.
Mucciaroni, Reversals of Fortune, 38-39.
in

Strahan,

that tax

entrepreneurship of self-interested agents

1

Quolcti

In his analysis

New Ways and Means,

1

50- 151.
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who

of the

reform was

exploited

the

td-porary ccnciclenco be,
ween ,hc,

view assigns ,„o passive
Itave

seen,

atmosphere

actively

in

own and gencal

a role ,o legislative
leaders,

c„ns,i,ncncy

however, hegislalive

maniptdated proeednres, and
the legislahon

which the general

For tnstance, the Hnal

bcnellt

bill

of lax reform was

gave individuals

pm

or

b.

I

that 8t, percent

percent less to be exact.-

notice a difference of this sixe.
lo indivitinals in the

file

Though corporate

of

to

ereate an

of roughly S24 bilhon

less in taxes -

tax returns every year

and are hhely

tax inereases are even,
.tally passed

tlifficul, for

cm

an average

form of lower corporate earnings,
lower dividends, increased

or reduced services, these costs
are mdirec, and

we

lea.lers, as

fhe benefits of this ,ax

of Ameneans would pay

Individuals

itself,

This

„p from.

a net tax en,

annually and increased corporate
taxes by the same amount,

were spread around so

in, crests.-''

to

on

priees,

voters to trace to the actions

legislators.

Moreover, legislative leaders did more
than

Once

spreati the general benefit around.

again, they manipulated the
procedures they could, utilizing the newly
installed

Senate television cameras lo shame
senators pushing

for

amendments

that

were not

rcvcnuc-nctilral or that disproportionately
favored wealthier individuals or
corporations.

When

Senator Alfonsc D’Amato (R-NY) and Senator
Christopher Dodd (D-Cf) sought

lo restore

came

some of

to the lloor

taxpayers.

the deduction for contributions to IRAs,
Senator Rill Bradley (D-N.I)

with charts lo explain

the

amendment would only

Bradley’s tax aide, Gina Despres pointed out the

Buchanan, “Tax Reform as
2

how

I’olitical

Choice,” 33.

1

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 214-215.
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utilily

benefit wealthy

of the cameras.

:™“::r,:,?:“r:ct/:r“^^^^^

making $200,000 would make out

like a bandit.

Procedures and modifications of
the
the general benefit

tax reform.

was

large

enough

bill aside,

that legislators

This could not have been the
case

This was show

hiz."'*

the point for our
punroses

that

is

had a positive incentive to
support

base closure as the general
benefit was

in

not large enough for legislators
to credibly claim their
actions had any positive impact
on
citizens’ lives.

And most

importantly, the difference in
the size of the general
benefit

offered by tax reform and base
closure

was

a direct result of the
difference in the scope of

the respective policy areas.
Therefore, in addition to the fact
that legislators were

delegating

power

for fear

found a positive incentive

Ihe Moment
procedural choice
parttcular point

is

of agency losses
to

m

such a broad policy area, legislators
also

be a part of enacting

Time,

in Political

A

political calendar

TRA86

third factor

the notion of political time.

on the

was

-

a chance to claim credit.

of importance

in the question

There are a variety of reasons

right for tax reform.

First,

imposes particulanstic costs while delivering
general benefits requires

semblance of a public willing

to

endure the costs.

American people were disgusted with
latent political force waiting to

overdrawn of course.
issues.

There

be

is

Bimbaum and Murray

Bimbaum and

in

why

any law

at

least

of

this

that

some

point out, “the

the [tax] system, and that disgust represented
a

tapped.”'’'^

The

political

weight of such claims can be

always a certain amount of

But congressional action on policy proposals of

Gina Despres quoted

wary of

latent

this sort

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 182.

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 285.
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anger on a variety of

does not require angry

cmzens

calling their leg, slaters
and imploring then, ,o tlx a
problem.

that legislators

If

Mievc

there

is a

significant

chance cit.zens

be

Congress does nothing. So desp.te
optnion polls showing

of tax reform, ““ Bimbaum and
Murray point

All

ung^ on

,,

reepnres

Election

that the public

was

is

Day

skeptical

out.

smart politicians knew that
beneath the apparent public
indifference
01 ed a potential gusher
of discontent that could prove
to be a fearsome
orce. Few members of
Congress cherished the thought of
ending up on
president's

battle

against

terests. They may not have
nLrsrxhef
wanted refonii, but they

seen standing in

A
that, as

its

way

reform a possibility.

in political

be

time was ripe for tax reform

Ironically, that very

The previous

section

supported tax reform was that the general
benefit
that legislators

to

is

above, the period from 1975 to 1981
had seen the most rapid expansion
of

tax expenditures in the nation’s
history.

tax

special

either.^^

second reason the particular moment

we saw

the

were not about

were willing

of tax expenditures

to

argued

to

expansion helped to make

one reason

that

be delivered was sufficiently large

endure some particularistic pain.

in the 1970s, this incentive

legislators

would have been

Without the expansion

lessened.^^^

Third, the mid-1980s witnessed the rise
of an elite consensus on tax reform.

Conlan, Wrightson, and

220

22

Beam

argue that the enactment of TRA86 should be
attributed,

'

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam,

Bimbaum and

Taxwg

at

—

'

Choices, 39.

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 285.

This line of argument is similar in a way to the description of
legislative behavior in Morris P. Fiorina.
Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Second Edition
(New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1989).

Fiorina argues that legislators profit politically by claiming credit
for the creation of big

government and then

profit politically

services to constituents.

One could

by becoming

the

similarly argue that

monopoly provider of “bureaucratic unsticking”
members of Congress profited politically by

creating the myriad of tax preferences that they then sought to claim credit
for eliminating in 1986. I would
not ascribe any conspiratorial or even remotely organized intent to this
pattern of policymaking. The only
point of relevance here is that the timing is important. Tax reform could only have
happened after a period

of expanding tax preferences

like the

one

in the late

1970s.

leas, in

pan, to the role played by
“policy ,deas and professionals,
poHbcal emrcprencrs,

and the news

media.- They

.hose within government

point ou, .ha, “by .he n.id-,980s,
,nos. experts

were

-

whom

“devoutly believed that tax refonrr
should be enacted because

courageously chose to subordtnate
the.r

among

in tax

to

it

authors claim.

was

’right’

and there

is

and
That

also httle doubt that

But precisely because many
members of

refonn, very few were required
to subordinate their

what they believed

allowed legislative leaders

tlte

electoral interests to this
purstut.’’^^

shared that vtew.

Congress were true believers
electoral interests to

own

elites existed is incontestable,

many members of Congress

including

agreement on baste principles’’^^
of tax rcfonn. This

eonsensus even extended to
members of Congress, some of

such a consensus

-

employ

to

be

“right.’’

After

all,

that

very consensus

the procedural tactics with
winch this study

is

concerned.

Fourth, there

is

some evidence

divided government were

to indicate that the political

critical to the

enactment of TRA86.

Democrats and Republicans were wary of being
caught holding
reform. But Rostenkowski

was

also clear in asserting to

We

dynamics unique
have seen

that both

the knife that killed tax

Ways and Means Democrats

divided government offered an opportunity that
unified government could not.

person

who

participated in meetings on tax refonn with Rostenkowski
recalled,

most of us had made speeches in favor of tax reform at every
civic
Rostenkowski seized on this and said: “Now you people have been

club.

talking

about reforming the tax code and making

^23

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 240.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 242.
225

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 244-245.
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it

to

fairer for the

lower income

that

One

~

o7po«;n!t;,:;T?LTht:L^ra:se

:7 i^rjor -

In

Rostenkowski's view then, the
m.d-1980s served as a somewhat
unique window of

opportuntty for tax refomr
because ne.ther polit.cal party
could be held accountable
by
the myriad of groups likely
to lose favored tax
preferences.^”
It

is

also .mportant to point
out that, like in the case
of base closure, legislat.ve

TRA86

leaders in

were very sensitive

revenue neutrality,
neutrality

distnbuttonal

their prized tax preferences

each

But

bill,

bill

this

were given tax

would

and the Treasury

bill,

expire.

across

was a

would mean

presidential

The

effective policy result

classes,

relief at least at the

so-called “stagger."

rate reduction

would be

We

have seen

that

and geographic

But legislative leaders were
equally

would go down 6 months

rates

income

same time

One component common

had delayed the effective date of the

preferences.

Quoted

neutrality

were key components of tax
reform.

careful to ensure that citizens

Senate

to the political calendar.

To

to the

if

not before

House

bill,

the

get to revenue neutrality,

by half a year

to July 1, 1987.

after the elimination

of scores of tax

that in April, 1988, in the

middle of the

and congressional primary season, millions
of middle-income taxpayers

in Strahan.

New

fVays

and Means,

147.

2">7

“

This line of argument

face of many of the arguments advanced by observers
such as James
for the New Era of Coalition Government in the
United States” in
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 103, No.
4, Winter 1988-89, 613-635. Sundquist complains that

Sundquist,

Needed;

A

flies in the

Political

Theory

science needs to rescue America’s governing institutions
from the “electoral accident” of divided
government. The mam deficiency of divided government, he
claims, is immobility - the inability

political

of our
obvious policy problems. The view advanced by
Rostenkowski here implies that divided government may, in fact, be
more capable of acting decisively.

governing institutions

to act decisively to resolve

113

would come

to the

about $700.

unpleasant realization that tax reform
had increased their tax

by

bill

Eliminating the stagger would cost
about $29 bilhon over
5 years.

While

Senate conferees, potential presidential
candidates Dole and Bradley aside,
were willing
to live with the problem.

not.

The

percent.

House

conferees,

all

of whom were facing reelection bids
could

stagger remained but the top
tax rate

was increased from 27 percent

28

to

This maneuver moderated the effects
of the stagger, particularly on middle
and

lower-mcome

As

taxpayers.^'*

in

base closure, the political calendar
had proscribed the

policy possibilities available to legislative
leaders.
Finally,

because of the

and most importantly,
state

of the

TRA86

benefited from

its

moment

institutions required to enact tax reform.

in political

time

Gary Mucciaroni

points out that because of the massive
projected budget deficits in the

wake of

the

enactment of the 1981 budget. Congress and the White
House had both recognized the

need for centralization

in

decisionmaking on tax policy. This meant

that,

atmosphere surrounding Ways and Means had become more
conducive
kind of stronger, more directive leadership
Specifically, there are at least 3

become

ways

that the

by 1985, “the

to a return to the

that characterized the pre-refomi era.”^^^

Committee had reformed

better equipped to handle tax reform

by 1985.

First,

its

environment

Arnold points out

seeking to find electorally-acceptable ways to raise taxes to combat deficits
1980s,

Ways and Means had developed

and comfortable by 1985.^^°

”)78

Bimbaum and

to

that, in

in the early

an array of procedural tactics that were familiar

This included drafting

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 270-271

Mucciaroni, Reversals of Fortune, A1
Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 210.
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bills

behind closed doors and the

avo, dance of roll-call
voles. Second, despite
efforts to open up
the

House

floor to

amendments between 1973 and
1975,

more and more successful since
then
cons.derat.on

on

the

By

floor.

in securing

1985,

the

the

use

of such

to the

Ways and Means Committee who
were

bills

on

Committee had become

some ktnd of modified

groundbreaking.^' Finally, the early
1980s also saw a return

members

Ways and Means

a

rule

closed rule for

was no longer

to the practice

of appointing

considered to be electorally

secure. Randall Strahan points
out that,

percent of the vote in the previous
election.

m

1985 had

As

a result, only four

of the

won

reelect, on ,n 1984 by less than
a 60 percent margin
I.,
the rout.ne appointment of
freshmen members (a prac.ce T.m.ted
to the Democratic side during
the reform era) had also
stopped.^“

addmon,

Thus, with elosed committee hearings,
the use of voice votes

in

committee, the

establishment of modified closed rules,
and the recruitment of more
clectorally-secure

members

for

Ways and Means,

the

handling tax reform than a decade

Committee found

itself,

by 1985, more capable of

earlier.

All of these factors relating to the
political calendar served to influence
the

question of procedural choice.

because there was a public ready

Legislators chose to handle tax reform
on their
to

be tapped, because tax expenditures had expanded

the point that comprehensive reform

agreement among key
because

legislators

elites,

New

Strahan,

New Ways and Means,

IVays

would

yield significant tax cuts, because there

to

was

because divided government provided the opportunity,

were able

Strahan,

own

to

and Means, 145-146,
146.

alter

the

timing of policy

effects,

and because

congress, onal ins.iuu,„„s
had developed enhanced
capacuy

enactment.

In short, the

moment

in political

time was

One
,n ,hc

shephcd

right.

final lac, or

nnpaefing proced.nal

cl, nice

case of tax refonn was ,he
exislenec of a se, of
powerf.,1 leaders willing

chanrpion the issne.

In ,hc

discussion of base closure,

lcg,slalors delegaled authority
to

draw up a

was pointed

of bases

list

ol bases to be closed, „

was

asserted there,

om

to be closed

within the Congress wanted to
he associated with specific
closures.
l,sl

,ax relo,.,,

would he seen

,ha,

was

,o

one reason

tha,

Proposing

nobody

a specific

as an attack no, jus, on

parltculansn,, but as an attack on
the particularistic benefits
enjoyed by specific fellow

ntenbers of Congress.

If

Congress were

to handle base closure
internally,

best procedural conditions,
sontebody, whether
leader, or the lowest rank-and-file
n, ember,

Cotntng back

to otir dtscussion

cxplanatton of the enactment of
for the role

of

and

all

tax refonn,

played by powerful coal, lion leaders

of the media attention

benefits of tax reform,

be a conunittcc chairman, a
party

would need

TRA86 would

All of the procedural tactics employed,

it

all

to

is

it

be associated with that attaek.
important to point

be incomplete

who were

of the

if

it

result

willing to

legislative ann-twisting that

succeeded

went on,

on the general

of the efforts of powerful individuals including

and Finance Committees, Rostenkowski and Packwood.

TRA8b

any

champion the cause.

President Reagan, Speaker O’Neill, and, of course,
the chainnen of the

argue that

ot,t that

did not reserve space

that kept rank-and-file legislators
focused

were the

even under the

because a few dogged

anti

heroic, if not always purely motivated attempts to save

it

Ways ami Means

Conlan, Wrightson, and

Beam

well-placed individuals

made

and because

their efforts

wore

grudgmgly approved by the
optionless majority
front

Senator Bradley had been

pushtng the tssue of tax
refonn from the early
1980s

until

its

ottt

enactment.

in

But

despite hts best efforts, tax
refonn eottid never have
sueeeeded without these -well-

placed” individuals guiding
institutional contexts

were

credit for the importance

it

past legislative roadblocks.

critical in

arguing that the issue and

In

enacting tax refonn, Gary
Mtteciaroni also reserves

of leadership commitment. He
argues,

those leaders pushed and
persuaded reluctant majorities
address the issue and to approve
refonn measures. They

Congress to

in

possessed^greater
tneenttves and capacities than
nonleaders to champio7diffuse
interests
r specific interests, and
their support was an
indispensable ingredient
^
for the success of reform
efforts.^^-^

Such leadership

is

especially crucial in overcoming
the dynamic that led legislators
to

delegate in the case of base closure.
particular tax preference defended

Who

by a

will

champion the general

particular fellow legislator?

interest

In

over the

answering

this

question, several authors point to the
critical role played by Chairman
Rostenkowski.

Rostenkowski’s fervor for tax reform was
exceeded by many including Bradley.
But Rostenkowski offered two things
institutional position as

ball rolling

institutional advantages

tactics in support

handing out transition rules

monopolizing control of

member of

^33

the

Bradley could not.

Chaimian of Ways and Means meant

on TRA86. His

of procedural

that

to

First,

that

Rostenkowski’s key

only he could get the

allowed him to employ the

full

array

of tax refonn including closing committee hearings,

key

legislators inside

staff expertise.

The frequent use of

Ways and Means Committee

to remark,

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 221-222.
Mucciaroni, Reversals of Fortune, 49.

and outside the committee and

“if

this latter tactic led

I

one

had really wanted

to

influence the

way

the actual law

Tax or Ways and Means

A

was

written,

that

Rostenkowsk.’s leadership offered

I

would have applied

for a

job on the Joint

staff.

second characteristic

could not was his particular

style.

Bimbaum and Murray descrtbe

it

that Bradley’s

best.

cApiaiianons or legislative success, such
as seniority or leadership
position
The methods
ds were wrapped up in the man

or political quid pro quos.
himself.^^^

Characteristics such as these led Conlan,
Wrightson, and

Beam

to refer to

Rostenkowski

as “the single most important factor
contributing to congressional passage
of the

Reform Act of
There

1986.”^^^

a sense then in which the inexplicable
force of personality played a

is

significant role

Tax

m

enacting

why Rostenkowski,

TRA86.

It

is

beyond the scope of

this

study to speculate on

or Packwood, Reagan, O’Neill, or Bradley
for that matter, wanted to

take on tax reform. Others have done so in their
accounts of the saga. The relevant point
for our purposes is that

TRA86

legislative process

impacted the question of procedural choice.

and

that

did attract powerful champions inside the normal

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 244.

Bimbaum and

Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch, 132.

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing Choices, 84.
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Conclusion

We

have seen four reasons

rather than relying

internally

allowed

on some

sort

legislators

concentrated tax benefits.

why

legislators

chose

of extra-congressional
to

protect

more

Second, handling the

to

handle tax refonn intentally

procedure.

poHtically

b.ll

F.rst,

sensitive

handhng

the

bill

geographically-

internally allowed legislators
to not

only avotd the prohibitive agency
losses that attend delegating
power

in

such a broad

policy area, but also allowed legislators
to claim credit for the
larger general benefit that
attends such broad policy areas.
political

Third, legislators found
themselves

at

a

moment

time when the institutional capacity
of Congress was well-suited to
handling tax

reform internally.

Finally, powerful

nomial legislative process
necessary to shepherd

One
moving on

that

TRA86

final point

champions of

had both the

tax reform

inst.tutional position

and the legislative

earlier, merits

In assessing the lessons to be
learned

discussion before

from the story of tax

the politics and the outcome in the tax refomi
case directly contradict the
basic assumptions about committee behavior
derived from the electoral
connection model. Both the prominence of appeals to
members’ concerns

with good public policy in Chaimian Dan
Rostenkowski’s coalitionbuilding strategy, and an outcome in which broad,
diffuse, and poorly
organized interests were advanced over those of well-organized
clientele
groups show that congressional politics, in at least some cases,

are more
complex than Mayhew’s model assumes. To put it simply, a theoretical
framework that incorporates goals other than reelection is needed to
explain the politics and outcome in this case.^^*^

Strahan,

New

PVays

and Means,

skills

past legislative hurdles.

about tax reform, touched upon

to other cases.

emerged from within the

reform, Randall Strahan argues,

2.18

m

157.

Sin, Marly,

wo saw

for .ax refon,,.

earlier ,ha.

becanse of, he high degree
of

Conlan, Wrtgh.son, and Bean,
argne

‘couragconsly chose lo snbordinale
.heir

own

electoral

elite

consensns „„ the need

tha, son.e n,e„,be,s

miaesls

to tins pnrsinl.”^’''

Tha, ntentbers of Congress
have goals other than rcelection
winic .ncmbers of Congress
assert ,„a, even the

reelection

attytlnng,

may

no, be single-nnnded,

,s

is

that the

il'tlns

no donbt

Irnc.

cqnaMy „o„-con,rovers,al

choice Conlan, Wrightson, and
Bean, sngges,

,s

a

lalse one.

to ntilixe procednral
tactics

do not contradict

electoral interests.

In his

assessment of the polities

of tax reform, Douglas Arnold makes
the point more eloquently.
fhese proeedural strategies allowed
legislators to reform the tax
system
but they did not A;/re legislators to
do so. At each stage legislators had to
agree to tic their own hands, and most
of their decisions to limit the range
of choice were unaffected by electoral
calculations.

decided to meet

When

legislators

in secrecy, to

delegate difncult decisions to the chairmen,
to prohibit amendments, or to require
that amendments be revenue
ncutraf
they were declaring that they were personally
in favor of tax reform.
If
legislators had been personally opposed
to tax reform, all they

had

was insist that the sun must shine on any tax bill,
knowing
would have destroyed tax reform.
It
is hardly

that

legislators

reminder
legislators

were disgusted with the current
about the limits of electoral

own

tax system, but

explanations

it

to

is

to

do

sunshine

surprising that

many

a healthy

recall

that

personal policy preferences were necessary conditions
for

tax reform.^*’

240

Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam, Taxing’ Choices, 245.
-

hese are Douglas Arnold’s words substituling for Mayhew’s claim
that members of (’ongress are
single-minded seekers ol rcelection.” For a more extensive discussion
of the meaning of this distinction
sec Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 5-6.
I

241

,o

reshape the caicdns of legislative
ilccisioinnakmg creating an
cnviro.nnen, where

their policy interests

2V)

B,„

acconn, of tax relorn, teaches
ns

Policy-onented legislators arc jnst as
adept and jnst as l.kely
that

is

most policy-oriented tncnbers
of Congress “care intensely
abont

Fortnna.eiy lor then,, however,
it

t,

of Congress

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 222-223.
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Thus,

it

is

not contradictory to suggest
that legislators have
policy preferences that

transcend electoral pol.t.cs while
also suggesting legislators
constantly pay attention to
the electoral implications
of their actions.

context within which they

make

Because

legislators are able to

decisions, they are able to have

121

it

both ways.

shape the

CHAPTER

5

NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL

sue
ts

selection for a high-level nuclear
waste facility presents a policy
problem that

very stmilar to base closure.

the

In closing military installations,
legislators arc faced

prospect of imposing significant

districts in favor

political

geographical iy-concentrated

of a general, diffuse hcncm.

sensitivity

In that case,

of these geographically-concentrated

we saw
costs,

on

costs

that

with

specific

because of the

chose

legislators

to

delegate authority to close bases while
restricting the scope of that
delegation and

maintaining the power to stop the base closure
process. With
then,

we would

for a

national

legislation that

this political logic in

mind

expect legislators to want to delegate restricted
authority to choose a
nuclear waste

dumped

dump

site

rather than serve as the author or
supporter of

highly toxic radioactive waste

in a partietdar

fellow legislator’s

district.

As wc
choice.

In

will see,

adopting the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act (Public

1987 amendments
l()()-203).

Nevada

however, Congress did not delegate the authority

to that

law as part of the

Congress narrowed

its

sights

fiscal

make

this

Law 97-425) and

1988 reconciliation

bill

(Public

the

Law

and eventually singled out Yueca Mountain,

as the sole site for a pemianent repository designed to house high-level nuelear

waste for thousands of years.

Before examining the question of

handle this policy problem internally and

how

the scope and history of the policy problem.

policy,

to

wc

will

examine the

it

did so,

is

important to

first

ehose

to

understand

After a very brief history of nuclear waste

particular procedures

122

it

why Congress

employed

to

narrow the choices

to

Yucca Moumain and cxan.inc
refont, in order to

the (actors

m

examined

the eases of base closure
and tax

draw conclusions about procedural
choice

ABrief History of Nuclear Waste

A.Primer on
waste policy,

it

is

the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

appropriate to

first

generated.

become

This study

is

ease of site choice.

Poliry

Before launching into an analysis
of nuclear

have a minimal understanding of
the particular kind

of nuclear waste with which we arc
concerned
IS

in the

in this

chapter and

only concerned with spent

clear later on, mostly with spent
fuel that

is

fuel

how

that nuclear

waste

and, for reasons that will

generated from civilian commercial

reactors.

Today, roughly 23 percent of the nation’s
nuclear reactors.^'^^

In a

nuclear reactor, uranium atoms contained

producing heat. This heat produces steam

become

electricity is generated

that generates electricity.

less efficient as the chain reaction within

them

is

dry casks. The problem with
temporary.

Many of the

removed and stored
this is that these

sites at

having

at least

is

Over

fuel rods,

rods fission.

time, fuel rods

fact that

they

which arc contained

cooling pools of water or air-cooled

methods of storage were only meant

which the spent

urban populations and the spent fuel

in

in fuel

slowed despite the

remain highly radioactive. After three or four years,
spent
in large fuel assemblies, are

hy commercial

to

fuel is stored arc near lakes, rivers,

be

and

dispersed throughout the country, with most states

some.

Remarkably few

alternatives for the disposal of this waste have emerged.

main focus of federal nuclear waste disposal has been

123

The

the concept of permanent, geologic

A

disposal.

1957 Nat.onal Academy of
Sciences report

Commission recommended

Smce

the

Atomic Energy

the burial of high-level
waste in deep, stable rock
fonnat.ons

and, in particular, suggested
further research into
fonnat.ons

domes.

to

then, research has

known

been conducted on such

salt

as salt beds and salt

formations along with

volcanic rock formations (basalt
and tuff) and crystalhne rock
fomtations (granite).
central idea behind

permanent geologic disposal

that wtll retard the flow

absorb as

much of

would

to find a rock formation
that

of groundwater through a disposal

site,

and

that will

,s

stable,

be able to

the radioactive material
released as possible ,f
groundwater does

penetrate the repository.^«

repositoo/

,s

The

also

have

1„ addition to these natural

artificially

bamers, a pemtanem geologic

engineered barriers but

it

spent fuel needs to be isolated for
tens of thousands of years.

is

important to note that

As

a result, the concerns

with permanent, geologic disposal include
long-term issues such as climactic
and seismic

change

at

the site and the possibility of accidental
or purposeful

human

intrusion into the

repository.

One

When

alternative to permanent, geologic disposal

uranium undergoes

fission in a reactor,

is

plutonium

the reprocessing of spent fuel.

is

created which can then be

used to generate more energy. There are two problems
with reprocessing

however.

First,

reprocessing does not

make

this spent fuel,

financial sense for utilities because of the

worldwide abundance of uranium. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, plutonium can
potentially be separated from the fuel and used in the
construction of nuclear

Neil Gross, “Between a

Rock

anii a

Hot Place”

in

weapons

Business Week, No. 3574 (April 20, 1998), 134.

The League of Women Voters Education Fund, The Nuclear Waste Primer, 1993 Revised Edition
(Washington, D.C.: The League of Women Voters Education Fund, 1993), 42-43.
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raising national
security concerns.

As

a result, reprocessing

is

not used in the United

States.

Wtth dtsposal as the only
cho.ce,
disposal have been considered
and

most actively researched of
these

all

is

3,000 to 5,000 meters of ocean
water.

a

nun, her of alien, at, ves
to pennanent,
geologic

but abandoned by the
federal govenunent.

subseabed disposal

-

disposal

The

sediments below

Significant uncertainties
reman, about subseabed

disposal including water flow
through the sediments and
the effect that the hea,
generated

by waste packages would
have on the sunounding
sediment.
waste

in the Antarctic ice
sheet

stability

of the

ice cap over

A

proposal to buiy the

never got off the ground
because of uncertainty about
the

thousands of years. Proposals

to

launch the waste into space

have been abandoned because of
the cost of such a proposal
and because of the
of a launch accident.

where

it

is in

Finally,

that spent fuel

These

facility

latter alternatives

until

a

more technologically-sound

N uclear

Act

(NWPA)

Waste Policy Prior

is that

IS

to

alternative

remain the only viable alternative
to pemtanent,

geologic disposal and will be discussed
in greater detail

waste policy

should either reman,

the short term or should be
transferred to a temporary
away-from-reactor or

monitored-retrievable-storage

emerges.'^

some have suggested

possibility

NWPA

The

later on.

short version

of the history of nuclear

the history of nuclear waste policy
prior to the Nuclear Waste Policy

short.

As Gerald Jacob

points out, 1954

was

a milestone year in the

beginning of nuclear waste policy. The 1954
Atomic Energy Act discarded provisions
the 1946

Atomic Energy Act

that kept reactor design data classified

League of Women Voters, The Nuclear Waste Primer,

39.

League of Women Voters, The Nuclear Waste Primer, 44-46.
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in

and encouraged the

commercal development of
nnancing and the necessary
generate electricity.
study, however,

was

nuclear power.

The new law provided

fuel to finns willing
to set

The most important of these
that the act required the

subsidies such as

up nuclear reactors

would

that

subsidtes from the perspective
of tins

Atomic Energy Commission
,AEC)

responstbihty for the reprocessing
or disposal of the
spent

fuel

to take

from commercial

reactors.

As was
pohcy

,n the

the case w.th tax policy
and mih.aty installations policy,
nuclear energy

1950s and 1960s was characterized
by a sub-govemment type of

polities.

Jacob argues,

e

1

954

act maintained federal

preemption of the authority to regulate
the
from pesky state regulations that
could
interfere with their operations.
The AECs relationship with Congress
was
generally benign.
The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy (JCAE)
nuclear mdustiy, freeing

utilities

monopolized congressional oversight and,
with few exceptions, supported
and promoted the AEC’s mission.
The AEC was both regulator and
promoter of atomic energy and for years
no other federal, let
entity threatened

alone state

Growth of the industry and advancement
of
nuclear power was accomplished by
administrative fiat. The goals and
policies of the promotional campaign
were never spelled out in legislation.
its

authority.

Similarly, the nuclear waste

program would evolve

for thirty years without

explicit legislative direction until the
passage of the 1982 Nuclear

Pohcy

But another similarity between nuclear pohcy, tax
pohcy, and military
is

that these

cozy arrangements were broken up

in a variety

in

1970 provided new avenues

to

consumer groups and

installations

of ways during the

The passage of the National Environmental Pohcy Act
(NEPA)
Act

Waste

Act.

in

Jacob, Site Unseen, 27.
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1

970s.

1969 and the Clean Air

states to challenge federal

Gerald Jacob, Site Unseen: The Politics of Siting a Nuclear Waste
Repository (Pittsburgh, PAUniversity of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 26.

pohcy

dominance of nuclear policy.-

m,o

the

Nuclear

Regulatory

m

,973, ,he A.onnc Energy
Comnussion was broken

Commission (NRC) and

Development Administration
,ERDA). wh.ch would
Energy (DOE).-’

Committee

Finally.

,n

the

Energy

become

later

Research

and

the Depart, nent of

,977, Congress eliminated
the Joint Atontic

Energy

splintering junsdiction
over nuclear-waste legislation
between 3 Senate and 7

House committees.
In total, these

federal

changes provided new tools

authority on nuclear policy,

new

for

groups and states

to challenge

points of access to challenge
the nuclear

mdusto^’s dominance of nuclear
policy such as the w.dened
number of congressional

committees and the new

legal tools available to
groups seeking to sue in federal
court

and new opportunities for
nuclear policy process.

political entrepreneurs in

At the same time

this

Congress

to

was happening, and

become
in part

ck box of nuclear policy had been
opened up, the nuclear industry found

part

of the

because the

itself

on the

negative end of the evening news
more often than ever before. Gerald
Jacob argues.
reports of nuclear accidents
became commonplace in the mass media;
bizarre accidents attracted public
attention. In 1975 a fire at the
Browns
erry, Alabama, reactor started
by a technician checking for leaks with
a
candle, knocked out fifteen percent
of the electrical capacity on the
grid.
The story was published in Newsweek

TVA

nuclear slapstick” became

confidence

m engineered

magazine, and stories of

common.

It

became

difficult to

solutions under such assaults.

sustain a

Nineteen seventy-

nine was a very bad year for the nuclear
establishment with Three Mile
Island, the

Kerr-McKee/Silkwood

verdict, the release

of the movie China

Jacob, Site Unseen, 32-33.

Jacob, Site Unseen, 27.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

Congressional Quarterly,

Inc.,

1985), 364.
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VI,

1981-1984 (Washington

DC

•

-

^>"

niicluu

power

llie

plants

^Hreacly aocun„.,a,«,

MO.COVC.
sites

a

had press, there was

m

were

operation

25,000 spen,

cslaaalc

,n

lac,

addrc.ss Ihc

was already Incased on
ror a high-level nacicar

'I'd,

yea,-.

mcnorandan,

Cola,

assen,N,cs ,„a, ,„cy

Ilealh,

lhal p,-oposed

lion,

lo,-,nalio„s

Ihc .lireelor ol

pohhcally palalabie.

had advised I«RI)A

in

Nevada.

.lispo.sal

Uy

II,

,caCo.-

c DOI-, had

1977, allchon

conlcadcns

sail

liRDA

lor

h “sail stales”

to

-

a.al

siles

in

-

-

hasall

In

in

Washinglon

a.Iddion, howeve,-,

such government-owned

a,„l

lha,

p,-epa,ed

slates lha,

have

p„,-,

heeaase of

a variety of ,-„ck

these siles

wee

n.ore

n.anhcs of Congress

reservations.^'^-’

.lacob, Site (Insccii, 57.
252

»

Coiigrcs.sional Quarterly, ('on^rcss

I.iitlicr.I.

l).(

.:

and

Carter, Nuelear Imperatives

Re.soiirces lor the

l

utiire,

the Nation,

and ruHie

Volume

Trust:

1987), 131-132.
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VI,

a

Wa.shingKa, and

sites olTcred special advanlagcs,
a,

Carter points „„l lhal niany governors
and

to look llrst to

laic.-

woald renan, ,„c

geologic

sihng search

,|,e

geologic lin-n.alions there
inelading lalT

a,

over Ihc nex, decade. I.alher
Ca.ler ponds o„l

lac, lily

Neva, la. The Wasinnglon and Nevada
lie

capacily

.li.sposing ol spcnl lud.

geolog.c lonnalions of eilher don.cd
or hedded

the spec,

,ps2, 82

slonn, .5c,npo,a„ly

Cong, css, Ihc liRDA, and

prohicn oh

landing

wee

icapa.ay

a landed n.anhcr ol silcs
lha,

wasic

Ry

\

Meanwlalc, w.lh.na .lirccOon
in alicnp,

problem bmidmg up.

the United States and
by 1980, these plants had

,<«, cone

would no longer be adecpiate by

hegnn

m

a real

362.

Dealing with Radioaetive

tCr/.v/c

(Waslimgtoii

plutonium or the testing of nuclear
weapons."*'’
All this raises the quest.on
of

choose a

no

state

why DOE

site for the nation’s
high-level

wanted

to take the nation’s

did not simply march
forward and unilaterally

nuclear waste.

There are several reasons.

First,

commercial high-level nuclear
waste and each

state’s

congressional delegation was gearing
up to keep such waste out. For
this reason,
other,

Congress was sure

to

weigh

Ihese congressional delegations

decisionmaking

in the

in

on the

issue.

now had new

And

Freedom of Information

as already pointed out.
each of

tools at their disposal.

Act.

number of committees
State and

local

in

geologic and engineering claims
parttcular sttmg proposal

priorities

made by DOE.“"

fonns of

state

It

and the

had developed significant

easier for

them

to challenge

calls “the

emergence of a view

which emphasized environmental protection,

public health, and safety’’"'’ throughout the
1970s.
at its disposal.

it

staff,

Additionally, opponents of any

were emboldened by what Jacob

and functions of the

than public opinion

New

Congress, more

authorities

expertise independent of federal
decisionmakers making

of the

no

Held of nuclear policy had
emerged as a result of sunshine laws,

dispersal of authority to a greater

I

if for

had the

Moreover,

legal tools

Air Act. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,

this

provided by

DOE could

movement had more

NEPA and

the Clean

never have unilaterally made

a decision about siting a high-level nuclear waste
facility because any facility would

Carter,

Nuclear Imperatives and Public

Trust, 132.

Jacob, Site Unseen, 48-51.

Jacob, Site Unseen, 47.

1
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require billions of dollars
to study and construct

make

all

that

Congress would need to

these reasons then. Congress
needed and wanted to deal
with the problem

siting a high-level
nuclear

easy, however.

Choosing a

waste

site

already d.scussed in this study.

fac.lity in the early
1980s.

Congress

to

choose a

site.

It

The

Understand, ng the procedures
Congress chose

,s to

we

f,rst

understand

a description of that

The Problem Posed bv

Site

why

problem

,t

that

a process to choose a nuclear waste
to

site,

is

it

also rather easy to see

avoid the problem altogether. If
legislators

would be

we now

to deal

diff,cult

turn.

rimic^

Though we discussed above why Congress
wanted and needed

want

would not be

task

presents a collective act, on
problem sinular to the ones

with this problem requires, of
course, that
for

money

available.

For

of

-

are, as

Arnold

to

choose or create

why Congress would

asserts,

concerned with

negative policy effects of identifiable
government actions that can then be traced
back to
their votes,

we would

expect that they would be especially
leery of taking any traceable

action that leads to the depositing of
high-level nuclear waste in their state or
district that
will

remain radioactive

siting

for tens

of thousands of

of a high-level nuclear waste

fierce opposition

surrounding

The choice of

from the

from such a decision

is

-

who

base closure then, the

of the

a particular district can be expected to generate

legislators in question as well as

those

like

particularly difficult for Congress, as an

Meanwhile, we would expect

districts.

Much

facility necessarily involves a redistribution

costs and benefits of nuclear energy that

institution, to handle.

years.

live near

legislators representing

that the interest

temporary storage
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from

of those

sites for spent

who

benefit

nuclear fuel

-

would be

far less intense

referred to as

A

and enduring.

This collective action
problem

is

commonly

NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard).

nuntber of observers of the
process of selecting a s.ngle
national storage

spent nuclear fuel have
argued that this case does
not confonn well to
the
syndronte.

For instance. Gerald Jacob

cites

evidence that local offic.als

in

NIMBY

Washington.

Utah, Nevada, Colorado, and
South Dakota expressed
support for attentpts to

noxious fachty

in their

and depressed areas, the

These

towns.

facility

The

of such a

lure

fac.lity is not

would provide good jobs with

direct financial incentives

were thus

s.te for

site the

hard to unagtne. In rural

relatively high

attract.ve to locals tn

incomes."’

companson w.th

the

intangible, vaguely defined,
potential environmental impacts
..25n
imnacts from a
a nuclear facility.”

While such arguments have merit
intrastate politics, they

do

legislature’s attempts to

choose a

little

in

explaining the behavior of

to illuminate the

site for

actors in

dynamics surrounding the national

storage of spent nuclear fuel.

Carter acknowledge that despite local
support for a

some

facility at a

Both Jacob and

few potential

sites, this

support was countered in each and
every case by opposition from state
governors and
legislatures.

Because the nuclear waste

qualities or the status

facility, in

Jacob’s words, "lacked the pork barrel

of a research center or reactor testing

station like the Idaho National

Engineering Lab,” members of Congress were
not fighting
facility

m

financial

their district.

compensation

Indeed, as

we

shall see,

for the host state

at the

trough to land the

even after Congress included annual

of a permanent spent

fuel storage facility, the

congressional delegations of every state under consideration,
including states explicitly

Jacob, Site Unseen, 42. Also see Carter, Nuclear Imperatives
and Public Trust, 145-146.
7C0

Jacob, Site Unseen, 43.

131

highlighted by both Carter
and Jacob as having locals
supportive of hosting a

fought to keep the facility
out.

This observation

,s

consistent with the

designed by Howard Kunreuther
and Douglas Easterhng.

conclude that cotnpensat.ng
local ctizens
facility ts unlikely to

risk

is

tn retuor for

have a pos.t.ve effect on those

who

econonuc model

Kunreuther and Easterling

permission to

s,te a

hazardous

are already resistant
-unless the

perceived to be sufftc.ently
low to oneself and to
others, nrcludtng future

generations.

this

They eontinue,

conclusion does not

mean

that tradeoffs

between

risk

suggests that before one attempts
to initiate this process,
safety to nearby residents

must be

In addition to the fact
that

Congress, there
that

facility,

made

it

is

and benefits are

some

threshold of

assured.^^®

compensation could not provide an
easy out

another characteristic of the case
of siting a spent fuel storage

a particularly difficult collective
action problem for Congress,

In the

facility

case of

base closure, the seeds of a coalition
to close excess military bases
always existed
fact that not

every congressional

might appear

that

district

similar seeds

has a major military base.

exist

commercial high-level nuclear waste. After
to focus its efforts

on 6

salt states

choosing a

in

all,

as

possibilities.

located in South Carolina,

Some

New

for

storing

mentioned above,

plus Washington and Nevada.

the congressional delegations of those states
had already

expand the

site

Upon

DOE

first

the

Illinois -

in the

glance,

had appeared

But, not surprisingly,

worked hard

to find

ways

Howard Kunreuther and Douglas

Facilities?” in

-

should take the spent fuel assemblies

“Are Risk-Benefit Tradeoffs Possible
The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2 (May 1990), 255.
Easterling,

Kunreuther and Easterling, “Are Risk-Benefit Tradeoffs Possible

132

to

sites

'

259

it

nation’s

suggested that away-from-reactor (APR) storage

York, and

for

in Siting

in Siting

Hazardous

Hazardous

Facilities?” 256.

from reactors around the
country. More

weaknesses of the argu,nen.
facility

where spent

retrieved,

fuel

assemblies could be temporarily
stored, monitored,

once better technology was

was Senator

tn the

J.

(MRS)

country since

it

to tsolate radioactive

of

hand.

in

The

facility

came

to

attd later

be known as

and, significantly, the
champion of this proposal

Bennett Johnston (D-LA), an
tnfluential legislator from
a printe

points out, the beauty of

possibility

on the technological

for pen^anenC. geologic
disposal ,o argue for a single
storage

monitored, retrievable storage

As Jacob

significantly, others seized

MRS

was

that

it

salt state.

“could be located virtually
anywhere

did not depend upon local
geology, such as Louisiana’s

waste from the btosphere.”“'
Others wanted

siting a permanent, geologic
repository in granite

DOE
-

a

to

salt

domes,

reexamine the

move

that

would

tnclude most of the states in the
northeast in the search for a national
repository. In short.
in this

atmosphere, though some were politically
advantaged, virtually every

congressional district could conceivably
assemblies.

The seeds of a

become

the nation’s

home

state

and

for spent nuclear fuel

coalition to choose a single national
nuclear waste

dump were

thus not readily apparent.

Ihe Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 982 and
1

The process by which a permanent
would be chosen was outlined
1987.

As

in the

originally designed in

choose two national repository
the Act s enactment,

DOE

NWPA

NWPA,
sites

Amendments of QR7
1

national repository for spent nuclear fuel
in

1982 and then amended by Congress

the process appears to delegate

according to a

was required

the

to

strict

timetable.

power

133

DOE

to

Within 180 days of

develop guidelines that outline

Jacob, Site Unseen, 76.

to

in

criteria for site

scleoioa
10 11,0

ShorUy .hccancr,

prcsidcm

narrow ,„c

lis,

DOE

for site charaOoriza.ion.

,o

.con,

Ecfore January

end

I,

a, Icas,

reeot„n,end a single

site

the 3 eat, d, date sites.

by March 31.

1>,87.

a site for a second
repository

NWI-A

The law

by March

5

DOE

,>,85,

ofcatKltdatc s.tcs Tor character,
.at.on tVon, 5 to 3.

IX)E she charactcrizatton of

recommend

was .cc,uncd

was

.dnal.y,

rec,, tired

canCdalc

si,cs

,cc,u.rcd to

„„ the basis of

the president to

also rec,uired the president
to

31.

I>,<„,

and outlined a specific

timetable leading up lo this
decision as well.

NWI>A

also appeared, on

its

local officials hostile to the
siting

surface, to provide

of a nuclear waste repository
within

Before any she could he nominated
by
hold hearings

comments.
be made
assist

in the vicinity

assistance,

of the

site

to the president, the

in

reviewing the scientific work of

monitoring

been selected, the host
the federal decision.

lo report

site

characterization

on the

lo slates

their borders.

DOE

law required

all

and

localities

DOE, developing

activities,

stale or, if applicable, Indian tribe

of an

lo

seeking to

requests for impact

and providing information

would have

the

In addition to these protections, other
provisions in

feasibility

lo

to

Most impohanlly, however, once a single
she had

MRS

facility

by June

issue a license for such a facility if Congress authorized

For

and

both lo inform local residents
and to receive

Moreover, the law provided funds

residents aboul site characterization.

DOE

DOE

to state

Environmental assessments prepared
during DOE’S search were required

ptiblie.

them

numerous protections

its

I,

l>,85

power

N WPA

and required

lo veto

required

NRC

to

construction.

these reasons then, the siting of the nation’s high-level
nuclear waste

repository appears to have been handled by delegating
power to technical experts.
Specifically, the process appears to rule out meddling
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by members of Congress. Writing

1987 of

in

NWPA,

then-Govemor and now-Senator
Richard Bryan (D-NV)
argued

lawmakers consciously
attempted
seientifically

and “keep

to

craft

a

process

political factors front
taking

would destgnate

that

over the

site select.on

Such an impression of the
process would be completely

that

a

site

process.”“^

inaccurate, however.

A.

no point, could the process
be descnbed as
extra-congress.onal. There are
countless ways
in which we can see
that congressional
f.ngerpnnts were all over the
ftnal chotce from
start to

months

finish.

First,

while

NWPA

authorized

DOE

to

develop gu.delines within
6

for the s,te seleetion
process, other provisions in
the

the options

open

to

DOE

sites

should not qualify

area

1

mile by

1

in

if

law severely c.rcumscribed

developing those guidelines.
For instance,

they are “(1) in a highly
populated area; or (2) adjacent to
an

mile having a population of
not less than 1,000 individuals.”^’

language effectively ruled out
large parts of the eastern
seaboard.
stated at various points that

DOE was required to

which

may

sites for

repositones

sites in different geologic

authorizing

DOE

NWPA stated that

to

be located and, to the extent
practicable,

site

characterization

activities

to

recommend

in a section in the

law

“beginning with

the

candidate sites that have been approved
under section 112 and are healed

geologic media

.

The choices

are

NWPA

“consider the various geologic media
in

media.”’“ This language was repeated

carry out

Moreover,

Such

narrowed even further

later

in

various

on when DOE,

Governor Richard H. Bryan (D-NV), “The Politics and
Promises of Nuclear Waste Disposal: The View
from Nevada” in Environment, Vol. 29 (October
1987), 15.
42

use

10132.

-"^2 use 10132.
42

use

10133,

my

emphasis.
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The importance of the

specification that the s.tes
chosen for characterization
should be in

deferent geologic media

is

not read.ly apparent.

inventor, of potential sites

DOE

.hat the first repositoo^
site

should be

numerous

at the

in

Nevada

site.

Mountain, Nevada and Hanford,
Washington

Some

consider the ex.st.ng

a relatively unpopulated
area,

2 years after

- i, is

only options

not hard to see

were 2 of the

sites

DOE

of the Washington

If these are the

about to see further evidence of
why they were

characterization.

we

had been mvestigat.ng
and the additional
specification

sites in salt formations,
the basalt ntediun,

various rock fonnations

final 3

But when

how

is lefi

site,

-

with

and the

and

we

are

both the Yucca

final 3 sites selected for

Yucca Mountain and Hanford were
included

in the

by DOE, Governor Bryan of Nevada
argued,

when

evaluated in relation to the other
eight preselected sites that
DOE
its limited screening
effort. Yucca Mountain
would have
rated very low on the list had
the department not used a
self-imposed
requirement that the three top sites selected
for characterization be in three
d^^ffererit rock t^es.
Since Yucca Mountain was the
only tuff site and
Hanford the only basalt site, and since
all of the remaining
sites were
located in salt formations, both
Hanford and Yucca Mountain were
guaranteed to be selected among the top

considered

m

three.^^’^

In the light

that

is

of the provisions of

NWPA

“self-imposed” about the push to locate 3

DOE was merely acting on Congress’

‘‘’'’42

highlighted above, however, there

use

sites in various

10193.
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very

geologic media.

explicit language.

Bryan, “The Politics and Promises of Nuclear Waste Disposal,”
34,

is

my emphasis.

little

The

This bnngs us

,o

penrranent geCog.c d.sposa,

de.en.ine the best

NWPA

also re, u, red

repository

by law

s.te,

t.

site.

gave

DOE

way

a second

in

Though

DOE

which Congress limited
the search

NWPA

after the date

In effect then,

underway.

And

NWPA

those siting efforts were
taking place ,n

DOE

at the basalt site in

complied with the provision

in

guidchnes

to

the tncan.nne,

potentially acceptable sites

90 days before

had given legal sanction
to

Louisiana, Texas, and Utah,
and

Nevada.

one or more

of enactment.”““ Thus,

to Identify ..potentially
acceptable sites"

search.

to issue

180 days to issue those
guidelines.

to no.tfy states ••wt.h

w.thm 90 days

DOE

authonzed

for a

DOE

was

rcqtiired

issuing gtudehnes for

DOE

salt states

its

siting effons already

such as Mississippi,

Washington and the tuff

Februa^, 1983, identifying 9

site in

sites

and

notifying the 6 states (Mississippi,
Texas, and Utah each had 2
sites) in which they were
located.

Not

surprisingly,

Governor Bryan viewed the decision
with skepticism.

Rather than engaging

arbitranlvmf^"'

Taslge

When DOE

oVnwT;.-

reconsider

''^P^itory,

"^

finally issued its siting guidelines
about

December, 1984,
sites to 3.

in a truly national
site-screening

DOE
its

it

viewed the guidelines

as criteria

program aimed

DOE

at

proceeded

18 months behind schedule in

by which

to

narrow the

list

did not believe, however, that Congress
wanted the Department to

initial

decision on “potentially acceptable sites.”

A GAO

report to

Congress indicated,
despite criticism from

reconsider

42

use

from 9

its initial

some of

the affected states,

identification

of the nine

sites

10136.
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16.

DOE

does not plan

to

using the final siting

.

guidelines.

proposed

According

to

DOE’s May 1983

siting guidelines

^

the

selections to be
recotTder d
(see. 116(a)) requTed

j-

'

DOE m

acceptable sites” within
90 days of'thTa
for issutng the siting

Identification required

Congress had intended
possible sites

'2

To

this explanation,

''
ii
alone

wo

act

dTu req^

on the

S“'J^''nes because the act
'^oalaming "potentially

r

wonld^ h»

DOE use
DOF nfr!

that

sites for the first
repository
all

r

gulres *::: X:“®^D^^^
y. DOE
by the

r
comments

™‘

er

d

m

resnonse
,

T

believes the site

“’®
"7?*"'’'®
the finarsitinu"
® S‘'>dehnes to select
^ -consideration of
,

7

‘'t

- '2

”S
f
f
~ r:r;.=r.

Bryan responded by arguing.
that

Congress would have enacted
let
included language explicitly
critical of prior DOE
effZ
had
the department to merely
continue ongoing I^'seleln

NWPA

Icfivtes.-^

Most obseiwers disagree with Bryan’s

DOE

could not

move forward

efforts legal sanction.

over

NWPA.

with

its

interpretation, however.

siting efforts

Gerald Jacob points out

on

its

own

that

,t

was because

Congress gave those

that throughout the
congressional debate

“the states that would host deep
geologic repositories were already
known.

There were few doubts about the outcome
of the post-NWPA

He

Indeed,

also points out,

"NWPA

was not

a break with the past;

it

site selection process.”'’^

set

no new administrative

gears in motion but merely confirmed
existing powers, priorities, and
practices.”^^^

^70

General Accounting Office, “Department of Energy’s
Policy Act of 1982,”

GAO/RCED

Bryan, “The Politics
272

aniJ

85-27 (January

Promises of Nuclear Waste Disposal,”

Jacob, Site Unseen, xv.

273

Jacob, Site Unseen,

Initial Efforts to

10, 1985), 20.

1 1
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16.

Implement the Nuclear Waste

Thus, while Bo^an
viewed

NWPA

as an a„e,np,

by Congress

,o slop

DOE

f,o,n

dev,a.ing fron, a seien.ifie
si,e-selee.,on process,
a n,ore accurate
in.erpre.a.ion would be
that

Congress was attempting

already had underway.
act, V, ties

Realizing that

DOE

the search

DOE

would conduct.

disapprove a decision by

.magtne any

NWPA

DOE

state not exercising

search anew.

for site characterization

NWPA

includntg provisions

leads us to a third

way

in

which Congress limited

that states

were given the

to site the repository
within the,r borders.

such a veto and

this

While

to override a state’s veto

this action is

harm’s way.

Congress

The

logic

act

recommendation.^"
use.

Second,

hard to

NWPA

that

we have
First,

simply by passing a resolution

not yet

NWPA
,n

both

reopening the process would put their

of such a vote would thus be

that the

own

state

only members of

would be those from

the host state.

required that congressional consideration
of the state’s notice of

disapproval be guided by

little

that

likely to vote to sustain the state’s
veto

Moreover, the

is

conceivably a high hurdle, legislators
would be voting on

such a resolution with the knowledge

m

I.

right

could conceivably open up
the

dtscussed, however, that were
designed to prevent this from
happening.

houses.

NRC

data

-

the

same source

In effect then, the state

NWPA

it

in s,le selectton.

There are two important
provisions of

gave Congress the power

process

legal sanctton for
putting the nation's

was pointed out earher

It

site selection

would need funds

DOE to a politically feasible choice

to dtrect

along the

one place, Congress
enacted

in

This intenrretation of

.0

DOE move

and construct, on of a
repository and

commercial nuclear waste

meant

help

to

power

that

to veto

would have produced DOE’s

DOE’s

siting decision

was of

created a nuclear waste fund into which consumers
of nuclear
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power would pay user
reposhoo, cons, rue, ion
for ,hese pu^roses.

Tlus fund would .hen he

fees.

ae.ivi.ies, freeing

The

Congress

.,sed for

fron, ,he

in,por,anee of ,his provision

sue eharae.eri.a.ion and

need

,o

beyond ,he

far

is

appropna.e .noney
real,,,

of

aceounhng, however. The
appropr, aliens proeess eould
have provided a loophole
useful
.0 legislalors

from a hos,

s,a,e

seeking ,o bloek cons.rue.ion
of a reposhory.

be hard ,o imagine a sena.or
well-plaeed

fron, a hos, s,a,e
hlibuslering an appropria.ions
bill or a

member of ,he House

.he cons,rue,ion

would no,

I,

of a reposhory.

blocking an appropria.ions

hill ,ha,

includes funds for

The nuclear was.e fund helps
Congress

,o avoid d.ese

obstacles.

It is

clear .hen, ,ha, in

legal sanelion lo

go ahead wiih

polenlial largels

disiriels

enacing

of

were no,

,ha, effort

quiet in

in Ihe cross-hairs,

and because Ihe

NWPA

it

was

forceful

and loud

work done

what path
site

in

Nevada

274

275

DOE

in

NWPA. As

would take

in the

site for site characterization

amendments

Washington

list

since Ihe primary

and by
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a

legislalors’

NWPA passed in

by the Congress
full

site,

from 9

1987.

to clean

well in passing

DOE

up

NWPA

had recommended a

and the Yucca Mountain,
to 3.

In addition,

-T-

a voice vote in the Senate

of

proeess was subtle and

Jacob, Site Unseen, 126.

The measure passed by

will,

bipartisan majorily in boll,

to

as an attempt

narrowing the

And

site seleetion

argued above, Congress knew

the Hanford,

DOE

provide

provisions held on, hope even

implementing the law. By 1986,

in

Deaf Smith, Texas,

MRS

,o

vas, majorily

was enacted by a

But while congressional control of the

NWPA,

undem-ay.

were already known and Ihe

The 1987 amendments can be viewed
the

Congress in.ended

siling aclivities already

for .hose stales in Ihe eross-hairs,

houses.'”

NWPA,

256-32 margin

in the

House.

DOE

had

a.so

begun

facuy.
matter

I,

,o

focus on

was

away

a. this

front

i.s

Oak

R.dge, Tennessee facib.y
as a po.enna, bo,ne
foe an

point that Congress

DOE

would take any sentbiance
of discretion

and unilaterally choose
Yucca Mounta.n

MRS
in the

as .he sole site for
the

nation’s geologic repository.

The 1987 amendments
characterization activities at
stipulated that if

DOE

to

NWPA

all sites

DOE

required

other than

found Yucca Mountain

to

suspend

research and site

Yucca Mountain. Provisions
to

be an unsuitable

pennanent, geologic repository,
the Department should
come back
instruction.

all

to

in the

law

site for the nation’

Congress

for further

Looking back on the 1987 law,
Senator Larry Craig (R-ID)
admitted, ‘Ve did

arbitrarily reach out

and pick Yucca Mountain,
no question about that.”"-

Numerous

unsuccessful appeals to the courts
and the Congress by Nevada
over the past decade have

delayed

NWPA

DOE’s work

at

Yucca Mountain,

repository

would be

characterization and

Congress sought

Mountain and

NWPA,

1998

But by

licensing activities

it

-

the time

1998.

at

when Congress assumed

DOE

it.

a national

had not yet completed

Yucca Mountain.

there until the repository

As

a result,

was approved and

ready.

(R-NV) summed up what he viewed

its

site

many
to

During

that

as the logic

this issue, not the scientists.
is

sa>dng, with

Senator Larry Craig (R-ID) quoted

What Congress is
Yucca Mountain and the temporary

in Holly Idelson, “Nevada Prepares for
Battle on Nuclear Waste
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 49 (September
7, 1991), 2558.
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in

Yucca

the 1987 amendments, and eveiything
that had happened since.

Congress has decided
doing in [the 1998] bill

in

close to stopping

"temporanly” move the nation’s
commercial waste

to

store

ready.

in

debate. Representative John Ensign

Again

come

required that the federal government
take possession of the spent
nuclear fuel

being stored around the country

behind

but they have not yet

-

Storage site a, , he
say.

It

going

IS

Nevada

to

,es, she. "M

be the

site,

going to lower the standards

The 987 amendments
1

would go

fuel

facility in

to

Oak

facility, the

and

until

do no. ea,e wha. any of,
he sciemis.s

it

is

it

is

goim. to he

First,

it

ntillincd the

Ridge, Tennessee and required
that

DOE

“shall

make no presumption

their previous selection.”^™

Not only was

provision was added prohibiting

DOE

’

suitable^’”’

also took other steps to
ensure that

Yucea Mountain.

snii ,hi„

m

all

of the nation’s spent nuelear

DOE’s

proposal to site an

searching for a

site for

pemianent repository
construction of an

spent fuel

was
for

in

MRS

somewhere

hand

MRS

is

for

DOE

supposed to

from selecting a

site

start

until

over on
after a

facility.

that

it

stated,

The philosophical idea behind

recommend

amendments

42

that time,

if the

incentive to begin

MRS

was

to put the

a provision to kill

MRS.

In contrast

with the provisions of

NWPA

that called for

a site for a second permanent repository by
1990, the 1987 law

the Secretary shall report to the President and to Congress
on or after January

in

use

See 42

At

also contained provisions designed to
block the

Representative John Ensign

of 1997?”

pennanent

In effect then, the provision
delaying site selection

Yucca Mountain was approved was

search for a second repository.

to

little

a

could be monitored and then retrieved
once the technology

permanent storage.

until after

MRS,

appropriate funds for sueh a
facility and

ready for construction, there
would be

Similarly, the 1987

DOE

to

MRS

or preference to such sites
by reason of

repository has gone through site
eharacterization and been approved.^'^'

however, Congress would need

an

MRS

1,

(R-NV) in “Should the House Pass H.R. 1270, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
Congressional Digest, Vol. 77, No. (January 1998), 25.
1

10162.

USC

10165.
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2007, bu, no.

la,er

than January

this report is unlikely
,o

conduct

s, . e-specific

20,0, on ,he need for a
second rcposi,ory.-«

emerge, however, because
the law also staled

acfivities

,ha,

DOE

to

phase out

all

act, v, ties

most of the

As

of this prov.sion was

east coast out

hammered home
to the host state

discusses in

Yucca Mountain was

on

that state's decision to

detail

the state once Ihe facility

how and when

is built

any benefits agreement provide

less

its

With

nght under

10172a.

42

use

10172a.

42

use

10172a.

42

use

10173a.

its

show

in

town had not been

veto rights under

a state will be

is

NWPA.

The law

compensated offering $10 million

approved and $20 million per year

and receiving spent

fuel.

But

later,

title

I

to

disapprove the recommendation of a

this provision, the veto rights
guaranteed in

143

to

the law requires that

that “the State or Indian tribe
that is party to

meaning.

use

thus taking

second repository.

the only

waive

per year to the state once a construction
license

repository.

for a

medium

clearly enough, the 1987
law also conditioned
compensatory payments

some

agreement waive

While the language may be

to rule out granite as
a host

of consideration as a host

,f the point that

Moreover, ihe new

-des.gned to evaluate the
stu.ability of

co'stalline rock as a potential
repositoty host .ned.um,”^*^

unclear, the purpose

DOE ‘•,nay no,

with respec. to a second
reposi.o^ mtless Congress
has

specfically authorized and
appropnated funds for such
activities.-'

law required

Even

NWPA

such

site for

a

take on even

We
.0 pu. Ihe

have soon then,

,ha,

i,

was Congress,

nahon's eonrnrere.al spen,
nuclear

cemral ,o Ihe ,ues.ions

imposing parheularislic

.ha.

a,u, really

fuel ,n

guide .his s.udy.

cos.s,

why

Congress alone,

Yucca MounUun. Such

When

,ha, decKlec,

a llnrhng

conferring general honefi.s
and

does Congress so.nci.ncs
delega.e power

....li.u.g

exlra-congrcssional procedures
and, in o.her cases,
enac. .hesc polices
....c-nallyV
po.nl

for

we have made

,s lha., all

appearances aside

choosing Yucca Moun.ain from

amendmen.s

wrihng

in

.o

NWPA

in .his case.

s.ar. .o finish.

We

,s

The

Congress was responsible

have seen how

NWPA

and .he

focused .he par.icuiar,s.lc
cos.s on Y.,cca Moun.ain,

1990, Gerald Jacob asks,
-was .he ou.come ever

suggests the answer must be ‘rarelv
rarely.

The nex. ques.ion

,s

In

douhfi.

The evidence

how Congress was

able lo

pass these laws.

Procedures as
In

discussing

how Congress

Key

forced .he nation's commercial
spen. miclear fuel on

Nevada, Douglas Arnold remarks,
this

solution, which seems so obvious
to amichair theorists,
required
nearly a decade for Congress to
accept. Concentrating costs on
the tiniest
group or area is seldom the easiest way to
build a coalition in Congress.^^^

This statement serves as an excellent reminder
that designating Yucca Mountain
as the

nations sole repository

members of Congress

Jacob, Site Unseen,

for

spent fuel required

versus 4 from Nevada).

xviii.

^85

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 111-112.
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It

more than simple math (531 other

required the deft use of procedures.

The
Closed

of

critical

rttle in

NWPA,

procedural maneuver ,n the
passage of

the House.

various

Throughout the

NWPA

was

leg.slat.ve process
leading

members of Congress had
attempted

up

amend

to

the adoption of a

to the enact, nent

the leg, station to

explicitly preclude selectton
of a s,te in the,r distnct or
slate. Coalition
leaders from both

houses were also seeking to
avoid having

would provide

go

to

conference on the legislation
as that

further openings for
legislators seeking to
protect their districts and
states.

Finally, legislators also

needed

to avoid a conference
as the

and there was not enough time.
The
It

to

state veto provision in

was because Senator William Proxmire
(D-WI) had

without

it.

The amendment

by the Senate on Deeember

To avoid

all

NWPA,

work on

to satisfy

NWPA was only as strong as

threatened to filibuster the
bill itself

House voted on

just a

few hours

after the

was

also the vote to pass the bill.^^^

overstated.

The elosed

deliver versus

NWPA

district.

In this light, the rule

called for,

amendments

to

tactics

most

for

process

Procedural

The importance of

rule forced legislators to

what was,

finally agreed to

that the vote to adopt the

this

procedure cannot be

weigh the general benefit

it

was

likely to

high-level nuclear waste repository in their

was adopted and

NWPA. One

its

legislators, the incredibly unlikely
possibility that the

would put a

played

Senate had completed

a rule for consideration of
the Senate version that

provided for no amendments and, more
importantly, provided
rule

were

bill

20, 1982, leaving no time for a
conference.

of these problems,

the

Proxmire and the

Congress was winding down

an even

the bill

larger

was enacted by

role

in

the

a vote of 256-32.

passage of the

1987

important difference between 1982 and 1987 was that by

1987, Democrats had regained control of the Senate and the

145

new Chairman of the Senate

Energy Committee was
committee

NWPA

that

in

1982, Johnston had been the

allowed

DOE

a

move

a

chance of being located

sites

Bennett Johnston (D-LA).

J.

to

move

mam

As

a minority

member of

proponent of including
provisions

forward with research and
siting of an

MRS

the

in

-

facility

designed to provide an alternative
to a pennanent,
geologic repository which
had

narrowed down

1987, Johnston

as the “screw

to

became

Nevada

in

Lomsiana^- With

the

list

of potential geologic
repository

Deaf Smith, TX, Hanford, WA,
and Yucca Mountain,

the primary architect of
what has

bill”

-

the 1987

amendments

to

come

NWPA.

to

be known

among

NV

in

critics

While Arnold argues

that

with the search narrowed to Texas,
Washington, and Nevada,
“coalition leaders finally

had the nucleus for an unbeatable
coalition,”* the
be

difficult.

state

As Arnold himself

truth is that the next step

difficult

both because of congressional
nonns and,

perhaps more importantly, because of the
danger of a

needed.

DOE

to

As

fiscal

1988 reconciliation

originally crafted

engage

in

department had on

site

its

bill

filibuster.

provided the procedural vehicle
Johnston

by Johnston, the amendments

to

NWPA

would require

characterization activities at only one of
the three sites the
list,

though Johnston’s

bill

left

the choice up to

DOE.

rationale, at least publicly, for attaching
the plan to the reconciliation bill

conducting one

^88

still

pointed out earlier, ganging up
on liny Nevada, or any

no matter how weak, remains

The

would

site characterization instead

was

The
that

of three would save $634 million over three

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

VI,

1981-1984, 365-366.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

VI,

1981-1984,264.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 111.
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yea.

-

„,os.

was required

or .He

on

to find to

meet

its

sav.n.s ove. .Hnee yea.
.loHns.on's Energy
Connnn.ee

reconciliation targct.^^‘^

Johnston’s original plan also
included provisions to
au.horize an

once a permanem facli.y
was licensed.
backup, Johns, on,
for

who

also served as .he

bill

was

.bat

Chairman of

bill.

The

Chairman of the Appropriations
SubconuniUee

poli.tcal logic

Johnston would then be able
the

facih.y

This prov.s.on was
i,npor.an. because, as
a

Energy and Water Development,
also attached

water appropr.at.ons

MRS

his plan to the fiscal
1088 energy and

of attaching the plan
to

go

to

to the appropriations

conference on the

bill

with the

House Appropriations Committee,
Representative Jamie Whitten (DJ

MS,

-

a

member from

a state, like Louisiana, that

was among

the six final states under

consideration for a permanent,
geologic repository but not on
the
states.

While

this

backup proved

to

list

of the

be unnecessary, the maneuver
highlighted the

procedural importance of including the
plan as part of the reconciliation

members of the Appropriations Subcommittee

bill.^‘»

Reid was seeking

Nevada and Sasser was attempting
junior

members of the committee

made good on

keep an

failed to

but Reid, along with Senator Brock

cross-hairs,

to

to

Inc.,

Fellow

to eliminate Johnston’s plan

keep the permanent

MRS

facility out

facility out

of Tennessee.

Adams (D-WA), whose

a threat to filibuster the

bill

state also

on the floor

-
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bill

in the

a tactic that kept the

VII,

1985-1988 (Washington, D.C.:

VII,

1985-1988, 484.

1990), 484.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

remained

of

These

keep Johnston’s plan off the appropriations

Congressional Quarterly, Congress ami the Nation, Volume
Congressional Quarterly,

bill.

Energy and Water Development, Sen.

for

Harry Reid (D-NV) and Sen. Jim Sasser
(D-TN, attempted
from the appropriations

final three

b.ll

off , he noor for several
weeks.^”

no. give up

wrihom a

procedural

advantages

Reconcihation

bills

Bu,

figh,.

between

it

would be studied by

reconciliation

a blue-ribbon

UdalTs (D-AZ)

A

House

Interior

from Johnston's plan.

Udall's

period,

,he difference in

-

appropriations

a provision that

would delay

MRS

commission.^” Tennessee was off
the hook.
to let the reconciliation

conference have

in

first

almost a completely opposite
direction

called for a bipartisan

commission from within the

handling of the waste issue, review
the foundation of

and report back to Congress on what
legislation would be needed.

DOE

lulls.

on nuclear waste approved by
Representative Morris

bill

DOE's

Nevada would

Seenrg the writing on the
wall, Sasser cut a

Committee had gone

legislative branch to study

NWPA,

bill

and

bills

An amendment added

Not suirrisingly, Johnston opted
crack at his plan.

clear lha.

nrade sonre.hing else clear
as well

cannot be f.libustered.

separate deal with Johnston.

while

I,

The denronsIraUon made

would be prohibited from studying

sites

for

a

During

this

permanent repository

further.^*^^

When

the

conference convened, the political logic of
the situation became

overwhelming. None of Nevada’s four members of
Congress were involved. Texas and
Washington, on the other hand, each had strong representation
representatives

demanded

a

provision

that

DOE

characterization any site that lay below an aquifer

and Washington

sites

-

could

in conference.

not

choose as a

an underground stream.

both lay below one and the Nevada

site

did not.

site

for

The Texas

Johnston agreed

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

VII,

1985-1988, 485.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

VII,

1985-1988, 485-486.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

VII,

1985-1988, 486.
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The Texas

and conferees

Nevada

later

as the sole

agreed to drop the murky
provision on an aqmfer and
just name

Along

site.

the way.

House conferees,

in a

Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN),
convinced Johnston to

MRS

facility

condit.onal on

DOE

permanent, geologic repos.tory,”^

between Johnston’s plan

down had sped

to

nod

to fellow

conferee

make authonzation of an

approving Yucca Mountain as
the nation’s

first

,n the

end then, a conference seektng

to negotiate

speed up the select.on process
and Udall’s plan

to

slow

it

the process up even further
than Johnston had originally
imagined.

Members’ comments before

the vote to approve the
conference report on the

reconciliation bill highlight the
importance of Johnston’s procedural
maneuver.

did the procedural tactic preclude

with a massive reconciliation

bill

amendments and

filibusters,

promising $76 billion

it

Not only

also packaged the plan

in deficit reduction

over 2 years.

Legislators thinking about voting against
the package would thus have to
justify not only

why

they voted against moving nuclear waste
out of their constituents’ backyards,
but

also

why

swallow

they voted against reducing the

m

the

bill

were hammered out

on the House conferees
selection process.

selection of the

host State

House

-

Moreover, because the hardest

deficit.

in conference,

a group that had

come

Johnston was quick

to

pills to

blame them

into conference seeking to delay the site

Johnston pointed out that “the House conferees
insisted on the

Nevada

was reduced

site

by Congress”^’^ and “the amount of money

substantially in the conference agreement

at

available to a

the insistence of the

conferees.”^*^^

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Motion, Volume
Senator

J.

Bennett Johnston (D-LA) quoted

in

VII,

1985-1988, 487.

Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37693.

Sen. Johnston quoted in Congressional Record,

December

149

21, 1987, 37694.

Regardless of
clear cho.ee.

who was

,o

blame, however, members
found dremselves wiih a

Rep. Udall argued,
-.he procedural course
adopted by .he other body

regrettable’-^ and suggested
.ha, he doubts “any
one wtll point to thts

example of our democratic
system’s abihty

as a noble

bill

to resolve sensitive
technical issues.’’^*

the end, however, he
supported the conference
report.

,s

In

Representative Philip Sha^, (D-

IN) eompiatned that “the
expedited procedures of the
Reconciliation Ac, should no,
have

been used

for this .mportan,
matter” but added, “it has
the virtue

pretense under

some

would occur.”»’

legislative proposals that

of cutting through the

any genuine consideration
of other

sites

Highlighttng the importance
of Johnston’s procedural
maneuver.

Representative Douglas

Owens (D-UT)

national site for a geologic
repository

pointed out that designating
Nevada as the sole

would bring tons of nuclear waste
through

his state.

Nevertheless, he concluded,

conference report, which makes
j'°
Utah a victim
with m''
Nevada and“,he crossroads of the
waste,” only because we must
above all legislative imperatives,
reduce the budget deficit. If we
were
pemiitted a separate vote on the
nuclear waste provision of this
bill
I
would vote Hell
’

Rep. Cooper of Tennessee, of course,
also supported the conference
report “reluctantly,”

thanked those

who had been

and expressed his

heartfelt,

responsible for including

though unsatisfied, desire

him

in the

to help

conference committee,

Nevada.

My

primary concern dunng the conference was
defeating the Department
of Energy s ill-conceived plans to locate a
monitored retrievable storage
Representative Morris Udall (D-AZ) quoted
298

Rep. Udall quoted

in

in

Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37068.

Congressional Record, December 21, 1988, 37069.

Representative Philip Sharp (D-IN) quoted in Congressional
Record, December 21, 1987, 37069.

Representative Douglas

Owens (D-UT) quoted

in

Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37084.
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(MRS)
le

near Oak Ridge, TN. But
my concern was not the
of wishing the nuclear
waste on someone else.^°'
facility

A. the same time, of course,
those from Nevada cried

Vueanovich (R-NV) argued
declared,

“Congress

is

that the bill

behaving

like

would -tuni our
a

Vueanovich and Sen. Reid also
complained
to

the conference committee
with

foul.

Representative Barbara

state into a federal

pack of wolves going
that

selfish

in

for

colony” and
the

kill,”’”

nobody from Nevada had been
appointed

Reid declaring

Nevada had been “shut out

that

completely.”’” Johnston responded,
“they weren’t shut out. They
just weren’t appointed
to the

conference.’””

Reid also took

to the floor

with language strong enough
for the

Civil War.

IS with a sense of revulsion
and shame that
budget reconciliation legislation that
shortly

I

will

rise

today to speak on the

be before

us; revulsion at

what can only be described as oppression
and colonialism, directed at the
people of my State by 49 other States
who are supposed to be our allies m
a political union;

shame because the sad truth is that this
legislation has
been subverted into becoming a vehicle
for the grossest kind of
political

chicanery.

Inflammatory language aside, however, what

NWPA
rules,

and the 1987 amendments

omnibus

to

NWPA

is

is

clear from the legislative history
of

that procedural tactics

legislative vehicles, legislating in conference,

-

the use of closed

and the use of special

Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN) quoted in Congressional
Record, December 21, 1987, 37074.
30 ^

Representative Barbara Vueanovich (R-NV) quoted in Congressional
Quarterly, Congress and the
VII, 1985-1988, 483.

Nation, Volume

Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) quoted in Congressional Quarterly,
Congress and the Nation Volume VII

1985-1988, 483.
Sen. Johnston quoted in Congressional Quarterly, Congress

and the

Nation, Volume VII 1985-1988

483.

Sen. Reid quoted in Congressional Record,

December

151

21, 1987, 37632.

reconclia,ion procedures

-

were central

to the congress, onal
effort to designate

Nevada

the sole site for the
nation’s commercial spent
nuclear fuel.

Procedural Choice

anri

M„ c|ear Waste

ni,p n,.i

That procedures were central
to the congressional
selection of Yucca Mountain
thus clear.

More

What

is

why

specif, cally,

part, cular, Stic

less clear is

cost

we

utilizing

internal

in the

procedures

find in

in

case of base closure?

turn our attention to the factors

What we

leaders chose the procedt.ral
path they did.

did legislators choose to
impose a geographically-concentrated

congressional procedures
that

why coahtion

,s

examining those

this

case while

Answering

we have been examining

factors

is that

utilizing

extra-

this question requires

throughout

this study.

while most of the political dynamics
of

siting a high-level nuclear waste
facility are similar to the
political

dynamics of base

closure, there are a very few
differences in the nature of the
particularistic cost that

account for

its

different procedural treatment.

Ge ographic

vs.

Non-Geo ^aphic
,

that the siting

of a high-level nuclear waste

syndrome, there

is

no shortage of evidence

imposed was more

by Sen. Reid above

Despite the claim of some observers

facility

to

does not conform well

is

The language

but one example of the desperation legislators
fuel out

virtually every state

of

their districts.

maneuvered

west of the Mississippi attempted, but

to

to the

NIMBY

demonstrate that the geographic cost being

sensitive than the average particularistic cost.

keep the spent nuclear

NWPA,

Benefits

amend

site

outside their borders.

States

the law to prohibit nuclear waste

from being transported more than 500 miles from where

152

attempting to

During congressional deliberation over

keep the

failed, to

felt in

utilized

it

was generated

-

a provision

designed

to

keep the waste

in the east

where more nuclear reactors
were

located.

306

States in the east argued
for a remote, pemianent
facility with the
emphasi s on remote. 307
In 1987, the race

explicit.

became even more heated
and

Senator George Mitchell

outcome because
authonzed

to

the

new language

in the reconciliation
bill

conduct any activities related

made

clear

what

his priority

then this configuration gives
are going to give

jumped on board

was

second

site.”^°*^

site

and

that

DOE

“DOE

is

no,

can no longer

Representative A1 Swift

me

in

(D-WA)

conference as “a goddamned
outrage” but

had been. “If we are going
the parochial things that

I

to

the 1987

Cooper claimed

that his victory

have to do

need.""’

somebody some nasty stuff"’" As
we saw

it

over a barrel,

He would

earlier.

add,

“we

Rep. Cooper had

bandwagon when conferees assured him
provisions would be

added delaying construction of an
time.

to a

meant

with the

instrumental in guaranteeing
that Washington would
get off the hook along

with Texas described what had
happened
also

comments of members even more

(D-ME) expressed how “pleased"
he was

consider Maine as a potential
nuclear waste

who had been

the

his victory

MRS
was

facility.

“bittersweet.”

was “incomplete” because

Energy and Commerce Committee working
on
the permanent facility in Nevada,

Expressing sympathy for Nevada

Cooper

What he should have

just a

few years

later,

a,

the

said instead

with the House

a bill to speed up the licensing
process for

insisted not only

on maintaining the prohibition

Jacob, Site Unseen, 123.

Jacob, Site Unseen, 41.
308

Senator George Mitchell

(D-ME) quoted

(D-WA) quoted
VII,

1985-1988,487.

Rep. Swift quoted

in

in

in

Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37702.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation. Volume

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume
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VII,

1985-1988, 483.

on licensing an
insisted

to the

MRS

on a provision

Yucca Mountain

facility until after a

that

ordered

DOE

pemianent

to locate the

facility

MRS

NWPA

Though Senator Chie Heeht (R-NV)

“as close as possible”

this

geographic cost

did oppose the 1987

is

the

amendments

to

arguing that the waste should
be reprocessed tnstead of
burted, most observers

agree that he subsequently lost
his reeleetion bid
plan

aicility

site.^"

ne other measure of the
particular sensitivity of
electoral cost.

has been licensed but also

in

1988 because he did not
oppose the

acvely enough. Though Hecht himself
claimed

by adding amendments along the way,''^

it

to

have made the

bill

much

better

worth mentioning that he received
no

is

thanks from any of the three other
members of the Nevada congressional
delegation.
Note,

for

instance,

Hecht’s absence

from

Representative James

Bilbray's

(D-NV)

comments.

Our

delegation has fought together. The
gentlewoman from Nevada [Mrs.
Vucanovich] and myself and the junior Senator
from our State have fought
Vigorously to oppose this.^ ^

Later he added,

Nevada’s House delegation has fought shoulder to
shoulder to bring sense
to this body.
My friend and colleague, Congresswoman Barbara
Vucanovich has worked long and hard to keep nuelear
waste out of
Nevada. In the other body. Senator Harry Reid, led a long
filibuster to try

to prevent

what

Idelson, “Panel Acts of

is

happening here

today.^'"^

Waste Dump,” 2613.

See the comments of Senator Chic Hecht (R-NV) quoted

in

Congressional Record, December 21

1987

37690-37691.
Representative James Bilbray

Rep. Bilbray quoted

in

(D-NV) quoted

in

Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37076.

Congressional Record, December 21, 1987, 37076.
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No. surprismgly, a comn.cn

refrain heard in .he

Governor Richard B^^an was

wake of Hcch.’s

|.)88

Hech. was no. opposed
enoug,.

.ha.

instance. Congressional
Quarterly reported that Hecht
had

ree.econ

.0 .he

loss .0

dmnp.

For

lost,

•!’<= planned
Yucca dump
he once sa.d he did no.
wan.
.he stale o
become a nuctor suppository” did little to persuade
Nevadans of the
seriousness with which he
approached the issue.

And
An?'LTh'.'’s"
Hech. s

Thus, there

'’‘“f
.nalaprop.sm

is

no question

-

that

because sit.ng

this

particular place imposes
geographically-concentrated costs,
far

more important

.0 legislators .0 avoid

nuclear waste facility in a

it

was

of geographic cos.

is,

in fact,

costs imposed by base closure.

more

blame than would have been

costs were particularistic but
geographically dispersed. But there
this type

far

even more

difficult .0

is

sensitive and

the case if the

reason .0 believe that

swallow than the geographic

Legislators seek to keep bases open
because they believe

constituents working in and around these
bases will face heavy economic
losses if the

base

IS

closed and will seek to punish the
legislator in the next election.

Kunreuther and Easterling found

that

presence of a hazardous waste

that

We

saw

earlier

citizens will be unwilling to accept
the

facility in their district in

exchange for compensation

unless they have reason to believe the physical
harm to them and to future generations
will be minimal.

waste

to

facility out

But

of their

keep a base open

on tourism

in

tn addition to these costs, legislators

have the same economic concerns as those seeking

district also

in their district.

Las Vegas

-

a

While

Holly Idelson, “High

(October

10, 1992),

Noon

at

legislators in

Nevada worry about

mere 90 miles from Yucca Mountain

concerns of legislators elsewhere are no

315

seeking to keep a nuclear

Yucca Mountain”

less frightening.

in

-

the

the impact

economic

For example. Representative

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report Vol 50

3142.
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Kent Hance (D-TX),

who

represented the district that
contained the Deaf Smith

received a letter from
Fnto-Lay

company

a

-

worth of com and potatoes
from the area

that

purchased up to $23 million
a year

and around Hance’s

in

site.

d, strict

-

that

contained

the following passage.

We

know that nuclear waste is an
emotional
much magmation to conjure up the
eventual
all

issue,

and

it

doesn’t take

hue and cry of the public

bout food crops being irrigated
by water that flows over
nuclear Lste
Under such a situation our alternative
would be to move into other
com
and potato producing areas for
raw materials,

economy of your

seriously disrupting the

district.

seems

It

that a far better alternative
for

tery
p rty concerned would be to locate nuclear
waste disposals in areas of
wastelands where even sage brush
has a hard time

gro^n^°*“‘^

The dual dimensions of the geographic
theoretical explanation for

to

what

cost

we have

be concerned with a nuclear waste

-

both environmental and economic

seen above.

facility

Legislators have even

being located

in their district

-

imply a

more reason
than they do

with losing a military base.

This conclusion further complicates the
puzzle of procedural choice.
hypothesis guiding this study

is that

geographic costs are more

impose because the costs are borne by

Blame avoidance techniques
legislators are

more

geographic cost

In the case

to

Letter to Representative Kent

consumer

more

difficult

likely to delegate the authority to

the case of base closure.

difficult

are far

particular,

affairs for Frito-Lay

swallow. So

why didn’t

legislators.

such cases and, as a

make such

of a nuclear waste

central

difficult for legislators to

identifiable individual

in

A

facility,

result,

decisions as they did in

we have

an even more

legislators delegate?

Hance (D-TX) from Charles H. Murphy, vice-president of government and
in Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust, 157.

quoted
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One
leaders dtd

in

1987

As mentioned

$10 mtllion per year

once the

that

to

would receive

,t

Super-Collider^legislators did

,s

.uestion that desewes
ntention

earlier, a

-

fuel.

a

licensed and

Nevada was

$20

less

the waste

site that

was

no

fruit.

Finally,

expenditures

in

Nevada

-

to

also given assurances

least likely to

whether intentionally or

provoke

local resistance.

Moreover, the surrounding area

likely to be resistant to
the jobs and
facility.

is

mill, on per year

located on federal land that served
in the pas, as a nuclear

demography

accompany

is

In addit.on,

a prom.se that yielded

choose a

the site

that

special considerat.on for
other federal projects such
as the

already considered to be contaminated.
-

that legislative

is

compensat.on package was
included

Nevada once

begins accepting spent

site

Mountain

to this

consciously attenrp, to ntit.gate
some of the costs borne
by the host

commumty.
del.ver

of the answer

par,

Yucca

test site that is

is rural

and poor

federal dollars that will

Indeed, Gerald Jacob points out
that in 1979, total

nearly

$450 per

state resident

-

not,

were

DOE

slightly higher than

Department of Defense expenditures.

These

geographic

benefits

that

flow

to

Nevada

from

DOE

activities

notwithstanding, the geographic/non-geographic
variable offers more questions than

answers when

it

comes

Congress suggests

some

to procedural choice.

that they should

want

The geographic

sensitivity

of members of

to delegate this decision, if not to the

other standing agency then to an ad hoc commission
empowered to

decision.

The puzzle becomes

all

the

more confusing when we

proposals to do just that were considered and rejected

Jacob, Site Unseen, 170-171.
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at

a

recall

number of

DOE

make

or

the

that various

points in the

process.

Since the powerful force of
geography was unable ,o compel
leg.slalors

delegate

power

in tins instance,

we

,o

are compelled to look to
our other factors to answer

why.

Ih e Scope of the_PplicxArea, The scope
of the

many

msights to the question of procedural
choice

facility.

Our

legislators to

in s.ting a high-level
nuclear

central concern about the
scope of the policy area

be

less willing to delegate

power

allow greater discretion to decisionmakers.
facility

policy area also does not
provide

provides

some evidence of

appeared to delegate power
department’s options

in so

to

in policy areas that are

The

many ways

to

choose a

DOE

that

we

that

expect

broad and that

of a high-level nuclear waste

siting

this principle in action as

DOE

is

waste

site

really

we saw

that legislators

but actually constrained the

had very

little,

and with the

enactment of the 1987 amendments no, discretion.

With respect

to this study,

to delegate authority if the

we

we would

expect that Congress would only be willing

scope of the policy area

is

is

a narrow

enough policy area

authority without fear that that delegation

that

because, in this case,

Congress might be willing

would

Furthermore, because members of Congress had very

318

And

are talking about finding a site to house only one
type of hazardous waste,

expect that this

to

narrow.

members

Various proposals were offered

in

to delegate

over into other policy areas.

spill

little trust

lack of trust in the Pentagon in base closure

we would

-

in DOE^'*^

we would

-

this is similar

expect Congress to

1982 by Representative A1 Swift (D-WA), Representative Ron

(D-OR) and Representative Stanley Lundine (D-NY) to name a
proposal of Rep. Udall in 1987 that was rejected in conference.

few. In addition,

we

Wyden

discussed earlier the

Establishing this point requires only that the reader skim any history of relations between Congress and
Several authors have made this argument including Jacob, Site Unseen and Carter. Nuclear

DOE.

Imperatives and Public Trust.
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delegate to an ad hoc
commtssion to site a facility
instead of

Congress did not choose
that the

scope of the poiiey area

never claimed that
area

is

it

this factor is

is

determ.native

-

still

in this study.

only that the ability to
this

Nevertheless,

This does not suggest

not a useful faetor to
examine

an important precondition of
delegation. That

Congress
than

to delegate authority in
this policy area.

DOE.

na.ow

That said, there was one point

it

in the battle

did to enact

the policy

in this

case

area.

facility that is relevant to this
factor that is

Congress took as long as

was

precondition was satisfied and

chose not to delegate says more
about other factors involved

does about the scope of the policy

It

over siting a high-level nuclear
waste

worth mentioning.

One

part

of the reason

NWPA was that members disagreed over whether

or not high-level nuclear waste from
military programs ought to be
stored in the same
facility

with high-level nuclear waste from commercial
nuclear reactors.^^® The issue was

difficult, in part,

because of the turf battles that are

policy area cuts across congressional committee

common

lines.

But

in

it

many
was

policy areas

when

a

also difficult because

including military wastes in the facility would
broaden the scope of the policy area.
President Carter had issued an executive order prohibiting

DOE

from reprocessing spent

nuclear fuel and using the byproducts to build nuclear weapons
but President Reagan had

reversed that decision.

While no spent

fuel

was reprocessed

in the early 1980s, the

Congress explicitly prohibited the federal government from reprocessing
action

is

relevant in the context of nuclear waste disposal because

it

is

in 1982.

This

an indicator of the

sense of Congress in keeping military and civilian nuclear programs separate and, by
extension, keeping the scope of the policy area in siting a high-level nuclear waste facility

159

.

narrow.

Luther Carter makes precisely

this point arguing,
“it

most members of Congress the
waste issue was

for

Indeed, Senate

would demand

Amred

Serviees Chainnan John

NWPA

should be pointed out that

strtetly

a domest.c cottcem.”^^'

Tower (R-TX) warned members

be referred to his committee

if

it

that

he

included provisiotts to store

military waste as well as civilian
waste.

Surpnsingly, in the end,

NWPA effectively delegated authority to dcctde

whether

military waste should be stored
with civilian waste to the
president.^« This delegat.on
of

authority probably says

more about Congress’

lack of destre to deal
with the entire

process agatn for disposing of high-level
nuclear waste than anything
IS

relevant for our purposes here, however,

is

that

else.

The

point that

Congress chose not to delegate

authority to site a high-level nuclear waste
facility despite the fact that
the policy area in

question was sufficiently narrow.

was

a result

more of the moment

What we

are about to see

in political

is

that this procedural choice

time and the number of geographic
locations

targeted than the geographic nature of the cost
or the scope of the policy area.

T he Moment
more

in Political

likely legislators

Time.

would handle

internally rather than delegating.

impose

The

particular

ways

benefit, legislative leaders

USC

VI,

I98I-I984, 361

VI,

I98I-I984, 364.

Trust, 195.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

See 42

made

it

10107.
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were very

to mitigate negative electoral

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

Nuclear Imperatives and Public

time

case in which legislators are seeking to

of a general

sensitive to the electoral calendar and found

Carter,

in political

the siting of a high-level nuclear waste
facility

As with any

particularistic costs in favor

moment

impacts

for

most

legislators.

As Gerald Jacob

NWPA -‘only materialised

points out,

hectic hours of the
Ninety-seventh Congress.”

Remember

coahtion leaders had amanged
for legislators

to

be able

that in the

after the election.

And

in the

race for

Day

that legislators

money was

all

had

of base

of closures

list

less reason to

but over at that point.

1986 election.

worry about

In fact,

PAC

was so

it

full

he

close to

funds drying up.

The

Stnniarly, in the case of nuclear
waste

dtsposal, coahtton leaders scheduled
a vote at a point on the electoral
calendar that

two

to

case of tax reform, legislators
had been able

to vote for taxpayer rate
rehef just before the

Electron

ease of base elosure,

to vote for the not.on

closure in general just before
the 1988 elect, on with
the spec, tie

announced just

in the final,

left at

years least (the siting process set in
motion would take even longer) to get
out

from under the negative policy effects of

their votes.

This sensitivity to the electoral

calendar also dtsplayed itself in the struggle
over the 1987 amendments to

NWPA.

Sen. Sasser of Tennessee had fought alongside
Sen. Reid to stop Johnston’s

After

bill in

the

appropriations committee, Johnston struck a deal
with Sasser that would set up a

commission

to study

whether

MRS

(the facility proposed for Tennessee)

was

feasible

and, tmportantly, the commission was not expected to report
back until January, 1989
scant

two months

after Sasser’s

But a second, and

far

expected reelection

more important, way

offered opportunities for coalition leaders to handle

we

will discuss in the next section,

small, the delegation

was

particularly

was

weak

in

which the moment

in political

site selection internally

a critical factor.

in 1987.

When

is

time

has to do with

small and

that,

But, in addition to being

the choice

came down

Nevada, Washington, and Texas, there was no match, not only because of the

161

a

to the Senate.

the strength of Nevada’s congressional delegation. Nevada’s delegation
as

-

to

relative

sizes

of ,he congressional
deleganons, bu, because of
,he ins.Uu.ional posii.ons

members

held.

Douglas Arnold points

out,

"’*=

p’o"

frieltd^

legislators held

.heir

President’s closest

feer

no“’

remaining

^^"'°ri‘y (two

ere elected
werfelec
ed in
n 1987°^.
1982, and two’"“"iT
m 1986). Texas and Washington not onlv
ad size, committee positions,
and seniority on their side,
they were also

f.™ “ "
The same

logic

When most

in

worked

“-.4 L.t

in reverse in

Congress wanted

to create a

to store the spent fuel until the

friends in high places.

1998 when Nevada’s delegation
was much stronger.
temporary waste

permanent

site

and Sen. Bryan killed the

Yucca Mountain
had

it

that year. Representative

John

convince the Speaker of the House,
Representative Newt

to

Gingrich (R-GA) to keep the

next to

was constructed, Nevada found

Challenging Sen. Reid for his seat

Ensign (R-NV) was able

site

bill

bill in

off the legislative calendar. At the
same time. Sen. Reid

the Senate

by holding

all

but 3 Democrats with them on a

cloture vote.^^^

T he

One, the Few, and the Many. The moment

m political time thus played a key

role in presenting opportunities to legislative
leaders to handle the issue internally.

while the

moment

in political

different factor served as the

facility differs

way.

time helped legislative leaders to handle

major impetus.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action,

1

in this

way, a

Site selection for a high-level nuclear waste

from base closure as a collective action problem

In base closure, legislators seek to

it

But

impose

in

one very significant

particularistic costs

on

a

number of

12fn73.

Chuck McCutcheon, “Nevada Waste Site Defeated in Election-Year Tussle Over Reid’s Senate Seat”
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 56 (June 6, 1998), 1536.
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in

geography areas

once.

a.

legislators single out

one locat.on

in the general benefit.

Amtey’s

every legislative

district

fachty being placed

The minority

to

to

shoulder the costs while the

Moreover, while many congress,
onal

a notable example

is

choosing a she for a was.e
fachhy on ,he other

,n

had no military

-

.nstallations

in the district

and accepting

be overcome was thus smaller

truism that a determined minority
in Congress
bill,

it

Specifically,

also a truism that no,

is

all

all

in the

question was not only small, but

weak

minorities and larger majorities are

base closure.

all

is

districts -

In short, the

-

Representahve

of significant

size, nearly

MRS,

APR

or

of the nation's spent nuclear

fuel.

case of nuclear waste site
choice and

was thus

larger.

While „

is a

quite capable of blocking action
on any

minorities in Congress are created
equally.

other things equal, small minorities

smaller majorities.

of the nation shares

had to fear the prospect of
one of a geologic,

the natural majority of districts
seeking to dodge this bullet

given

res,

hattd,

-

we saw above

that the minority in

are less capable of blocking
action than large

more capable of overwhelming

mathematics of

While singling out one

identifiable, particular legislator, the task

site

site

still

is

much

minorities than

choice are different than those of

requires that

easier if

it

legislators

becomes

target

an

a process of

ganging up on the weakest member of the herd.

Not
it

surprisingly, this process

as an extended

began

game of musical

was

chairs.

to take focus in Congress, there

potential sites for either the

first

facility for the nation’s spent fuel.

a very slow one.

The

best analogy

is to

Luther Carter points out that as the

were about a dozen

permanent, geologic

states that

facility or for a

still

imagine

NWPA

remained as

temporary storage

In addition to the six states eventually

named by

DOE

as “potentially acceptable” in 1983 (Nevada, Washington, Texas, Utah, Louisiana, and
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Mississ.pp„,

three

states

w.th

good

gran, to

fonnations

were athact.ng

attention

(Wisconstn. Mich.gan, and
Minnesota) and three states
were cons.dered likely hontes
an

APR

(South Carolina,

bloc suggests

why

i,

number of .nstances

all

wanted

Ill.no.s,

York).

all

wanted the waste

their interests could

to include the

be divergent or

upper midwest states

and South Carolina wanted

to

its

choice

down

to

make

in

conflicting.”'^'’

DOE’s

The

considerations.

salt states

New

York,

sure a permanent facility
wotild be built
to

make

sure states had as

much

veto

as possible.

Thus, the enactment of

enactment of the amendments

to

NWPA, DOE’s

NWPA

in

implementation of

1987 can

all

NWPA,

As we have

seen, this process took on a variety of
fomis.

Tennessee were brought on board very
delay and study

late in the

MRS. Members from Texas

demanded and

for characterization.

process

site

remained.

Members of Congress from

when

provisions were added to

and Washington only came on board when

received, in conference, a provision to

Representative

and the

be seen as a long process of

eliminating players from the game, sometimes
one by one, until only one

they

Nevada. He

legislation to give then,
a strong voice, but in

somewhere soon. Nevada and Washington
wanted
power

H.s deseription of these
states as a

took so long for Congress
to narrow

argued, “the host states
a

New

and

lll.nois,

for

name Nevada

Edward Markey (D-MA) described

as the sole site

the process this

way.

We passed

another bill in 1987. What did we say? Well, the [Speaker] of
House then came from Texas. He said, “I don’t want it in Texas.”
That was one of the sites. The Majority Leader came from Washington
State. He said, “I don’t want it in Washington State.” It was out.
The
third State was the salt domes in Louisiana.
The Chairman of the
the

Carter, Nuclear Imperatives

and Public

Trust, 197.
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andParR^lan"^^
not

urying all the nuclear waste
in America in New
Hampshire ”
kept search,
ng. playing this game of thennonuclear
hearts

we fm^o" WeT
“V
You get all the
t

When
allowed

It

11

the

-‘h --ebody. So we
:

^

We

nuclear waste.

moment

in

political

Nevada with

the

g

So we
,o

Lck

w^:!

looked around, ^,d
' ^^o
congressmen, two senators
are picking you.”“’

time was right

-

when

and when Nevada's congressional
delegation was

legislators stuck

tr^n

the electoral calendar

at its

weakest point

other

-

queen of spades.

Conclusion

Along

the road to choosing

Yucca Mountain

permanent, geologic repository for spent
nuclear

fuel,

as the nation’s sole site for
a

many

legislators

complained

that

the scientists and technicians were being
forced to yield to legislators and
politicians.

While he remains a harsh

critic

of how

choice was handled in this case, Gerald Jacob

site

argues that such complaints are misguided for two
reasons.
as

technical”

often a simple

is

economic choices

to others

way of

who may be

First,

categorizing a decision

shifting responsibility for

making

less responsible to the electorate.

social

But they do

not eliminate the underlying value conflicts associated
with those choices.

provides the following example,

Determining what kind of bolt

mundane

technical decision best

between

a

cost-saving,

to

use seems to be a straightforward,

left to

the engineer.

However, the choice

durable bolt

and a high tolerance, but
expensive one can affect the potential for catastrophic failure of a hotel

Representative Edward Markey

less

(D-MA)

in

“Should the House Pass H.R. 1270, the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act of 1997?” in Congressional Digest, Vol. 77, No.
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1

(January 1998), 17.

and

Jacob

skyway or

a nuclear

power plant cooling system
s.mplo “icchnical” .lcc,si„„
canacs lx>imcrn;,lKa.,on
gcogtapliic area anil popnlalion
cxposcii lo a level of risk- Ih
«l nopacls anil benclns
associalcil will, ,,se ol
of

the

more expensive one; and

savn g
sociali/eil
i

boll,
I

hat

however,
is,

Ihe

Ihe cost

mplex decisions, such

as

I

mcreaseil

risk

among

how

resiwmhn'rto

of injury or

ile-,U,

'a

is

Ibe popihation alVirge
site lo

’"'•'-"-'cononiic

waste she choice

lo rebuild an

n

,

which waslc disposal lechnology
or

second reason Jacob beheyes
relegaling decisions

level nuclear

l^V*

I

!

in,plicIL"““'"’’

A

**'
'

'

the social burden of

is ilislribiileil

n

.

is

misguided

is

lo

lechnoerals in Ihc case of a
high-

that in Ibis case, 'unlike
the i|ueslion

of

automobile carburetor, consensus
cannot necessarily he reached
on Ihc

basis ol cxisling technical standards
or practice."’^'’ Because of
this technical uncertainly,

technical debates

unresolved.

become

Kor instance,

became such an

lor

it

is

not terribly surprising to
imagine

ardent tidvocalc of developing

lenncssec had determined
solution than

proxies for debates about underlying
yaltie conllicts that go

MRS.

that

decision no

facility thus offers a lc.s.son lo those

arbitrary.

arbitrary than might

At worst, Ihc procedure

Writing before the 1987 amendments

to

NWPA

Jacob, Site Unseen, 124.

iSV/c'

who

suggest

utilized yielded a

have otherwise been the case.

lAithcr Carter suggests another lesson to be

Jacob,

far belter technical

Jacob’s critique of technocratic tillcrnalivcs
lo Ihc process utilized

Yucca Mountain was

more

Sen. Johnston

technologies, while legislators from

permanent, geologic disposal was a

choosing a high-level nuclear waslc

the choice ol

MRS

how

Lhiseen, 125.
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drawn from

this site selection process.

were enacted, Carter argued

that

NWPA

had delegated too much discretion

problem

in the future, legislators

to

DOE.

He

argues that

in

tackling similar policy

would be wise,

keep the geographic scope ami
procedural complexities of
the site
To seek a distribution of potential
reposiloi-y
sites over several regions
is more likely to
spread the misery than to
promote a sense of equity and fairness.
The elaborate,
to

search within modest limits.

long-drawn-out site
screening process which the waste
act explicitly and implicitly
prescribes
amounts to a cruelly demanding political
marathon.^^®
Carter

to as

correct to assert that, as general
rules. Congress ought to
want to limit a search

is

few regions as possible and Congress
ought

to

keep the process as simple as

But his view seems to express a lack
of appreciation of how

possible.

simplifying maneuvers are.
site

want

to

choice cited earlier

emerged

in the late

is

In short,

difficult those

Douglas Arnold’s view of high-level
nuclear waste

the best response to Carter.

1970s as the leading candidate,

accept this seemingly obvious solution.

That

it

it

Even though the Nevada

still

site

took legislators a decade to

look so long

is

the result of the

importance of the geographic concentration of costs
and the opportunities the moment
political

time offered.

only one

A
many

site

needed

final

That

it

was resolved

in the

way

it

was

is

a result of the fact that

to incur the costs.

normative conclusion seems

observers of high-level nuclear waste

in

order given the rather negative view that

site selection

have taken.

Practitioners and

observers of this process alike frequently assert that Congress mistakenly
allowed
“politics” to seep into the process of site selection and that Congress

handling such issues objectively. For instance, Gerald Jacob

while everyone can
engineering

is

appreciate

that

a

is

incapable of

asserts,

complex, highly sophisticated

required to safely store nuclear materials for thousands of

Carter, Nuclear Imperatives

and Public

Trust, 415.
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strategy for nuclear waste

been developed

management have

not

While Congress' eho.ce of Yueea
Mounta.n may have taken some
t.me and .nay have
been short of elegance, it does
sewe to remind us that legislators
need
not wait w,th bated

breath for social scienhsts to
develop

problems. They appear

to

new

inst.tutional solut.ons to
these types

of pohcy

be quite capable of developing
and implementing them on

own.

Jacob, Site Unseen, 164.

168

the.r

CHAPTER

6

NAFTA

The

pursuit of free trade
presents a policy problem

discussed in the previous
chapters.
trade ban-iers promotes

find

difficult to

it

Whtle

ve^

similar to the problents

virtually all economists
agree that lowering

economic growth and reduces
prices

for

consumers, legislators

avoid the allure of particularisttc
protectionism

procedural restraint. Despite this
collective action problem,
however,

dechned over the past

in

the absence of

tariffs

have stead, ly

sixty years and other non-tar,
ff barriers have been
reduced a, times

as well.

Th,s changed pattern

in

trade policy^"

procedural context in which trade policy
this

study has been concerned,

procedures are used and why.

we

is

made

is

largely the result of the
changed

and, as in the other cases with
which

are interested in examining
precisely what kinds of

This chapter will examine the
adoption of the North

American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
the
employed by Congress

NAFTA

reduced

tariffs

to gain additional leverage

on the question of procedural choice.

and other non-tariff barriers

Canada, and Mexico effectively creating a

Tax Reform Act of 1986,

NAFTA

freer

so-called “fast track” procedure

in trade

between the United

North American trading zone.

States,

Like the

presents a policy problem in which Congress

seeking to impose relatively geographically dispersed particularistic
costs

in

a relatively

337

‘

true that while legislators no longer seek to protect domestic
industries by setting individual tariff
they have employed other policy tools to provide relief from foreign competition.
Nevertheless, the

It IS

rates,

move from

the setting of tariff schedules to what Pietro Nivola has called “procedural
protectionism”

significant policy

change worthy of examination.
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is

is

a

broad pobcy area.
allowed then,
did so

In the

case of tax refonn.

overcome the

to

sens.t.ve

iha, legislators

chose proccdttres

collective act.on problem
with,,, the tns.itut.on.

was expected both because

geographically

we saw

allowed leg.slators

it

particulanstic

tax

understandably reluctant to
delegate authority
virtually eve^. other policy
area.

While

That they

to systemat.cally
protect the

benefits

and

because

legislators

m a policy area that cuts across and

NAFTA

presents the

.ha,

more
were

impacts

same type of policy

problem, the conventional
understanding of the enactment
of this international agreement
ts that legislators

the president

because of

NAFTA

-

- an

its

were able

to

institution

reduce trade barriers because
they delegated authonty

which

is

national constituency.

a case veor s.m.lar in

its

understood to have more

So why did

what delegation there was, was the
w.th foreign powers.

But

in

liberal trade preferences

legislators delegate in the
ease

characteristics to tax refonn?

extent to which legislators delegated
in the case of

result

making

of the

this case,

it

NAFTA

fact that

is first

to

We

of

will see that the

has been overstated and that

NAFTA

required negotiation

necessary to briefly review the

history of trade policy in the United
States.

A

—789-1930. Among the
the Constitution are the

to regulate

powers

commerce with

wholly dependent

Brief History of Trade Policy

first

powers granted

to “lay

Congress

and collect taxes,

foreign nations.”

in the early

to

in Article

duties, imposts

I

Section 8 of

and excises” and

Because the generation of revenue was

days of the republic on these types of taxes,
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it

is

not

suT,rising ,ha, ,he

f.rs.

law enacted by Congress
was a

tariff b, II

Front that point on,

along with slavery, the issue
of the tanff becante tbe most
important and controversial
political issue for

more than a

And

century.

tanff policy was considered
a domestic

development and

to raise revenue.

were fought mainly along

niatter.

And

most of that time,

for

Tariffs

throughout the

sectional lines.

The

rural

dependent on imported goods than the
north and

benented from proteet.omsm. Not
surprisingly,
the Democratic Party had

Party

was more

somewhat more

protectionist.

in control

lost control

in the

9»'
1

and

was northern

at the turn

in

of the century,

was hard

to gain control

to achieve.

in the

couple of months

That

enacted with Democrats and Progressives

Sharyn O’Halloran,

Michigan Press, 1994),
Michael

J.

Gilligan,

in

in the House,""^

Politics. Process,
2.

The law was

White House, the

later,

in the

the

bill -

the

bills,

high

Democrats

4,

1789,

1

was

White

University of

Stat. 24.

Reciprocity’, Delegation,
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1913,

and not surprisingly, the use of what was

Duty Act of July

Exporters, 66.

only one of

Underwood Act of

ami American Trade Policy (Ann Arbor, Ml: The

the

Empowering Exporters:

Empowering

1894,

In

control of the Congress and the

Trade Policy (Ann Arbor, Ml; The University of Michigan
Gilligan,

of the

1896, they lost the Senate and the presidency.""
Indeed,

substantial tariff reduction.

House, a weakened Speaker

was more

this nteant that

modestly but only made a small dent

A

industrial

industries that primarily

period between 1890 and 1930, Congress enacted
7 major trade

which enacted

promote

preferences and the Republican

liberalization

by the McKinley Act of 1890.

of the House and,

to

important to note,

less industrial south

of Congress, and President Cleveland
tariffs

is

century, battles over the tariff

But even when Democrats were able

Wilson-Gomian Act reduced
tariffs instituted

were enacted

liberal trade

House, the Senate, and the presidency, trade
with Democrats

it

it

and

Press, 1997), 64.

Collective Action in American

‘essentially a closed

rule-‘ on the House

for part.cularistic
protect.onism run

The penod ended with

floor.

amok

-

the

Smoot-Hawley

tar.ff

the poster ch.ld

of 1930 which

increased duties on over 25,000
specified commodities.^^^
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p

policy

New

The

in virtually

Deal changed both the fonn and
the substance of American

every policy area, and trade
policy was no exception. The
signal

event of change in trade policy
was the enactment of the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements

Act of 1934 (RTAA). Whtle the
Democrats took control of the
Congress and the White

House because of

the profound

economic consequences of the
Depression, perhaps no

piece of legislation better represented
the failed Republican response
to the economic

calamity than Smoot-Hawley.

Among the

incumbents

who were

not returned to Congress

were the authors of Smoot-Hawley, Senator
Reed Smoot (R-UT) and Representative
Wilhs Hawley (R-OR).“* When
note and the

commit

RTAA

was

the result.

the nation to reciprocal

president’s

power was

legislators

The

pay

RTAA

that ultimate price, other legislators
take

gave the president power

trade agreements

by executive proclamation.

limited in that the delegation of authority

3 years), the president could only reduce

tariffs

by up

to

to

50 percent from 1934

Gilligan,

Empowering Exporters,

™ O’Halloran,
338

RTAA stands as a striking example of congressional

most observers who view the

Politics. Process,

Smoot was defeated

RTAA

lists.^^^

levels,

The

and

Despite these

delegation. Contrary

as a sharp departure from trade policy procedures

1.

and American Trade

in the general election

and

was not pemianent (only

the president could not transfer items between the
dutiable and free
limitations, the

to negotiate

Policy, fn2 p2-3.

and Hawley

failed to

even secure

O’Halloran, Politics. Process, and American Trade Policy, 85-86.
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his party’s nomination.

of the

past,

delegating

Shan^ O’Halloran
authonty

to

the

argues there

was “a long

executive branch

Nevertheless, O’Halloran concedes
that while
trade policy,” the

The

RTAA was “a great

results

of the

RTAA

it

to

tradition in U.S. trade
policy

negotiate

program are well known. Between
1934 and 1945, the

reduce rates by an additional
50 percent

Congress also renewed

1954, 1955, and 1958."'

legislators

to previous

leap forward.

1937, 1940, and 1943, and Congress
acted

rates.

concess.ons”

was “not wholly unconnected

United States entered into
agreements with 28 countries with

1934

reciprocal

of

m

1945

permitting a

-

RTAA

RTAA

being renewed

in

to give the president
authority to

total

reduction of 75 percent from

authority ,n 1947, 1948,
1949, 1951, 1953,

The frequency of

these renewals suggests two
points.

First,

found their new role as supervisor of
an executive setting rates more
appealing

than setting the tariff rates themselves.

Second, despite the

fact

that

consistently renewed, the short terms
suggest the short leash on which

Congress hoped

to

keep the president.

RTAA

members of

O’Halloran argues renewals of the president’s

negotiating authority,

were anything but automatic.
In many instances, as in the one-year
extensions of authority in 1947, 1953, and
1954, Congress strongly
contested the president’s use of his discretionary authority.
When imports
threatened sensitive domestic industries. Congress introduced
new fomis
relief (the escape clause and the peril point provision)
to protect

of import

disaffected constituents. At each turn, the authorizing
legislation showed
the effects of partisan conflict and a willingness on the part
of legislators
to design

complex procedures

was

that protected specific industries.^"^^

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, ami American Trade Policy, 108.

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 87-92
O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 108.
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The resulung

War and
around

.rend ,n (ar.ffs

New

the

was

While

,n

,he per.od between ,he

Cvil

Deal, the ra.to of total tariff
reeeipts to total du.iahle
nnports had been

.4 to .5, the ratio

declined steadily after the
enactment of

throughout the 1950s and 1960s
In

also easy ,o spc.

1962, President

The Congress gave

at

RTAA

and hovered

about

Kennedy asked

for

and reeeived new negotiating
authority.

the president broad powers to
pursue tariff reductions and

some of the impediments

to trade negotiations

injured industries rather than exempting

authority set the stage for the

first

removed

by providing avenues of compensation

them from coverage.

This

new

multilateral trade negotiations
under

for

negotiating

GATT

-

a

negotiating round that reduced average duties
by about 35 percent. But conflict broke
out

between the Johnson administration and the
Congress over whether
barriers should be part of the trade talks.''^^

president’s negotiating authority

conferred in

19 74

1

-

1988.

remained unresolved and the

a victim of the impasse.

The 1974 Trade Reform Act marked

policy.

By

the end of the

had become increasingly clear

are defined

Kennedy

that tariffs

Instead, non-tariff barriers

tariff barriers

conflict

962 lapsed, no new authority was granted over

American trade

trade.

became

The

-

non-tariff trade

When

the next several years.

a dramatic procedural shift in

Johnson round of tariff reductions,

no longer presented the major

were the concern and

by what they are not

the authority

this

it

threat to free

posed a new challenge. Non-

rather than

what they are and

that

observation suggests a problem with breaking them down. Because the category contains
a

wide variety of trade

Gilligan,

Empowering

practices, delegating authority to the president to unilaterally

Exporters, 1-2.

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 95-96.
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reduce these barriers would
be

far too

wide a delegation of power.
Moreover,

discussed in pnor chapters,
the early 1970s were
no, a period
history in

which

As

president.

Icgtslaiors

were

in

as

we have

Amcr.can poUhcal

particularly inclined to
delegate addit.onal

power

to the

a result, since 1974,
though non-tariff burners
have been the subject of

international trade negotiations,
presidents

have been unable

trade agreements without
congressional approval.

to enter into intentational

The Trade Refonn Act gave

b.rth to

the so-called “fast track”
procedure in which Congress
would have to approve any
international trade agreement
before

have
for

to consider the

Special

ways

that

Congress also gave

we

Representative

Representative (USTR).

USTR would

became binding

agreement under expedited

any amendments.

variety of

it

but, in return.

legislative procedures that
did not allow

itself a greater role in trade
negotiations in a

will discuss in greater detail
later

for

Trade

Negotiations

In addition to

Congress would

to

and created the Office of the

be headed

by the U.S.

Trade

conducting negotiations with trade
partners, the

investigate alleged unfair trade practices
such as foreign import restrictions,

export subsidies, and dumping, and section
301 of the Act authorized the president
to
unilaterally retaliate against these practices.

The 1974 Act paved
Congress acted

to

extension of the

the

new

track authority within

Chadha

Tokyo round of GATT

negotiations and

in 1979, they also enacted a slightly

trade procedures for 8 years.

In 1984, Congress again

Ways and Means and Finance Committees

60 days

enter into trade negotiations.

the

for the

approve the agreement

these procedures allowing the

wake of

way

after the president notified

to bolster its

which had taken away Congress’ power
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modified

amended

revoke

fast

Congress of his intention

Moreover, Congress took steps

decision,

to

when

power

to

in the

to unilaterally

Ihc presulcm u, .caluUc
agains, unfair Marie
pniciccs.

Cong, css lespunrlal by

shilling Ihc aulhoiily l„ iuiiialc
unfair Irarlc pracliccs cases
lo Ihc

<’l

when Congress

l»8H.

In

nn arldihonal 2 years

US

I

k.

cxlcn.lcl fasi Hack aiilhorily
for 3 ,„orc years will,
Ihc

if neilhcr

house

pa,s,sc.l

a disapproval resoluliou.

Congress

look holh of die l-«4 provisions
slrenglheniug Congress’ role a
slep fnriher by adding a
so-called ••reverse

fasI

track” procedure ,n which
Congress could revoke

milhorily hy passing a rlisapproval
resohilion in boll, houses williin
any

hy iransferring

lo Ihe U.SI

R (from

(,()

track

fast

day period and

Ihe presirlenll the aulhorily
,o uudalerally relahale

against imrair trade practices.

Ihc 19X8 law put

NAM A
been

in

place the (Inal piece of the procedural
context

would he negotiated and eventually approved.

brief,

it

While

in

this historical tour

has served to highlight an important point
that will be emphasi/.ed

coming pages.

The standard

interpretation that

American

which

trade policy has

in

Mas

the

become

increasingly liberalized as a result of congressional
abdication of authority during the 60

years prior to the enactment ofNAI"l'A

procedures by which

implemented are
C

ongress than

pioeeduies

m

is

far

international

simplistic at best and inaccurate at worst.

trade

We

understood.

detail later, but

collective action problem C ongress

(list,

is

it

I'Me

agreements are negotiated, aiiproved, and

more complicated and provide

commonly

moie

is

is

will

far

more procedural power

examine

to

the complexity o( these

uselul to take a ste|i back and understand the

seeking to resolve with these complex procedures

in the first place.
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s

Tlic l»i-ohlcm

The p,ohlcn.

,,l

ami

by bade policy

p„se.l

,s

reduces pr.ees lor consu.bcrs
by chnbna.ing
are usually passed on to
eonsun.crs.
r>ncl

one

all like to

|.>ec t,a.lc also

wouki be

harriers

but

which

in

lor protlueers.

thcr

inee bade

to produce,

encourages greater co,npet,t,on

in their districts front

no sutgle legislator can protect
the uulustries

nation

and olhcr nou-lari ff costs

be assoeialed with the benelits
of

protect the particular utduslrics
based

coliccttvc logroll in

,ha, ,s no, nnlanniia.
U, ns.

lar.lTs

,„novat,o,t by leveling the
playing Held

Congress would

T.n,l,.

Of

course, ntentbers of

IVce trade but

wouUI

lorcigu con,pctit,on.

district

on

their

own, the

like to

Bceattse

result ,s a

univcrsalistic protcctionisnt
tritnuphs over free Itade.

collectively belter off with
reciprocal

members of Congress have

individual

I

bade agreements leducing
iucenlives

that

are

he

tra.Ie

collectively

destructive.

Pohlieal economists have long been
aware that collective action problems arc
a

key feature of normal trade

politics.

While Maneur Olson published

the sources of collective action problems

himself outlined the implications of
Rise

and Decline of Nations,

(jilligan

in

l%5, Michael

his seminal study „,,

(iilligan points out that

his theory for trade politics in his

summarizes the

1U82 work, rhe

logic.

Since import competing industries form a much
smaller group than
consumers do they have much less stringent collective action
problems
and can more readily take political action. I'urlhermore,
producer

groups
can sometimes provide selective incentives such as closed
shops or
professional licensing requirements that consumer groups cannot.
As such
there

.145

(iilligan.

is

a bias in the political system in favor of protectionism.

Empowering

Exporler.s, 4.
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Olson

Following

will Ihcrcforc

the

argu,nom

this

have more

presidential

bias

,o ,.s logical encipo.m,
various scholars

liberal trade preferences
than

favor

in

of

free

trade

responsibilities associated w.th
the office.

security agenda, particularly

foreign powers.^'

have more

liberal

presidents are

any

site

-

more

While

dunng

this

(he

is

Congress.

the

,ha, prcsulcnis

Robert Haldwin argues

of the

result

foreign

Cold War by pronioltng closer economic

trade preferences than

policy

Presidents seek to advance
their nal.onal

argument has some ntent,

,t

is

more

members of Congress

likely to support base closures,
tax reform,

for high-level nuclear

poim ou,

waste disposal.

A

president

is

lies

w.th

likely that presidents

for the

same reason

and the ehoiee of

a site

-

one person representing

a

national constituency and therefore docs
not suffer from the collective action
problems
that

plague Congress.

The

natural

answer

members of Congress “tom between
demands of

then,

would appear

be delegation.

to

their free trade proclivities

Will,

and the protectionist

their constituents,”-’'''' the president is “in
a belter position to

weigh the

overall costs and benefits of protectionism.”’-"’
This theory conforms with our anecdotes

and observations of trade politics
legislation

for

NAFTA,

in action.

President

In

Clinton

pushing

even promised

Republican incumbents against Democratic challengers
supporting the agreement.

for the

who

passage of the enabling

to

defend congressional

attack

them

Recognizing the collective action problem

at

for their votes

work, Clinton

Robert Baldwin, “U.S. Trade Policies: The Role of the Fxecutive Branch” in Alan V. Deardorff and
Robert M. Stern, eds., Constituent Interests and U.S. Trade Policies (Ann Arbor, Ml: The University of

Michigan Press, 1998), 81-82.

Howard Wiarda, “The

U.S. Domestic Politics of the U.S. -Mexico Free Trade Agreement,”

Baer and Sidney Weintraub,
(Boulder,

eds..

CO: Lynne Rienner

The

NAFTA

in

M. Delal

Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade Issues

Publishers, Inc., 1994), 131.

O’l lalloran. Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 32.
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deelared, “I do not believe
that any

what

member of Con giess

should be defeated for doing

plainly in the national interest.

is

Why Study NAFTA?
The
course.

collective action problem described
above applies to any trade agreement
of

Studying the case of

NAFTA

proximity to the other cases examined

seems appropriate because of

in this

study but

NAFTA

attractive case for study because
there are several reasons

particularly difficult

taking

First,

taking

down

problem

down

was

“it

economic walls guarding
its

own

of how

least

countries
patterns

interest

painful

the

more
first

also a particularly

why NAFTA

presented a

legislators.

Mexico

fundamentally different than

is

industrialized trading partners.

time the United States had agreed

Congressional

to take

down

all

from a country whose economy was as poor and
as different

as Mexico’s.”''^

his assessment

The

it

minded

trade barriers with

trade barriers with

Quarterly pointed out,

from

for free trade

is

temporal

its

Timothy

MeKeown makes

the argument

more

directly in

groups impaet American trade policy.

and most valuable agreement

one between two

is

whose produetion is complementary, and whose consumption
create a large demand for the produets of the other country.

Increased competitive pressure on import-competing industries, such as
that faced by American lumber from Canadian imports or by
American

low wage manufacturing faces from Mexican imports,
adjustment costs and political opposition
President William

Pact” in

New

J.

Clinton quoted in

York Times (November

Gwen

13, 1993),

Ifill,

to

creates

economic

agreements.

“Clinton Extends an Unusual Offer to Republicans on

A2.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress ami the Nation. Volume IX, 1993-1996 (Washington D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly,

Timothy
P.

J.

1997), 153.

McKeown, “What

Marchildon, eds.. The

Westview

Inc.,

NAFTA

Forces Shape American Trade Policy?”
Puzzle: Political Parties

Press, 1994), 67.
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and Trade

in

in

Charles F. Doran and Gregory

North America (San Franciso:

McKeown
tough ease.

also points out a second
reason

He

argues, “evidence

is

why NAFTA

accumulating

that

represented a particularly

for

ftmts,

naltons, or the

tntemational system as a whole,
growth does create the polittcal
condiltons for trade

openness, whtle the lack of growth
does the opposite.””^ While the
American economy

was growing when

NAFTA,

the

legislators deetded to delegate
authortty to the president to
negotiate

American economy went

into

a recession while the pact
was being

negottated and this altered the
polittes of the negotiation.

O’Halloran points out that

because of the recession, a number
of industries were more sensitive
to import
competition.

The most vocal opposition

to the proposed free trade
agreement came
and vegetable producers, textile and apparel
manufacturers, auto
suppliers, and the steel industry, all of
whose products competed directly
with Mexican imports. This opposition
was even more difficult to ignore
in hard economic times.

trom

fruit

And

this

problem
Senate

leads to a third reason

for legislators.

m

Whereas

NAFTA

represented a particularly difficult

the Republicans had been the majority party
in the

1986 when Congress gave a Republican president

fast

track

authority to

negotiate a trade agreement with Canada, the Democrats
held majorities in both the

House and

the

Senate throughout the negotiation and approval of

importance of unions

and auto industries
represent meant that

35 ^

McKeown, “What

in the

in parts

NAFTA.

Democratic coalition and the importance of the

of the nation

NAFTA would

that

steel, textile,

Democratic members of Congress tend

face a particularly difficult path.

Forces Shape American Trade Policy?” 71.

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 159.
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The

to

Fourth, related to the prior point,
legislators are less likely to give authority
to a

president of a different party. O’Halloran
argues.
If a prineipal

could find a perfectly representative agent,
she could obtain
her ideal outcome by delegating completely
to the agent. One corollary to
this observation is that the greater
the difference in preferences between
the principal and the agent, the less authority
will be delegated. If we take
partisanship as a proxy for preferences, then
the implications for trade
policy are clear. Congress will delegate more
power to a president of the
same party than to a president of the opposing party.

McKeown

echoes

this

view arguing, “when the presidency

party, delegation is less likely, since the preferences

likely to

of

this

is

controlled

by an opposing

of the president on trade are more

be different than those of the party which controls Congress.”^^^
One example

dynamic

in action is the creation

of the reverse

fast track

procedure.

Democratic

congressional leaders were less than pleased with the level of consultation they had
been

accorded during the negotiation of the U.S.

responded by adding the reverse
allowed the Congress to revoke

fast track

-

Canadian Free Trade Agreement.^^^ They

provision for the negotiation of

fast track authority if

NAFTA

that

both houses of Congress enacted a

resolution with any 60-day period.

A

final

reason

collective action

NAFTA

was

problem associated with

that regulatory structures

be erected

reduced to such low levels under the

been

far

more

a

more focused on reducing

difficult

agreement

free trade is that

those

Because

tariffs

who promote

had been

free trade

non-tariff trade barriers in the past 25 years.

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 35.

McKeown, “What

any agreement would require

in a deregulatory era.

RTAA program,

to enact than the standard

Forces Shape American Trade Policy?” 72.

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 159-160.
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have

The

promotion of

free trade in the

that will monitor, investigate,

this

new emphasis.

however,

is

and

fight unfair trade practices

The enhanced powers and

competitors.

of

1980s and 1990s therefore requires regulatory
structures

that

it

roles

The importance of

of the

USTR

discussed above are the result

this regulatory

serves as yet another reason

undertaken by foreign

paradox

for our purposes,

why NAFTA was even more

difficult to

enact than the traditional collective action
theories would suggest. Pietro Nivola argues.

Not only did much regulation of foreign trade
practices take root amid a
policy dissensus; it expanded during a period
of growing awareness and
sophistication about the limitations of other economic
regulatory ventures.
While the U.S. government was policing more international
commerce, it
curtailed

its role in important sectors of the
domestic
as transportation, energy, and telecommunications.^^^

Given

all

of these

difficulties,

it

is

economy, areas such

not surprising that

NAFTA

contentious piece of trade legislation of the twentieth century.”^^*^
collective action problem,

NAFTA

was

became “the most

More

than a difficult

a trade agreement that required legislators to

delegate authority to a president from the opposing party to negotiate a
trade pact with a

neighbor whose economy was

agreement

that

far less industrialized

would regulate commerce during an

examining how reelection-minded
useful to

first

during a recession and

legislators

examine the provisions of

anti-regulatory

accomplished

NAFTA

this

era.

it

was an
Before

herculean task,

as enacted so that

we

Gilligan,

Empowering Exporters,

82.
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The Brookings

is

can better

understand where the process was headed.

Pietro S. Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade (Washington, D.C.:

it

Insitution, 1993), 15.

The Provisions of NAFTA
Before

first

we examine

the procedures utilized to enact

understand the provisions of

NAFTA

as

was

it

implementing legislation cleared the House on Nov.
20, 1993, and

was signed

major provisions of

into

NAFTA

Canada, and Mexico.

The

NAFTA,

finally enacted.

NAFTA

The

17, 1993, cleared the Senate

law by President Clinton on December

significantly liberalized trade

legislation

important to

is

it

8,

on Nov.

1993.^^'^

between the United

gave the president authority

States,

make

to

The

tariff

reductions specified in the agreement, lifted import
quota restrictions on a variety of

Mexican

agricultural

products,

and

liberalized

some U.S.

agricultural

standards.

Moreover, the agreement also liberalized U.S. government
procurement procedures

making some government
manufactured
the car

in

contracts available to

Canada or Mexico

was value added

in

Mexican bidders,

qualified automobiles

as domestically produced if 75 percent of the cost of

North America, and established trade dispute settlement

procedures.

While these major provisions of NAFTA effectively created a much
trade

between the United

States,

Mexico, and Canada, the

details

The

from floods of imports

had a few years

earlier.

in

legislation established

much

the

same way

NAFTA

the U.S.

-

The president was empowered

certain products if the International Trade

The

mechanisms

NAFTA

created a

to protect U.S. industries

Canada Free Trade Agreement
to

suspend

Commission determined

tariff reductions

on

the imports to be a

implementing legislation was PL 103-182.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation. Volume IX, 1993-1996, 159-161.

183

zone of

of the legislation also

contained a variety of provisions that restrain us from contending that

pure free trade zone.

freer

serious threat to a domestic industry.

mechanism
American

to protect the

transitional

still

had

to

legislation also included a special
expedited

American orange juice

agricultural standards

peanut butter

The

were relaxed, the standards

meet U.S. standards.

worker assistance

industry.

to

Moreover, while certain

for certain products such as

Finally, the legislation also
provided

workers hurt by

NAFTA,

codified side agreements

negotiated by the Clinton administration on labor
and the environment, authorized the

funding of a Center for the Study of Western
Hemispheric Trade, and authorized

Amencan

participation in the North

American Development Bank, a bank

that

would

fund border cleanup and economic development projects.
In the

coming pages, we

will outline a

number of other ways

in

which

NAFTA

is

not simply a case of legislators voting for free trade over
particularistic protectionism.

But the general theme of the major provisions of NAFTA should not be

lost.

NAFTA did

create a significantly liberalized trading zone between the U.S., Canada,
and Mexico.

Legislators

who, according

to the

worried that constituents would

textbook understanding of legislative behavior, were

fail to

notice the benefits of

NAFTA

those benefits with their vote, indeed did vote to liberalize trade.
in the other cases

with which

allowed Congress to overcome

many

fail

How? As we

to connect

have seen

this study is concerned, specialized legislative procedures

this collective action

Procedures as

In her

and

examination of how trade policy

is

problem.

Key
made, Sharyn O’Halloran suggests

that

students of trade policy emphasize the ways in which interest groups seek favorable
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treatment while others focus on the
role played by executive agencies.

Of this

scholarhip,

O’Halloran points out,
each of these approaches certainly captures
an important element of how
policy IS made, but before they can be
effectively evaluated, we must first
ask: What procedures define the
decision-making process, and what effect
do they have on public policy? The choice of
institutions is a political one
and is crucial to determining outcomes.

Few

political scientists

would dispute O’Halloran’s argument but

there remains a great

deal of misunderstanding about the nature of
the procedures used in the case of

and the degree

to

which those procedures delegate authority

to the executive.

As we have

discussed, most scholars view trade policy as a case
where Congress recognizes
institutional

shortcomings in dealing with a

delegates authority to presidents

general interest.

As we

theoretical question,

it

procedure adopted for

by most

who

are

will see, this

is

useful to

NAFTA

more

view

first

difficult

collective action

likely to

make

is far

in

its

own

problem and

policy consistent with the

too simplistic but before tackling that

review some of the details of the

and the way

NAFTA

which

this

fast track

procedure has been understood

scholars.

The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988^^^ authorized
to negotiate bilateral

and multilateral trade agreements

that

the president

would be submitted

for

congressional approval under expedited procedures that would guarantee an up-or-down

vote without amendments.

extension of

House

The law

fast track authority that

also allowed the president to request a 2-year

would be automatically granted unless

or the Senate adopted a resolution of disapproval.

O’Halloran. Politics, Process, ami American Trade Policy,

The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
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is

ix.

PL

100-418.

either the

Most observers have viewed

this

track

fast

procedure

abdication of authority and the best example
of this view

the

,s

as

a

congressional

work of

I.M. Destler.

Writing in 1998, Destler argues,
for the great majority

concern,

it

sufficient

is

important in one

and

to whom trade is but an occasional
advocate the cause of constituent groups

of members
to

and the national extensions of these groups,
which appeal to one’s support
For most members in most instances, it is simply
not costs district -

to strike general trade policy postures

coalitions.

effective to strive for direct, significant personal
influence over trade

policy outcomes.

Mayhew

points

Nor
to

such influence necessary to the member.
activities
typical
of re-election seeking

is

three

Representatives: advertising, position-taking, and credit-claiming.
of these requires actual impact on policy.^“
It is

to

particularly appropriate that Destler links his

Mayhew

the

view of American trade policymaking

since the larger study of which this chapter

Mayhewian model of

Destler’s view of

how

legislative behavior offered

trade policy

is

None

made under

is

a part

is

linked to the critique of

by Douglas Arnold.

fast track is clear.

In

any case,

Presidents and

executive agencies dominate the process and legislators abdicate their authority
seeking

only symbolic victories. Before Congress gave away
argues, industries seeking protection had to

Now, they must seek
them, of course:

it

to

power

Legislation

rules, set priorities,

action)

easier

or

in this policy area, Destler

Congress for assistance.

that action elsewhere.

can establish

export-market-opening

come

its

still

members and

their staffs take very seriously.

to

relief (or

And

obtain.

matter to Congress: representing them

members’ hands regarding
trade measures. So if it is

matters to

make import

harder

constituencies

still

is

something

But Congress has

tied

their ability to legislate constituency-specific
effective, product-specific trade policy action

these constituents want, they are unlikely to get

it

on Capitol

Hill.

Non-

binding resolutions backing semiconductor makers in their fight for

Japanese markets? Certainly. Textile quota

bills for the President to

veto?

I.M. Destler, “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy” in Deardorff and Stem, eds..

Constituent Interests

and

U.S. Trade Policies, 98.
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Of course. Advice on who
something real? Not

to talk to at

USTR

Whtle Destler’s view of congressional
authority
fails to

allow

or

Commerce? Sure

in trade policy is

recognize the vanety of subtle and
not-so-subtle ways that

members of Congress

to influence the process.

particular procedure utilized to enact

One

NAFTA

A

more

It is

commonplace,

fast track

procedures

NAFTA reinforces this view.
is

the fact that

as a congressional-executive agreement
rather than

a little-mentioned fact that

NAFTA was passed by the

Senate by a vote of

61-38, several votes short of the two-thirds vote
necessary to approve a treaty.
observation, Bruce

it

detailed look at the

aspect of this procedure that has received
scant attention

was negotiated and adopted

as a treaty.

But

likely.^^*^

Of

this

Ackerman and David Golove ask

whatever happened to the Treaty Clause? No less puzzling
obvious question was never raised during the long
hard

NAFTA. The

opponents were grimly determined

is

why

battle

this

over

to gain victory at all

They could well have mustered

costs.

the thirty-four Senators needed to
had been treated as a treaty rather than a congressionalexecutive agreement. And yet the obvious questions were left unasked.

NAFTA if

defeat

it

Ackerman and Golove review

the history of the evolution of the process

by which

Congress and the president negotiate and approve international agreements but

argument

is

was nothing

important for our purposes because they

make

their

the important point that there

inevitable about the evolution of this procedure.

The

Constitution, they

argue, puts in place three distinct legislative systems; law-making, treaty approval, and

Destler, “Congress, Constituencies,

and U.S. Trade Policy,” 95.

Bruce Ackerman and David Golove,

Is

NAFTA

Constitutional? (Cambridge,

Press, 1995), 1-2.
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the process for constitutional

amendments. The existence of these three

distinct systems,

however, begs the question of interchangeability.

To what degree could statute-making

substitute for treaty- writing, and vice
The Supremacy Clause provides part of an
answer by stipulating
that a treaty could serve as the “law
of the land” and take immediate effect
as a federal law.
But the text is not equally clear about the

versa?

opposite

relationship.

Could

a majority of both Houses, in the
exercise of its
statute-making powers, approve international
agreements? The Treaty

Clause does not say Yes or No, and so
constitutionalists are
construe the sounds of silence.^*'^

The point

is

relevant to our discussion because

answer has become a clear

yes.

During and

after

is

it

to

left

only relatively recently that the

World War

II,

infomial precedents were

allowed for the interchangeability of the statute-making and
treaty processes

set that

for

international agreements despite the failure of parallel
efforts to adopt a constitutional

amendment

explicitly authorizing this interchangeability.

The Trade Act of 1974

further

codified the process grafting fast track procedures onto the
congressional-executive

agreement process.

Seen

in this light,

fast track

procedures are an enhancement of congressional

capacity and authority rather than an abdication of power as Destler claims.

had been considered as a
senators

would have been able

offers legislators

no surprise
fast

treaty, for instance,

it

is

NAFTA

highly plausible that a minority of

to kill the agreement.

no formal opportunity

If

And because

the treaty procedure

to influence the treaty in its formative stages,

that treaty approval debates are so contentious.

In contrast, as

we

it

is

will see,

track procedures encourage and facilitate congressional input in the negotiating

stages while simultaneously

Ackerman and Golove,

Is

empowering

NAFTA

majorities in both houses at the expense of a

Constitutional?,

8.
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,

minority

m

the Senate.

Ackerman and Golove’s

In

tenns, “the classic constitutional

procedure not only generates unnecessary
disaffection abroad but encourages
obfuscation
at

home.

The Trade Act

strikes

at

encourages interbranch consultation

The notion

that

these practices, but succeeds only
because

at the

it

policy fomiulation stage.”^^’^

members of Congress simply throw up

their

arms and delegate

authority to the executive to dominate trade
policy isn’t even logically consistent.

Michael Gilligan asks tough questions of those
to

get

who

believe Congress delegates authority

around the collective action problem associated
with trade policy

that

are

particularly relevant to this study. First,

if

Congress was unable

to

liberalize trade policy itself,
institutional

delegation
pressures.

change
could

resist

constituency pressures in

why was

able to resist

it

that led to liberalization?

any

in

way

Congress was

faced

is

them

to

make an
how

also hard to see

Congress

insulate

still

It

order to

from

constituency
with periodic renewals of the

president’s delegated authority.^^’^

Second, and more importantly for the purposes of

was

the source of the problem

why

did Congress choose delegation rather than one of

several other institutional innovations that also

question reads as

this question,

overcome

if Gilligan

of course,

is

had read the
that

Is

NAFTA

Empowering Exporters,

5.

Gilligan,

Empowering

5.

Exporters,

earlier chapter

This

on tax reform.
in the

latter

The answer

to

NAFTA

to

case of

Rather, Congress delegated authority to the

Constitutional? 105.

Gilligan,

would have cured

Congress did not delegate

a collective action problem.

Ackerman and Golove,

this study, “if a universalistic logroll
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president because the nature of the policy
problem, unlike the case of tax reform,
required
that

someone

negotiate with a foreign power.

Indeed,

when we look

see a variety of

made

ways

which

legislators restricted the authority that

sure that their preferences

number of the more
result

in

closely at the fast track procedure utilized
for

would be taken

restrictive provisions

into account in

adopted for the

NAFTA

NAFTA, we

was delegated and

any agreement.

A

negotiations, were the

of congressional displeasure with the president’s handling
of previously delegated

authority.

For instance,

in the

1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988,

the law that put the fast track procedures for

super 301

amendments

NAFTA

that transferred authority to

trade practices from the president to the

USTR,

in place,

Congress added so-called

conduct investigations into unfair

required the

USTR

to provide

Congress

with reports on countries engaged in unfair trade practices, and required
mandatory trade
retaliation if a country

was found

to

be engaging

in unfair trade practices.

But what are the procedures by which Congress maintains control over trade
policy while delegating authority to the president to negotiate trade deals?
aspect of fast track that gives Congress authority

agreement requires positive congressional action
forces legislators to

legislators find

it

make

is

the

fact

that

The obvious

an international

in order to take effect.

Because

a binary choice between an agreement and no agreement,

easier to justify a vote for free trade over protectionism.

Pietro Nivola

argues.

The assumption
Congress

that the

American

trade policy process suffers

presented with a polarizing choice

is

administration defending a regime of liberal trade

debating
quite

its

is

most lawmakers are not anxious

may wind up

190

to

whenever

questionable.

An

better off

The reason is
restore outmoded

dissidents than trying too hard to co-opt them.

simple:

this

protectionism.

They remain conscious that a reprise of the Smoot-Hawley
syndrome would constitute, in the words of Senator John
C. Danforth,
“an

of gross stupidity.”^^°

act

But the

down

fast track

process offers legislators far more control than a mere
up-or-

vote on an agreement negotiated by the president. Though

frequently pointed out by scholars

who view

fast

track

dominance, Congress retained several other formal tools
First,

though Congress delegated

the president

nation.

is

at its

as

it

is

a

not well-known nor

disposal to derail

required to notify Congress before entering into negotiations with
any

Within the next 60 days,

revoked.

if either the

The president

is,

of course,

whenever he wants. But those negotiations

House Ways and Means or

free to negotiate

are unlikely to

be

agreed to vote on an agreement without amendments.
instituted a

one-committee

does not exercise

at

this option.

Congress

still

retains the option

is

legislative veto

-

fast

fast track authority

fruitful if

Congress has not

Effectively then. Congress

Assuming Congress

of stopping the negotiations
procedure.

If

both the

full

the full Senate pass a disapproval resolution within any 60-day period, fast

track authority

discussed

fast track

the Senate

with whomever he wants,

legislative veto over trade negotiations.

any point through use of the so-called “reverse”

House and

NAFTA.

fast track negotiating authority to the president in
1988,

Finance Committee passes a resolution disapproving the negotiations,
is

of presidential

tool

earlier,

revoked.

These reverse

fast track

a two-house legislative veto

-

over

procedures thus constitute a second

fast track negotiations.

Finally, as

even though Congress provided for an automatic two-year extension of

track authority in the authorizing legislation, that two-year extension could be

revoked

if either

house of Congress voted a simple resolution disapproving of the

^™Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, 149.
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extension within a 90-day period once the
president requested the extension.
Effectively,
this

would provide a

Congress could use

third legislative veto

this

-

time a one-house veto

-

that

members of

to kill the negotiations altogether.

These formal procedures

that

members of Congress could use

to pressure the

administration were supplemented with procedural
requirements that would provide

members of Congress with an
president

a

list

was

insider’s

view of the negotiations as they proceeded.
The

required, for instance, to provide the International
Trade

of articles

to

be diseussed

in negotiations

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
committees

on issues

that

that

might affect their particular

Finally,

was

negotiated.

The

also created a host of private sector advisory

would advise negotiators and

significant reporting requirements

committees.

before any agreement

Commission with

attend negotiating sessions to keep an eye

industries.

on both the

USTR

members of Congress ensured

negotiating sessions by allowing the Speaker of the

In addition,

Congress

instituted

and these private sector advisory
their

own

House and

physical presence

the

at

president of the

Senate to appoint congressional delegates to the negotiations.

The purpose of all

these requirements

is clear.

As O’Halloran

describes

it,

procedures created,

an

elaborate

“fire-alarm”

mechanism

oversight

that

incorporates

the

private sector, government agencies, and even congressional committees
in

developing international trade agreements.

two purposes.

First,

groups sensitive

agreement are given an opportunity
compensation.

These consultations serve

to or threatened

to express their

by

the proposed

concerns and seek

Second, negotiators learn from these consultations which

are the industries that, if ignored,

may

lobby members of Congress to veto

any eventual agreement.^^'

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 144-145.
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these

A

number of less formal aiTangements

trade policy.

First,

even though Congress

members of Congress

also allow

impact

required under fast track procedures to vote

is

up-or-down without amendments within 90 days on the agreement
president, the

to

as negotiated

by the

House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees do hold mock

mark-up sessions on the implementing
legislators to not only learn

legislation,

more about what

is in

and

this

provides an opportunity for

the agreement but to also strike side

deals with the administration in return for their support.

It

was

at this

point in the

process, for instance, that the Clinton administration agreed to add worker retraining

money to

the

NAFTA implementing bill.^^^

All of these procedural requirements add up to real congressional influence over
trade negotiations without allowing legislators’ protectionist proclivities to run rampant.

President

Mexico

Bush expressed

in

his intention to negotiate a trade

September 1990, and

extension of

fast track

authority that

Congress voted a simple resolution

on a resolution
viewed

as a

resolution

in

May

that

to

meant he would need the automatic two-year

would expire

in

NAFTA.

by a vote of 192-231 and

May

1991

if either

house of

deny the extension. Each house had a tough debate

1991 in which the vote to extend

referendum on

agreement with Canada and

And

fast track authority

was widely

while the House rejected the disapproval

the Senate rejected the disapproval resolution

by a

vote of 36-59,^^^ the episode demonstrated the importance of the procedural hurdle in

ensuring congressional influence.
opportunity of the renewal of

O’Halloran points out

fast track to

ensure that

that the

many of

Congress “took the

the

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume IX, 1993-1996, 157.
Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

193

VIII,

1989-1992, 189.

most controversial

issues

the

-

the environment, labor concerns,
and workers’ rights

authorizing legislation.”’’^

-

were written

directly into

Specincally, the Congress insisted on
a variety of

safeguard and transition provisions that
would reduce barriers slowly and provide
for the
restoration

damage.

of barriers with escape clauses

The

more than 50

president

percent.

was

if

domestic industries faced significant

also forced to agree to a domestic-content
rule for cars of

Finally,

the president also

vowed, “not

to

negotiate lower

standards than were currently in the law in the
areas of pesticides, energy conservation,
toxic waste, and health and safety.

While

O’Halloran

understanding of

how

eorrectly

trade policy

is

criticizes

made,

it

dominant

the

is

presidency-centered

important to note that

many

other

observers also seem to recognize the greater role played by
Congress as a result of
track procedures.

Because many of these authors tend

to

fast

view presidential dominance of

trade policy not only as a fact, but as a good, their take on
this effect of fast track

procedures

is

decidedly different.

But

it

unmistakably the same view of congressional

is

influence. Robert Baldwin, for instance, complains that,

one consequence of the new implementing procedures is that members of
Congress and various special interests have become involved in the
negotiations at a micro-management level.
Under the threat of the
rejection of the agreement by Congress, administration officials have
sometimes been pressured into negotiating detailed provisions that favor a
particular interest group at the welfare cost of the general public.

Similarly,

374

Ackerman and Golove argue

that

under

fast track

9

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 161-162.
O’Halloran, Politics, Process,

and American Trade

Policy, 163.

Baldwin, “U.S. Trade Policies...,” 79.
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procedures,

no longer can
an

legislators escape their moment
of truth, yet both Senators
Representatives are given many
opportunities to voice their concerns

advileTe

^lmd -

Michael Gilhgan takes
legislators delegate

this

'heir

argument a step further by suggesting

authonty

in the first

place

is

that the

only reason

because they are seeking to
reduce

foreign trade barriers and this requires
the assistance of an executive

O

Finally,

Halloran views fast track procedures
as an explicit attempt “to ensure
that the actions

taken by the president are in line with
legislators’ preferences ””> In
defending this view,

O’Halloran points out

that,

do not go as far as congressional dominance
theorists in insisting that
Congress always gets its way; after all, one central
reason for delegating
I

authority

is

passed on

its

make

to

authority to regulate
this area is

policy different from what Congress would
have
I do recognize that
Congress has the constitutional

own. But

eommerce, and therefore any executive authority

Procedural Choice and

We

in

delegated authority and should be analyzed as such.^^^

have seen

in

NAFTA

the preeeding section that the subtle details of
fast track

procedures and the extent to which those procedures allow for
congressional influence

in

trade negotiations have been under-appreciated. Both of
these points speak directly to the
central question with

which

this study is concerned.

particular procedures they choose in attempting to

Ackerman and Golove,
378

Is

NAFTA

overcome

do

choose the

collective action problems?

See, for instance, the argument presented at a variety of points in Gilligan,

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy,

Politics, Process,

legislators

Constitutional?, 106.

51, 136.

380

Why

and American Trade

5.

Policy, 36.
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Empowering Exporters 10
’

’

.

Answenng
examined

this

in

question

vs.

NAFTA

Non-Geographic

geography matters.

beyond

the case of

requires returning to the factors

we have

each of the previous three cases.

Geographic
that

m

observers of trade policy doubt

Destler points out that the trade literature
“has established,

a reasonable doubt, the responsiveness

interests concentrated within their districts.”^''

In discussing the relative

Few

Benefits.

of individual members

This behavior

is

to constituent

nothing new, of course.

advantage heavy industry had over agricultural producers

securing reciprocal trade provisions late in the

19'*"

century, Gilligan argues that “factors

inherent in industrial production put industry in a
collective action problems and lobby the

in

much

better position to

overcome

government than agriculture enjoyed.”^^^ What

were those factors?
Industry was geographically concentrated in a few states in the Northeast
and the eastern Great Lakes region of the country. Agriculture was spread
over hundreds of thousands of square miles throughout the country often
in areas

In a

of great isolation where communication was very

difficult.

study of the politics of protectionism in the 1970s and 1980s,

the hypothesis that

“more

political

power

is

generated

when an

industry

concentrated in a relatively small number of states or congressional

examined the

relative level

Wendy Hansen
is

tested

geographically

districts.”

When

she

of protection afforded industries whose operations were

Destler, “Congress, Constituencies,

and U.S. Trade Policy,” 93.

Gilligan,

Empowering Exporters,

1

Gilligan,

Empowering Exporters,

1 1

1.
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concentrated in a small number of
states, she found that those
whose operations were

concentrated received more protection.

While

all

these authors agree then that
legislators afford greater protection
to

tnterests that are geographically
concentrated, scholars

who view

fast track

a scheme of presidential dominance
argue that Congress overcomes

problem by delegating authority

to the president to

its

procedures as

collective action

lower trade barriers across industrial

boundaries. Destler, for instance, argues,

For sixty-plus years. Congress has simultaneously
been yielding power on
trade and approving major liberalizing
initiatives.
It has done so while
regularly sounding protectionist-enabling liberal
traders to warn regularly
of the wolf at their door. But somehow the wolf
never gets
in.

Of

if

he

does, he spares most of the sheep.^^^

But

this

view

is far

As discussed

too simplistic.

members of Congress

above,

m adopting fast track procedures,

are not simply accepting that they cannot play
a reasonable part in

trade policy and therefore throwing control over the
policy area over a barrier into the

president

s

hands.

Just as in the case of tax reform,

able to protect the most sensitive

-

where members of Congress were

geographically concentrated

of NAFTA, members of Congress sought

to design

-

tax benefits, in the case

procedures that would allow them

to

lower trade barriers while protecting the most sensitive trade benefits. Scholars who
view
fast track

procedures as a simple delegation of authority to the president to negotiate a

trade agreement and present Congress with an up-or-down vote without

miss the subtle and important steps of the process outlined

Wendy

L.

amendments

in the previous section.

Hansen, “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism,” American

Political Science Review, Vol. 84,

No.

Destler, “Congress, Constituencies,

1

(March 1990),

36.

and U.S. Trade Policy,” 96.
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Legislators designed

groups could

alert

numerous

fire-alann oversight

Congress during the negotiations

mechanisms

to potential negative policy
impacts

before any agreement was signed.
Legislators also designed
a

way

that they

would have

a

to ensure that private

fast track

number of formal avenues and

procedures

opportunities to suspend the

negotiations if the president deviated
too far from congressional
preferences.
legislators interested in

washing

their

wanted

to

make

protecting the most sensitive

-

Why would

hands of the collective action problem
associated

with trade policy provide themselves
with so
that legislators

such

in

many avenues of mlluence? The answer

is

sure they would be able to lower trade
barriers while

geographically concentrated

-

interests.

Thus, while

Destler suggests that Congress has been
involved in a symbolic game, O’Halloran

suggests a more sophisticated understanding of
congressional behavior.

Congress

solution has been to temper

s

its delegation, diluting it with
procedures through which industries can seek
compensation from the
adverse effects of increased competition.
Thus, instead of Congress
legislating itself out of the business of making
product-specific trade laws,
it has gone into the business of
procedural protectionism.

This

latter point is

Nivola

in

undoubtedly a reference

Regulating Unfair Trade.

individual industries have turned

to

arguments such as

Nivola argues

away from

have found a way

in the case

of

made by

Pietro

that legislators seeking to protect

erecting trade barriers and towards erecting

regulatory structures to fight foreign trade practices

argument can be made

that

fast track

deemed

procedures.

unfair.

Legislators, as

to delegate authority to the president to negotiate

while maintaining enough influence over the president

And

to

we

the

same

will see,

lower trade barriers

guarantee that the most

geographically concentrated industries will continue to receive preferential treatment.
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Returning to the case of

NAFTA,

one clear indicator of the
i.nportance of the

geographic concentration of trade
benefits

is

the relative difficulty in
adopting the

enabling legislation for the
agreement on the House and
Senate doors.

McKeown

Timothy

argues,

if, as some argue,
representatives of small districts have a
greater tendency
to support policies that create
costly spill-overs for other districts
(such as
federal construction projects) then
the Senate ought to be on average
^ less

protectionist than the House.^^^

This dynamic played itself out

m

the

House on November

approved the

bill

17,

when

the enabling legislation for

1993 and

m

the Senate on

61-38 while House members approved

it

NAFTA

November

came

20, 1993.

to a vote

Senators

by a narrower margin of 234-

200. Congressional Quarterly explained the
difference this way.

The margin of victory in the Senate was larger in
part because senators
were less susceptible to the pressures that caused many
House members to
vote no. Most states were expected to derive
some benefit from free trade
with Mexico; that was certainly not the case
with every House district.
For example, two of labor’s strongest Democratic
allies - Edward M.
Kennedy of Massachusetts and Tom Harkin of Iowa backed the

agreement because Mexico offered export opportunities for
high-technology or agricultural exports.

their states’

Legislators in both houses also displayed the institution’s
geographical sensitivity by

voting largely along geographical

lines.

fast track negotiating authority in 1991,

divided

more along regional than party

O’Halloran,
387

388

389

Po//?/c.s,

Process,

In considering an extension

of the president’s

Congressional Quarterly reported the House was
lines.

and American Trade

McKeown, “What Forces Shape American Trade

Members from

the west and southern

Policy, 180.

Policy?” 72.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

IX,

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume

VllI,

199

1993-1996, 159.
1989-1992, 189.

border

states, the

southeastern sunbelt, and the midwest
tended to support the measure

while those from areas with
large numbers of union workers,
large numbers of non-

Mexican immigrants, and heavy
manufacturing

sectors tended to oppose

the geographie sensitivity of
the vote, Democratic

members

free to vote their consciences.

House

have been more accurate

to say

it.

Recognizing

leaders essentially declared

House Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA) supported

the pact while the Majority
Leader, Richard Gephardt

David Bonior (D-MI), both opposed

it.

(D-MO), and

the Majority

Rather than voting their consciences,

members were

it

free to vote their constituencies.

Whip,

would
While

business interests spent millions of dollars
attempting to convince wavering members
to
vote for the pact, President Clinton told
business leaders late in October 1993 that their

lobbying strategy was not working.

He

argued,

Ask your employees who support
Congress.

Congress
that

In

short,

work

I

that

ve had as
I

am

this

lobbying say to me,

for the employers, not just

“I

contact their

members of
Democratic members of
want to hear from the people

to

many Republican

from the

as

employers.”^^^'^

geographic constituencies mattered and because the particular
procedures

employed required positive congressional approval, the agent

to

whom power

had been

delegated was forced to negotiate an agreement that protected those
particular interests.

While
influence and

fast track

procedures allowed members of Congress a greater degree of

input on

NAFTA

while

it

was being negotiated than

is

commonly

recognized, the procedures also allowed for a great deal more congressional influence
that
is

commonly recognized even

members were convinced

after

it

was

to support the

negotiated.

measure as a

Indeed, a significant

result

of last-minute concessions

President Clinton quoted in Joshua Mills, “Business Lobbying for Trade Pact Appears to

Congress”

in

New

York Times (November 13, 1993), A28.
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number of

Sway Few

in

.

that offered geographically-concentrated
benefits.

The Clinton administration was

to negotiate a side deal before
the enabling legislation could

language of the original pact to
juice provisions bought a

votes

m

restrict trade in

number of votes

Louisiana and Maryland.

be passed “to reinterpret the

sugar and orange juice.”^‘"

in Florida,

forced

The orange

while the sugar provisions bought

Representatives from Tennessee were appeased

when

the president included their suggestion
in the enabling legislation that only
whisky

produced

in

Tennessee could be labeled “Bourbon Whisky” or “Tennessee
Whisky.”^^'^

Tom

Representative

Lewis (R-FL) agreed

agreed to include tomatoes on the
the market and

list

to support the pact after the administration

of crops subject

to tariffs if imports

two House members from Oklahoma wheat-growing

began flooding

districts

agreed to

support the pact after the president added teeth to a promise to working
towards ending

Canadian government subsidies
wheat.

transportation

and marketing of Canadian

Other members held out for particularistic trade benefits

Representative Esteban Torres

billion for the

pact that

the

for

(D-CA)

led the

way

North American Development Bank

in getting

-

other lawmakers held

out

for a

endowment of $4

funds.^^'^

And lawmakers

$10 million trade policy research

benefits

for

initial

an institution created by the trade

would provide border cleanup and development

Texas got administration support

an

for their districts.

that

had nothing

to

center.

do with trade

Still

at

Congressional Quarterly reported,

Keith Bradsher, “Clinton’s Shopping List for Votes Has Ring of Grocery Buyer’s

Times (November 17, 1993), A21.
O’Halloran,

f’o//n'c5’,

Process,

and American Trade

Bradsher, “Clinton’s Shopping List.

.

A2

Policy, 170.

1

O’Halloran, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy, 171.

201

List’’ in

New

in

York

all.

After announcing his support
for the NAFTA hill, Floyd
got a call front Chnton
tellutg hurt that a Small
pi

o program would he located
so agreed to

let

our purposes,

it

is

hy

NAFTA

clear that this

Lewis (R-FL) complained

strike its deal with him.

he

said.

“It

was

the only

‘T

at its best.

And, importantly

way something hke

this

costs had to be compensated.

that the administration

look with disdain on the

had waited

way

this

for

could be done.
Representative

until the last

minute

to

whole thing has been done,”

almost looks like you’re selling your soul.””'’
Representative Glenn English

(D-OK), one of the members who switched

his vote as a result

argued, ”It’s not a question of buying
votes.

supported the agreement.””’
both

Long

hacker Peter T. King, R-N.Y.^’^

process was a congressional logroll

Members with concentrated geographic

Tom

Queens district. The White House
go forward at Jones Beach on

Ins

a dredging project

Island in response to a request
In short, the

m

H Flake D-N Y
BusLss AdntmLatmn

legislators

This

is

of the wheat concession,

way we could have

the only

Thus, though they had different opinions
of the process,

would agree

that

the

process

worked because members had an

opportunity to protect the most sensitive of
particularistic benefits

-

those that are

geographically concentrated.

T he Scope of

NAFTA

the Policy Area.

in particular, clearly represent

In pointing out the difficulty

International trade agreements in general, and

what

certainly yearn for the

Congressional Quarterly,

Tom

IX.

Volume

Lewis (R-FL) quoted

Representative Glenn English

Volume

study has defined as broad policy areas.

of negotiating a pact as significant

Wiarda argues trade negotiators must

Representati've

this

in

IX.

as

NAFTA,

Floward

good old days.

1993-1996, 158.

Bradsher, “Clinton’s Shopping List...,” A21.

(D-OK) quoted

in

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation

1993-1 996, 158.
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Tariffs used to be the

main concern,

but this was a subject that was
remote
trom most people’s consciousness
and without high political stakes
or
even visibility. A handful of
experts and interest groups got
together

hammered

out

their differences if necessary, and
worked out an agreement!
now, the U.S. and Mexican trade
negotiators must also deal with “hot”
or new agenda” political topics
such as pollution, the environment
drugs
human rights, and democratization. In addition,
the negotiators must deal
wit
subjects such as farm and
industrial subsidies, patents and
ut

trademarks,

industrial

standards,

child
labor,
minimum wages,
unionization and labor rights, government
purchasing, and investment
issues - all areas that are close
to the bone

of national economic

policymaking.

Given the breathtaking breadth of
does,

why

legislators

would

this policy area,

delegate.

We saw,

one

is

led to wonder, as I.M. Destler

for instance, in the similarly broad
policy

area of tax policy, that legislators never even
considered delegating authority as a solution
to their collective action

that

problem.

Congress yields virtually

wonder aloud

at

one point

all

Though Destler

steadfastly,

and incorrectly,

asserts

control over trade policy to the president, he
seems to

why Congress would do

this in

such a broad policy area and

concludes, correctly, that the congressional delegation of authority
has something to do

with the fact that trade agreements are mechanisms offoreign policy.

He

finds

it

difficult

to.

offer a serious explanation of

why Congress behaves

rather differently on,

say, tax policy - where the same Congressional committees are much more
prone to assert their power and distribute particularist benefits. Part of the

may be that our domestic trade policymaking system evolved
under the international auspices of the GATT, now the WTO. This creates
an international constraint on national policy and reinforces the role of the
explanation

President in the U.S. policy process.

Wiarda, “The U.S. Domestic Politics

...,”

119.

Destler, “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy,” 100.
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While Destler overstates the degree
agrees that

Congress
the

it

this foreign policy

is

to delegate.

power

to set

He

to

which Congress has delegated

dimension of trade policy

points out, “after

any trade policy, only

all

authority, Gilligan

that forces

Congress did not delegate

members of

to the president

reduce trade barriers reciprocally with other

to

countries.”'^®®

This point not only explains

remedy

to the

umversahstic

why

logroll,”'^'^'

it

legislators

also explains

congressional approval on trade agreements once
the

first

time

m

the Trade Act of 1974.

chose to delegate “over some other

why

fast track

legislators required positive

procedures were adopted for

As argued above. Congress

is

very careful to

ensure that the trade actions taken by the president
are in line with legislators’
preferences.

It

is

no accident,

therefore, that at the

same time Congress expanded

president s negotiating authority to include non-tariff barriers,

it

the

reserved for itself a

requirement of positive congressional approval of any negotiated trade agreement.
short,

and

because the policy area

to restrict that delegation

that pattern

we

expect Congress to delegate only

of authority as much as possible.

What we

if

see

it

is

has to

exactly

of behavior.

The Moment

moment

broad,

is

In

in political

NAFTA. A

first

in Political

Time. There are number of ways

which the

time offered opportunities and constraints that led

important question that

why members of Congress would want
to a variety

in

of trends

in the

is

answered by the moment

to liberalize trade at

second half of the century

Gilligan,

Empowering Exporters,

6.

Gilligan,

Empowering Exporters,

10.
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all.

that

to the

particular

enactment of

in political

time

is

Michael Gilligan points

made

it

more

politically

profitable to vote for free trade.

He

argues that the global

interdependent, that American foreign
policy increasingly

search for export markets, and that
the rise of the Cold

would be used

to stabilize

that an increasingly

economies

m

economy

came

to

War meant

friendly nations.^^'

is

inereasmgly

be dominated by the
that trade concessions

Finally, Gilligan also argues

powerful export lobby began competing
with the groups lobbying for

protection of their industries so that
the interest group playing field
became, relatively

speaking,

dominant

more

The

level.

political

force.

result

In

of

all

particular,

this

was

by the

that free trade as

late

an idea became a

when

1980s,

legislators

began

considering trade barriers with Mexico, there
“was a growing sense that trade barriers

must be relaxed.”^®^

In his study

Gary Mucciarom found
pre

of a variety of policy areas over long periods of
time,

that despite increased global competition

and a breakdown of the

1970s free trade coalition, “protectionism’s advance
has been contained,” both

because of favorable institutional arrangements and “an
liberal trade.”'^®'^

among

He

intellectual

commitment

to

concludes, “free trade remains a cherished (albeit tarnished)
ideal

policy experts and top policymakers while protectionism remains
discredited.”'^®^

Indeed, in his research on trade policy in the 1980s, Pietro
Nivola found that legislators

who opposed
legislator

Gilligan,

who

free trade initiatives felt positively ostracized.

Nivola reported

voted against the extension of fast track authority

in

Empowering Exporters,

1

Inc.,

felt that.

1.

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume
Congressional Quarterly,

1991

1990), 148.

Mucciaroni, Reversals of Fortune, 105-106.
Mucciaroni, Reversals of Fortune, 96.
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VII,

1985-1988 (Washington D.C.;

that

one

,

almost a shameful thing,” he coneluded,
“to be labeled a
That agreeable generalization may
not last forever, but
neither should it be dismissed
as prematurely passe.'^®^’
IS

pro ectiomst ”

More
beeome
the

important, for our purposes, than the
faet that free trade as an idea
had

popular, the partieular procedures
utilized to enact

moment

m

political time.

As was discussed

earlier, the

NAFTA

were also a

result

of

concept of the congressional-

executive agreement as a method of
enacting international agreements was a
relatively

new

innovation.

enacted

if

it

Ackerman and Golove argue

had been submitted as a treaty and

1937, Roosevelt would have submitted
that

that

he had a choice

it

NAFTA

that “if

would

NAFTA

likely not

have been

had been negotiated

as a treaty to the Senate without recognizing

in the matter.”^^'^

Fast track procedures

were also necessary because

particularly decentralized Congress. Nivola argues
that

it

was being enacted by

by the mid 1980s,

access points in Congress abounded.

Responsibility for managing trade
had once been concentrated in the Senate Finance and House
Ways and
Means committees by virtue of their primary jurisdiction over tariffs. As
trade questions moved beyond tariffs and conceptions
of malfeasance
changed, however, legislative power flowed downward to subcommittees

and outward

in

to other panels.

At one time the chairmen of the two taxwriting committees could control the contents of trade bills. Now the
cast
of characters and the agendas they were trying to advance were becoming
longer because of new, more complicated policy requirements and because
of increased staff support and opportunities
Participation

spread

to

include

Committee (domestic content,

the

for political aggrandizement.

House

Energy

and

certification standards), the

Commerce

House Foreign

Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees (foreign loans, export
controls), the Judiciary committees (antitrust reciprocity), the banking

committees (financial services, foreign investment, the Export-Import
Bank), the agriculture committees (farm trade), the armed services

Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, 149.

Ackerman and Golove,

Is

NAFTA

Constitutional? 60.
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a

committees (procurement codes), and
so forth. Trade bills had always
been potential legislative Christmas
trees, but weaker
gatekeepers, multiple referrals, and

congressional

new parliamentary nonns

““W

to?"
As

a result,

in

addition to “regulating unfair trade,”
as a substitute for legislating,

members of Congress
procedures.

retired

There, even

at

power

the relative safety and predictability
of fast track

to

thts

members of Congress could have
the formal

that invited

be hung on

decentralized

moment

in

the

institution’s

history,

input on the substance of a free trade
agreement, have

to accept or reject the agreement,

and keep the enabling legislation from

dying a death of a thousand pinpricks.

Conclusion

The

NAFTA

fact that

Congress has not granted

was enacted

policymaking

is

worthy of our

fast track authority to the president since

attention.

institutions that suggest presidents

Theories

Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate

to

studies of trade policy have failed to recognize

American

trade policy has

become more

trade

dominate trade policy or those

suggest interest groups dominate American trade policymaking

Sharyn O’Halloran points out, “this might seem

of American

fail

commerce with

that

to recall that the

foreign nations.

As

be a simple point, but most previous
its

significance.”'^”*^

liberalized as a result

of the

In

rise

arguing that

of exporter

lobbying, Michael Gilligan agrees with O’Halloran’s view of the congressional delegation

of trade policymaking power.

Congress did not delegate, as presidential dominance

Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, 97-99.
409

Polities, Process,

and American Trade

Policy,
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ix.

(heorists argue, to take itself out

arrangements

is

of the trade game.

Rather the choice of institutional

seen by Gilligan as an assertion of
congressional power.

specifically, delegation did iwt insulate

He

Congress from constituency pressures

-

argues,

instead

it

transformed those pressures to include a voice for
liberalization from exporters.”^'® Even
I.M.

Destler,

members’

who

argues that in enacting fast track procedures
“Congress has tied

hands,”'^" concedes that in order to continue
liberalizing global trade in the

future,

there needs to be a close executive-congressional
working relationship in
support of open trade policy.
Specifically, this means close ties and

mutual responsiveness between USTR and the two key trade
committees.
Senate Finance and House Ways and Means.*^'^

So even

for Destler, in recent years, the president appears to

be playing a

lesser role in

trade policymaking.

Thus, while this chapter began with what appeared to be a paradox,
with a confirmation of our hypotheses.

Congress would delegate authority

in the case

authority in the case of tax reform.

action problem

in

is

commonly

Gilligan,

three-fold.

We

of

this chapter,

NAFTA when

Both eases are attempts

a broad policy area

geographically dispersed.

paradox

At the beginning of

have seen

First, legislators

where

to

particularistic

that the

key

to

it

it

we

has ended

asked

why

chose not to delegate

overcome
benefits

understanding

a collective

are

relatively

this apparent

delegated far less power to the president than

is

understood. Congress constructed elaborate fire-alarm oversight mechanisms.

Empowering Exporters,

10.

Destler, “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy,” 95.

Destler, “Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Trade Policy,” 101.
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provided

Itself

negotiators,

agreement

with numerous opportunities to

and required

that

to take effect.

that they

In

short,

positive congressional

legislator preferences clear to

action

must be taken

for

any

Second, where particularistic benefits were
geographically

concentrated, and therefore
protecting their interests.

make

more

sensitive to legislators, legislators

were

fully capable

Finally, the only reason legislators delegated
authority at

were seeking foreign trade concessions and

of

all, is

this required executive negotiation.

as this study has hypothesized, rather
than evading responsibility through

delegation, the institutional

collective action

mechanism Congress adopted

problem involved

utilized in tax reform than

is

in

commonly

NAFTA

is far

understood.

triumph than congressional abdication.
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to

more

NAFTA

overcome

the particular

similar to the

is far

more

mechanisms

a congressional

CHAPTER

7

CONCLUSION

The question
procedures they do

at

in

the heart of this study

why

is

legislative leaders

choose the

attempting to overcome collective action problems.

studies of base closure, tax reform, nuclear
waste disposal siting, and

exposed a number of factors

have also provided insights

that help us to

that are

of use

answer

in the

this question.

The case

NAFTA

have

But the case studies

debate between the competing schools of

thought on legislative institutions and behavior and insights on
the nature of legislative
delegation.

This

study

began

with

a

review

of the

debate

between

the

distributive,

infomiational, and party-centered models of legislative institutions and behavior.
the distributive school of thought has

works
“bring

is

not a matter of dispute.

home

the

bacon”

to

It

their

committees and subcommittees

that

is

much

to offer in

no doubt the case

districts

and,

in

understanding

That

how Congress

that legislators regularly seek to

so doing, seek appointments to

can serve as a means to that end.

But

this

study has

also validated the critique of the distributive school of thought offered by infomiational

and party-centered models.

Legislative leaders do, in fact, sometimes seek to enact

policies that confer general, diffuse benefits while imposing particularistic costs.

legislative leaders

who

are successful in enacting these policies are not alone.

not impose procedural strategies on an unwilling public.

210

They do

Rank-and-file legislators are

active co-conspirators in these undertakings because legislative institutions, as

seen, arc routinely a matter of majoritarian choice.

And

we have

The debate about whether
thought

is

a

the informational or the
party-centered school of

more accurate model of congressional
behavior continues and

cannot claim to have resolved
supportive of both camps.

it.

this

study

Indeed the cases studied have
provided evidence

For instance, the case of base closure
appears

claims of the informational models.

to vindicate the

Party leaders did not play a significant
role in the

process and legislators actively sought
to construct a process as free from
partisan
influence as possible.

cartel

would seek

While the party-centered model would predict

to protect

members of the

outsiders, nothing of the sort happened.

within the House of Representatives
sensitive issue

-

-

cartel

and impose the

that a legislative

particularistic costs

on

Indeed, the leading force behind base closures
the

chamber where base closures was

was Rep. Richard Armey (R-TX),

a

member of the House

a

more

minority.

On

the other hand, the cases of tax refomi and
nuclear waste disposal offered evidence

supporting the claims of party-centered models.

Rostenkowski,

Speaker

expressed concerns

at

Foley,

Chairman

In the case

Packwood,

and

of tax reform. Chairman
President

accounted for by informational models of legislative choice.
nuclear waste disposal,

we saw

worked

to

that partisan

Moreover,

bid.

in the

case of

leaders intervened for similar reasons.

And,

in 1998,

in a

nod

to then-

Speaker Gingrich kept a

bill

off the floor that would have set up a temporary nuclear waste

in a

nod

to Representative

commodity cannot be

keep nuclear waste out of New Hampshire

Vice President George Bush’s presidential

(D-NV)

each

various points that their party not be seen to be the party that killed

tax reform. This concern over party labels as an important electoral

President Reagan

Reagan

site at

Yucca Mountain

John Ensign (R-NV), who was challenging Senator Harry Reid

for his Senate seat that year.
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While these anecdotes provide support

remembered

Rohde

that the party-centered

model has

for the claims

of both camps,

greater explanatory llexibility.

it

is

to

he

As David

argues, “the distributive, infonnational, and
partisan perspectives are not mutually

exclusive but apply to different issues and institutions
in different contexts.”'"^

m Aldrich and Rohde’s formulation, the party-centered model
party government. In their view then,

work more

is

it

least

referred to as conditional

plausible that Congress does indeed sometimes

as informational theorists say

centered models suggest.

is

At

it

does and sometimes works more as party-

Thus, because infonnational models of legislative behavior

cannot account for the role played by partisan leaders and partisan
institutions displayed
in the

cases presented here, this study must conclude more closely aligned with
party-

centered models.

This study has also yielded useful insights on the nature of congressional
delegation.

Students of congressional delegation frequently ask

why and

under what

circumstances legislators delegate authority by examining cases in which Congress has

While some view congressional delegation of authority

delegated.

others have a

at

more sympathetic view of

virtually

it,

the beginning, congressional delegation as a

the extent to

which Congress has delegated

of extra-congiessional procedures

-

David W. Rohde, “Parties and Committees
Arrangements”

all

fact.

at all.

negatively"^'

and

scholars assume, as this study did

Rarely reassessed

in these cases is

This study began with an observation

cases in which Congress appeared to delegate

in the

in Legislative Studies Quarterly,

House:

Member

Motivations, Issues, and Institutional

XIX, 3 (August 1994), 341.

See, for instance, Theodore Lowi, The Etui of Liberalism, Second Edition (New York; Norton, 1979)
and James Sundquist, The Decline ami Resurgence of Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1981).
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authority to ad hoc institutions to
frame policy altematives for a particular
policy problem
at

a particular

delegation,

I

moment

m

have found

time.

While base closure and

NAFTA

they are far less e.r/m-congressional
than

that

assumed. For instance, the standard
interpretation of trade policy

m

particular,

is

who

is

and so

-

in this

legislators delegate

policymaking authority

understood to be institutionally

immune

to

delegated

what authority they did

characteristics of the policy problem.

in significant

instance, legislators

ways

its

that are not

imposed requirements

would be too high

that guides this study

-

of the

amount of

NAFTA
in

commonly recognized
in the first

to recover quickly.

collectively

the president

problem.

foreign

-

But

policy

where

was

or understood.

round of closures

would have

For

that ruled out

to

be shown to

whose cleanup and

Thus, the question of delegation

Why, when confronted with

remains relevant.

which

authority, that delegation

costs within 6 years, effectively ruling out large bases

relocation costs

and

commonly understood and

because

foreign bases for consideration and required that any closure

recover

an agent

is

originally

Similarly, in the case of base closure,

legislators clearly delegated a relatively greater

tempered

-

to the collective action

delegate

1

problem

case particularistic protectionism

legislators delegated far less authority to the
president than is

only

in general,

that legislators are confronted with
a collective action

individually rational behavior

irrational

remain examples of

similar policy

problems, do legislators sometimes choose to delegate authority and sometimes choose

to

handle the matter internally?

to

examine the complexity and
lumping cases

into

But the cases presented here suggest scholars need
subtleties

one category or the

high-level nuclear waste site

of

legislative delegation

other.

closely before

At quick glance, the process by which a

was chosen might appear

213

more

to

be a case

in

which Congress

delegated authority to the
in

Chapter

5,

DOE

what appeared

initial step in a

to

to

choose the technically superior

be a delegation of authority

before scholars ask

why

legislators

to look closely at the knot.

It

would ever

this

study

fits

we

to the

mam

action problems and

of the Congress

to

why do

its

own

really just an

own.

In short,

hands, they need

into the legislative behavior literature and

question with which this study

sometimes employ extra-congressional

on

was

think.

the literature on congressional delegation out of
the way,

back

site

voluntarily tie their

usually isn’t as tight as

With debates over where

DOE

to the

process by which Congress effectively chose
a

But, as described

site.

is

it

is

useful to turn our attention

Why

concerned.

legislative procedures in

do

overcoming

legislators

collective

they sometimes use the internal institutions and procedures

accomplish similar ends? While a quantifiable answer eludes

independent variable and other factors examined

us, the

study have each proven to be

in this

important determinants of procedural choice.

Geographic Versus Non-Geographic Benefits
This study has served as empirical support of an important point implied by
Arnold.

Arnold argues

that the distinction

between

particularistic costs

are geographically-concentrated and those that are not

is

barriers.*^

where

that

useful because geographically-

concentrated groups that receive the benefits or pay the costs

directly represented in

and benefits

are,

by

definition,

more

Congress and have an easier time overcoming organizational

Throughout the cases examined

in this study,

we found

countless examples

legislators did indeed display greater sensitivity to geographically-concentrated

214

costs and benefits.

important role
to

draw up

a

And

importantly,

m procedural

list

choice.

of military bases

geographically-concentrated as to

Congress impossible.

In

the Congress took over

congressional delegation.

Mexico and Canada,

found that

this

enhanced

Legislators, for instance, chose to delegate
authority
to

be closed because the costs of the policy were
so

make

the possibility of handling the matter within

would leave

In

designing procedures to enact a free trade agreement with

legislators

were sure

to leave

would be able

tellingly, in the case

to

site for the nation,

10 years to finally gang up on Nevada’s small and weak

themselves leverage

to protect the

at a variety

of

most sensitive trade benefits

those that are geographically concentrated in their states and

perhaps most

sensitivity played an

choosing a single high-level nuclear waste

points in the process so that they

-

we

Finally,

and

of tax reform, legislators settled on a procedure

that

districts.

themselves the tough choices about which tax expenditures would be

spared and which would be eliminated. Again,

it

was

the geographically-concentrated tax

expenditures that were advantaged.

The

sensitivity

of geographically-concentrated costs and benefits thus has two

implications for students of collective action problems in Congress.
for cuts in particularistic benefits or

to

search

expansion of particularistic costs, geographically-

concentrated benefits and costs do have a privileged position.

do decide

First, in the

impose geographically-concentrated

authority to impose those costs.

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 26.
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costs,

Second, when legislators

they are likely to delegate

The Scope of the Policy Aren
This study has suggested a distinction
between “broad” and

“nanow”

Despite the lack of a quantifiable
index of the scope of policy areas,

is

it

policy areas.

clear from the

evidence presented here that the relative
broadness or narrowness of a policy
area
important determinant

procedural choice.

in

likely to delegate authority in
a

All other things equal, legislators
are

narrow policy area and

less likely to delegate in a

is

an

more
broad

policy area because of the difference
in the ability of legislators to
contain agency losses

m

the

two

different types of areas.

narrow policy area both

m

terms of

Because military
its

installations policy is a relatively

impact and

fiscal

its

relative lack

of impact on

other policy areas, legislators found delegation
an attractive procedural alternative.

On

the other hand, because reforming the
tax code impacted virtually every policy
area and

had the potential
legislators never

NAFTA,

to

touch virtually every penny the

even seriously considered delegating authority. Similarly,

legislators only delegated the authority they

international negotiations.

had

That legislators chose not

factors impacting procedural choice than

of legislators
policy area

to

the easier

whom power

agency losses

it

is

has been

is

to delegate in the case

216

of nuclear

area.

It

make

preferences.

on

does about the scope of the policy
is

tells

more accurate

a precondition

to

case of

other

to contain those losses

delegated

in the

more about

areas do not require delegation.

to contain

is,

it

collects,

to delegate in order to carry

waste disposal despite the narrow nature of the policy area

Narrow policy

government

federal

us

to say that the ability

of delegation. The more narrow a

because there

policy

in

is less

conflict

room

with

for agents

legislators’

The Moment
It

Timp

in Politic^]

equally clear from the cases examined
in this study that the political
calendar

IS

impacts the question of procedural
choice.

Legislative

leaders

were consistently

constrained in their procedural choices by
both the electoral calendar and the history
of
institutional

development within particular policy

instance, advocates of the

president

m

legislators

among

the

commission process argued

In the case

that the

White House offered an unusual opportunity

would otherwise be more

legislators

hesitant to

do

so.

More

of base closure,

for

presence of a lame duck

to delegate authority

when

importantly, the perception

of a history of abuse of the base closure process by
presidents and the

Pentagon constrained the choices of agents
closed could be delegated.

independent commission

development.

areas.

One cannot

in the case

Similarly, the

revenue-neutral tax reform

to

whom power

understand

why

to

determine the bases to be

legislators

chose to create an

of base closure without understanding

Ways and Means Committee was

that historical

able to draft a significant

1986 because of institutional developments

bill in

in the years

prior to tax reform that strengthened the Committee’s ability to resist
the particularistic

demands of Gucci Gulch.”
cleared the

way

for

Congress

nuclear waste repository.

to

It is

Senator Paul Laxalt’s (R-NV) departure from the Senate
to

choose Yucca Mountain as the nation’s sole high-level

quite possible Nevada’s delegation

hold out longer with the aid of the President’s closest friend

would have been able

in the Senate.

Finally,

reverse fast track procedures, added because of legislators’ displeasure with President

Reagan’s handling of the U.S

-

Canada Free Trade Agreement, were an important

insurance factor in a close vote for legislators deciding whether to reauthorize
authority during the negotiation of NAFTA.
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fast track

The moment
choice.

m

time thus captures an important element of
procedural

political

Legislators are constrained both

actions and

by

by

institutional

developments

the electoral landscape they expect to
confront in the

m

base closure advocates

the

that precede their

coming

years, .lust as

mid-1980s were constrained by a perceived history of

Pentagon abuse, base closure advocates today are
constrained by a perceived history of
abuse of the commission process by the Clinton
administration. The procedural options
available are not what they were a decade ago because
of institutional developments that

have occurred

in the interim.

Existence of a Powerful Champion

A

less-emphasized but potentially important factor examined in

existenee of legislative leaders

who

cuts in favor of general benefits.

It

legislative behavior, the legislator

are willing to

isn’t

who

this

champion the cause of

hard to imagine

that, in

study

is

the

particularistic

any reasonable model of

seeks to impose costs on particular, identifiable

fellow legislators’ districts in favor of a general benefit for which few will be able to
credibly claim credit

is

unlikely to be popular. Yet the existence of such a character

important precondition of the pursuit of an internal procedural strategy.

attracted

no such person and delegation was the procedural answer.

eventually attracted the votes of

particularly interested in

it

was

some

different dynamics, however.

an

Base closure

While

NAFTA

party and committee leaders, none of them was

becoming the champion of the

the President’s fight.

is

free trade agreement.

Tax reform and nuclear waste
Tax reform

attracted all of the

In the end,

disposal displayed very

key

legislative leaders

including Speaker O’Neill, Chairman Rostenkowski, Chairman Packwood, and President

218

Reagan.
credit to

One

reason for this was that the general
benefit was so large that there
was

be claimed for being connected with the
popular

legislation.

Nuclear waste

disposal attracted legislative leaders
including Chairman Johnston, Speaker
Wright, and

Majority Leader Foley,
out of their

not

own

states.

why powerful

who were

each attempting

legislative leaders

championed these causes but just

The One,
final

waste in Nevada

the

became

Few, and the

that they did.

was

Containing costs to one location makes

to bear the

As

localities.

easier for legislators to

-

fewer legislators object

For

to determine a site for a national nuclear waste repository

discussed

above,

particularistic costs in favor

legislators

employing procedural

of general benefits are more

particularistic costs are geographically-concentrated,

relatively narrow,

when an

when

burden of

it

and a greater number of legislators are supportive as they are off the hook

compensate smaller numbers of

is

The case of nuclear waste

avoid delegation both because of the legislative math involved

easier to

is

With

important factor examined in this study that impacts
procedural choice

particularistic costs.

it

Many

disposal differed from base closure in that only one location

were able

keep

realistic possibilities.

the quantity of particularistic groups that are impacted.

becomes

to

Regardless of motivation, however, the important
point here

these well-situated champions, internal
procedures

A

to stick the

-

and because

it

this reason, legislators

on

their

own.

strategies

to

likely to delegate

impose

when

the

the scope of the policy area

is

agent can be found or created without a history of abusing the
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.

process,

issue,

when powerful

legislative leaders cannot

and when a greater rather than smaller number
of particularistic groups
Speaking more generally of strategies

legislative

roadblocks,

utilized

fit

by

will

legislative leaders to

Douglas Arnold argues, “there are no universal

appropriate for any proposal under any conditions.
to

be found internally to champion the

Leaders must

the idiosyncrasies of specific policy
proposals.”""’

“it

depends.”

hurt.

overcome
strategies,

tailor general strategies

This study has vindicated

Arnold’s view but has offered more in response to the
legislative leader

proceed than Arnold’s apparent answer of

be

who

asks

how

Legislators can close military

bases, close special interest tax loopholes, designate a site
as a national nuclear waste

and overcome

their particularistic proclivities in trade policy

We

that those right conditions are diverse, explainable,

of

have seen

legislative leaders to construct.

understanding of

legislative process.

how

a bill

becomes

party leaders but also individual senators

-

-

and within the power

especially congressional majority

now have more
It is

Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action, 91
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choices, and the alternatives

the

to a better understanding

processes.”

Sinclair,

under the right conditions.

a law no longer describes the contemporary

they choose lead to different legislative processes.”"’^

way

site,

Barbara Sinclair has suggested that our textbook

She argues, “congressional actors

study has contributed in some

to

hope of the author

that this

of those “different legislative
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